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SURVEY SECTION
Administrative Law. Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of
Public Utilities & Carriers, 824 A.2d 1282 (R.I. 2003). The stan-
dard to determine whether a commercial entity's planning
amounts to a practice, act or service subject to the authority of the
Division of Public Utilities and Carriers of the State of Rhode Is-
land is based on whether a substantial step towards the comple-
tion of the said entity's goal has been taken. Secondly, the
grandfather clause in section 39-3-4 does not allow an entity
carte blanche to provide any new service. Rather, material
changes that substantially alter the service provided for in the
original certificate require a new Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Interstate Navigation Co. d/b/a The Block Island Ferry ("In-
terstate") and Island Hi-Speed Ferry, LLC ("Hi-Speed") are two
competing ferry services that provide transportation between
Galilee and Block Island.' On February 20, 1998, Hi-Speed filed
for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN")
from the Division of Public Utilities and Carriers of the State of
Rhode Island ("Division") to commence high-speed ferry service to
and from Block Island.2 This new high-speed service would pro-
vide a smoother ride in half the time.3
Interstate and the Town of New Shoreham ("Town") inter-
vened at the CPCN hearing.4 During the hearing, Interstate's
President, Susan Linda, refused to answer several inquiries about
Interstate's future plans to provide high-speed service to Block Is-
land, citing confidentiality and Fifth Amendment privileges.5 Ul-
timately, the Division approved High-Speed's application for the
CPCN.6 Interstate and the Town appealed to the Superior Court.
The superior court upheld the issuance of the CPCN, but re-
1. Interstate Nav. Co. v. Div. of Pub. Util. & Carriers, 824 A.2d 1282,
1284 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1284-85.
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manded with instructions to set a reasonable effective period for
the certificate. 7
On April 2, 1999, while the appeal was pending, the Division
began an investigation of Interstate for acting "deceptively when it
denied its interest in entering the high-speed ferry market during
Hi-Speed's initial CPCN hearing."8 The Division determined that
Mrs. Linda's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and her
claim of confidentiality were unfounded. 9 The Division concluded
that Interstate, through the actions of Mrs. Linda, "obstructed the
regulatory process of the Division in violation of G.L. 1956 § 39-2-
8."1o The Division imposed a $22,000 civil penalty - $1,000 for
each question Mrs. Linda refused to answer." Inferring from Mrs.
Linda's failure to respond, the Division found that Interstate "had
engaged in the act of planning an entrance into the high speed-
ferry market" and banned Interstate from doing so for three
years. 12 After this three-year moratorium, Interstate would be re-
quired to apply for a CPCN if it still desired to provide high-speed
ferry service. 13
Interstate and the town appealed to the superior court pursu-
ant to the statute.14 The superior court overturned the Division's
order, concluding that "the Division exceeded its statutory author-
ity when it imposed the three-year moratorium" and required In-
terstate to apply for a CPCN for entry into the high-speed ferry
business. 15 Further, the court reduced the $22,000 fine to $1,000.16
The Division and Hi-Speed filed separate appeals and were both
granted certiorari by the Rhode Island Supreme Court on April 19,
2002.17
7. Id. at 1285.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court focused on three areas: 1)
the civil penalty of $22,000; 2) whether the Division had statutory
authority to require Interstate to apply for a CPCN despite a
statutory grandfather clause; and 3) whether Interstate's actions
of engaging in planning a high-speed ferry service amounts to a
"practice, act, or service," and warrants a three year prohibition by
the Division. The supreme court upheld the trial court on the first
issue and overturned on the second and third.
As stated, Interstate was fined $22,000 - $1,000 for each of
twenty-two questions Mrs. Linda refused to answer at Hi-Speed's
CPCN hearing. The Division, according to section 39-2-8, is al-
lowed to fine up to $1,000 for failure to perform a legal duty.'8 The
supreme court agreed with the Division stating, "Mrs. Linda's
failure to candidly answer the questions posed to her constituted
chicanery of the most deceptive sort."19 However, the court held
that the Division "overstepped its statutory authority in imposing
a $1,000 fine for each question."20 The court determined that each
question was of a similar nature and refused to "read slight varia-
tions of the same basic question" as separate breaches of Inter-
state's legal duty.21 The court affirmed the superior court's
imposition of a $1,000 fine.
On the issue of whether the Division had authority to require
Interstate to apply for a new CPCN to provide high-speed ferry
service, the supreme court overturned the superior court based on
statutory interpretation. "Section 39-3-3 states that 'no common
carrier of persons and/or property operating upon water between
termini in this state shall hereafter furnish or sell its services
unless the common carrier shall first have made application to
and obtained from the division certifying that public convenience
and necessity required the services."' 22 Section 39-3-4, however,
contains a grandfather clause which states that if a common car-
rier was incorporated before April 30, 1954, then "it is entitled to a
18. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-2-8 (2002).
19. Interstate, 824 A.2d at 1287.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-3-3 (2002)).
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CPCN as a matter of right without participating in a public hear-
ing."23
Interstate was incorporated prior to April 30, 1954. The supe-
rior court broadly interpreted this grandfather clause as "giving
Interstate carte blanche to provide any new kind of ferry service
because the carrier was operating before April 30, 1954."24 The
supreme court, however, took a narrow approach, holding that the
grandfather clause in section 39-3-4 only provided the benefit of
not requiring a public hearing for the initial granting of a CPCN.
The court decided that "material changes... that substantially
alter the service provided for in the original certificate" require a
new CPCN, and that providing high-speed ferry service was such
a substantial change.25 Therefore, Interstate would need to peti-
tion for a new CPCN before it could enter into this new service.
The last issue was whether Interstate's actions of "engaging
in planning," followed by Mrs. Linda's bad faith refusal to answer
questions at the hearing, amounted to a "practice, act, or service"
subject to sanction by the Division. The superior court held that
Interstate's action did not meet such a threshold and, therefore,
the Division had overstepped its jurisdiction. The supreme court
agreed with the trial court's interpretation of section 39-4-10,
which authorizes the Division to regulate carriers "if it finds that
'any... practice, act or service. .. is unjust, unreasonable, insuf-
ficient, preferential, unjustly, (or] discriminatory."' 26 The court
held, however, that the superior court judge erred in his applica-
tion of the statute and reversed.
The court analyzed whether "planning" falls within the scope
of section 39-4-10. The court turned to criminal law for assis-
tance, and looked at the standard used to determine criminal at-
tempt. For a person to be found guilty of attempt by planning or
preparation of an unlawful act that is never actually committed,
that person must take a "substantial step" toward the completion
of their goal.27 The court found that Interstate's test riding of Hi-
Speed's ferry, along with several inquiries into the price and speci-
fications of that service, was "a substantial step toward deciding
23. Id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-3-4 (2002)).
24. Id. at 1288.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1289 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-4-10 (2002)).
27. Id. at 1289-90 (citing State v. Ferreira, 463 A.2d 129, 132 (R.I. 1983)).
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whether to ultimately acquire ... high-speed service."28 Because
Interstate's planning was a "substantial step" and should be con-
sidered a "practice, act, or service" the Division had the "authority
under section 39-4-10 to impose the three-year moratorium on In-
terstate."29
COMMENTARY
The court correctly decided one of the issues, but with its
other two holdings it created some uncertainty and revealed an
underlying flaw in the administrative hearing process. The affir-
mation of the lower court's fee reduction to $1,000 makes sense.
Because the questions to Mrs. Linda were posed at the same hear-
ing, on the same day, and were substantially the same, imposing a
per-question fine is unfair.30 The Division would be in a position to
ask an unlimited amount of questions for the purpose of increas-
ing the amount of any fines. The court correctly decided that re-
fusal to answer all twenty-two questions fell under the same legal
duty and warranted a single fine.
The next issue involved the Division's authority to require In-
terstate to apply for a new CPCN to provide high-speed ferry ser-
vice. The court correctly held that if there is a material change to
the existing CPCN, regardless of the date of incorporation, the
carrier must apply for a new CPCN. As the court states, if the
grandfather clause is construed broadly, a carrier such as Inter-
state will have "carte blanche" to create any new types of services
it wants. The court's narrow interpretation is therefore an accu-
rate interpretation of the legislature's intent in regulating these
services. Giving free reign to certain companies would frustrate
this intent to regulate services through a CPCN.
However, applying the court's own rule to Interstate's service
raises another question: Is the creation of high-speed service a
material change? The court asserted that "Interstate's original
CPCN did not and could not have contemplated the new, high-
speed technology" and that "Interstate's use of such a substan-
tially different service naturally would be a material alteration."31
28. Id. at 1290.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1287.
31. Id. at 1288.
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Whether high-speed service is a material change is a question for
a fact-finder, so the court relied on the determination of the Divi-
sion. 32 Interstate is not altering its service to accommodate a dif-
ferent location; it is simply increasing the delivery speed of its
existing service through technology. If Interstate decided to oper-
ate its existing ferries at a slower speed, would this be a material
change?
The holding that Interstate's actions of "engaging in plan-
ning" high-speed service subject it to the authority of the Division,
creates two issues: 1) whether the "substantial step" standard ap-
plied by the court is appropriate; and 2) whether the facts of the
case actually arise to a "substantial step." The court uses a crimi-
nal attempt standard to judge the business planning actions of a
company. Treating a criminal and a company similarly may result
in unintended consequences. Under this standard, a company
could be brought before an agency and sanctioned for simply plan-
ning a new venture. As a result a chill in business planning could
occur.
Even in a criminal context, "to establish the exact placement
of the dividing line where preparation ends and attempt begins"
has been described as a "quagmire."33 In fact, the term "substan-
tial step" differs depending on the nature and the type of crime be-
ing committed. 34 As Justice Kelleher explained in State v.
Latraverse, "[L]iability for a relatively remote preparatory act is
precluded, but at the same time dangerous individuals may be
lawfully apprehended at an earlier stage of their nefarious enter-
prises than would be possible under the [other] approaches."35
Here, the court applies the standard outside the realm of criminal
law. Certainly society wishes to discourage the actions of crimi-
nals to prevent unlawful acts, even if the crime does not actually
32. There is a fundamental flaw in the administrative hearing process in
Rhode Island. See generally Daniel W. Majcher, Administrative Injustice: The
Rhode Island State Agency Hearing Process and a Recommendation for
Change, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv 735 (2004). The question of materiality
should be decided by a neutral fact-finder. The Division is not neutral and is
a party in the current dispute. Reliance on the Division's findings, therefore,
creates the appearance of impropriety and possible inequity.
33. State v. Latraverse, 443 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I. 1982).
34. Id. at 895.
35. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01, comment at 47 & 48, (Tent.
Draft No. 101960)).
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occur. However, should a capitalist society discourage a company
from business planning in the same manner it discourages a
criminal from committing a crime? Applying this standard in a
non-criminal, commercial setting is harsh and may chill a com-
pany's ability to plan for future business needs. This application
therefore seems inappropriate.
Even if this is the correct standard, the question of whether
Interstate's actions constitute a "substantial step" is an issue of
fact. The court again relies on the findings of fact by the Division,
when it asserts that taking multiple trips and inquiring about
prices and specifications rises to this level. The court ignores the
fact that Interstate, having taken these actions, may ultimately
decide that it has no interest in pursuing a high-speed ferry ser-
vice. Even if Interstate does decide to pursue high-speed services,
these actions may still easily fall under a category of garden-
variety business planning. By relying on the Division's finding
that these actions constitute planning, the court creates law that
could potentially impact the Rhode Island business community.
The problem may lie far deeper than the court's decision. The
Rhode Island administrative hearing process is inherently flawed,
creating difficulty for the courts. In fact, the court is caught in a
situation which can only be described as a "Catch-22." The court
may either follow the standard used in agency appeals by not sub-
stituting its own judgment for that of the agency, and end up with
inequity, or it may inappropriately use its own judgment (as the
superior court did here) and deliver presumed justice.36
36. The superior court overturned the Division's findings of fact. On ap-
peal from an agency, the superior court judge "shall not substitute [his or
her] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on ques-
tions of fact." Interstate, 824 A.2d at 1286 (citing Rocha v. State Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 694 A.2d 722, 725 (R.I. 1997)). The decision of the agency must be
upheld if it is supported by "legally competent evidence on the record." Id.
(citing Rocha, 694 A.2d at 725). The superior court may only reverse an
agency decision if "substantial rights.. . have been prejudiced because the
administrative findings... are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error or law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substan-
tial evidence on the whole record; or,
20041 779
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The hearing officer making factual determinations during a
hearing is an employee of the Division.37 The superior court and
later the supreme court are put in a position of relying on the find-
ings of fact from a potentially biased source: the Division's em-
ployee--one who is writing a decision that must be approved by
his or her superior. Moreover, if a material issue of fact arises (as
it did in determining whether the new high-speed ferry is a mate-
rial change, and whether Interstate's planning constituted a "sub-
stantial step"), the court would be forced to remand the issue back
to the agency-in essence, the court would require one of the par-
ties in a lawsuit to decide the outcome. Such a hearing process is
flawed and gives rise to issues of bias and the appearance of im-
propriety, which undermine the administrative hearing process. 3s
One solution is to create a new process, as other states have done,
using an independent state agency with the sole responsibility of
providing neutral hearing officers.3 9
CONCLUSION
While the holdings here only apply to the specific statutes in-
volving the Division, there are several undercurrents which may
have a broader impact. The court found that: 1) the Division over-
stepped its authority by imposing a $22,000 fine; 2) the Division
was within its statutory jurisdiction in requiring Interstate to ap-
ply for a new CPCN despite a grandfather clause; and 3) the Divi-
sion appropriately sanctioned Interstate through a three-year
moratorium. The two major resulting rules are that any material
alteration to an existing CPCN requires a public hearing, and that
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."
R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-15(g) (2002).
In reviewing the trial court's decision on certiorari, the supreme court
applies "the 'some' or 'any' evidence test and reviews the record to determine
if there is some or any evidence in the record to support its findings." Inter-
state, 824 A.2d at 1286 (citing Rocha, 694 A.2d at 726 (quotation omitted)).
37. R.I. DIv. OF PUB. UTIL. AND CARRIERS, RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 2(1) (1999), available at http://www.ripuc.ri.gov/regs/divrules
.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) (the Division's administrator appoints the
hearing officer).
38. For a complete discussion of the administrative adjudication process
in Rhode Island and its inherent issues see generally Majcher, supra note 33.
39. See id.
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planning falls under the Division's authority, if a carrier takes a
"substantial step" towards the completion of its goal. If the "sub-
stantial step" is applied in other agency issues, a company may
find itself facing fines and sanctions for making simple observa-
tions for planning purposes. More troubling is that in both situa-
tions the court relied on factual findings supplied by the Division,
made during a potentially biased and flawed hearing process.
Daniel W. Majcher
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Criminal Procedure. State ex rel. Town of Portsmouth v. Hagan,
819 A.2d 1256 (R.I. 2003). A police officer can lawfully transport
an arrestee outside of the officer's municipality when pursuing le-
gitimate law enforcement duties.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 11, 2001, Joseph H. Hagan was pulled over and ar-
rested by the Portsmouth police department for suspected driving
under the influence of liquor.1 Hagan consented to a Breathalyzer
test after being taken to the Portsmouth police station, but that
department's Breathalyzer machine was not functioning properly.
2
When the machine operator informed his supervisor of the mal-
function, Hagan was transported to Middletown, a town adjacent
to Portsmouth.3 Using that town's Breathalyzer machine, Hagan's
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results exceeded 0.15, and he
was charged for driving under the influence of liquor. 4
Prior to trial in Rhode Island District Court, Hagan filed a
motion to suppress the results of the Breathalyzer test taken out-
side of the town of Portsmouth.5 The gravamen of his motion was
that the town of Portsmouth police possessed no authority to de-
tain him while in Middletown, and that the Breathalyzer test re-
sults should be suppressed as "fruits of an unlawful custodial
detention."6 The trial judge agreed. He held that the Portsmouth
police exceeded their lawful authority by transporting Hagan out
of the town of Portsmouth.7 Thus, the results of the Breathalyzer
test from Middletown were inadmissible. In addition, the trial
judge held that, even though the Portsmouth police officers acted
in good faith, they failed to exhaust other alternatives for obtain-
ing Hagan's BAC prior to taking him outside the town limits.8 In
this decision, the trial judge closely followed the reasoning in State
v. Marran, a Rhode Island Superior Court case. 9 In that case, with
1. State v. Hagan, 819 A.2d 1256, 1257 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Driving under influence of liquor is codified at R.I. GEN LAws § 31-
27-2 (2002). The legal BAC limit is 0.08. Id.
5. Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1257.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1258.
9. No. 94-0525A, 1996 WL 937019 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 1996).
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facts substantially tantamount to the facts in Hagan, the trial
judge suppressed the evidence of the defendant's Breathalyzer test
on the basis that the local police failed to pursue the alternative of
taking a blood or urine sample in a hospital in the same town.1
Similarly, the trial judge in Hagan also looked to the police's fail-
ure to look to other reasonable alternatives for determining
Hagan's BAC.11 For example, the Portsmouth police could have
stopped at a state police barracks located in the town of Ports-
mouth.12 Thus, the judge ruled to suppress the Breathalyzer evi-
dence prior to trial, and the town of Portsmouth appealed the
ruling.13 The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted a petition for a
writ of certiorari. 4
BACKGROUND
In the 1881 case, Page v. Staples,'5 the Rhode Island Supreme
Court recognized that the power of a municipal police department
does not extend beyond the municipality's borders.16 However, the
court also discussed the power of the police to pursue a criminal
formerly in custody beyond the town border, capture the criminal,
and return to the town.' 7 Outside of this limited scenario, the su-
preme court noted that there must be a statutory exception to
grant a local police department authority outside of its own town
boundaries. 18
One such statutory exception was challenged in the 2002 case,
State v. Ceraso.'9 The exception challenged in that case was the
emergency police power exception, which allows a police chief to
10. Id. at*11.
11. Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1258.
12. Id. at 1260.
13. Id. at 1258.
14. Id. at 1256-57.
15. 13 R.I. 306 (1881).
16. In Page, a Providence sheriff transported a suspect in custody
through Kent County. Id. at 307-08.
17. Id. at 308. This power has been expanded by allowing police to pur-
sue suspected violators of the motor vehicle code beyond town boundaries
when the police are in "close pursuit" of the suspect. R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-7-19
(2002). The authority of police officers to engage in close pursuit was most re-
cently affirmed by the court in State ex rel. Town of Middletown v. Kinder,
769 A.2d 614 (R.I. 2001).
18. Page, 13 R.I. at 307.
19. 812 A.2d 829 (R.I. 2002).
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request emergency assistance from another police department. 20
When the assisting officers arrive on scene, they operate under
the authority granted to the requesting police chief.2' This power
is sustained until the requesting police chief releases the assisting
officers.22 Furthermore, the power extends beyond the reason for
the request, thereby authorizing all responding officers to enforce
all applicable laws in the police chiefs jurisdiction. 23 In Ceraso,
while assisting the Jamestown police with a rollover accident on
the Newport Bridge, a Newport police officer stopped a motorist
who was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol. 24 The
conviction was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court on
the basis of the statutory exception to the limits of lawful author-
ity.25
In addition to this statutory exception, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court has created a judicial exception. In Cioci v. Santos,26
a police officer transported a suspect in custody to a hospital out-
side of the town limits for treatment after a suicide attempt.27 The
court upheld the officer's decision to seek treatment and noted
that police officers should act in the interest of the suspect's well-
being without concern for lost opportunity to prosecute the sus-
pect.28
In State v. Locke,29 a case that closely mirrors the facts of
Hagan, the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a police officer's
decision to transport a DUI suspect from Charlestown to Westerly
for a Breathalyzer test.30 Unlike in Hagan, the reason for the
transport in Locke was that the town of Charlestown had not yet
purchased a Breathalyzer machine. 31 The court noted that the po-
lice officer was acting in "emergency circumstances, in the interest
of protecting the driver from harming himself or the public at
20. R.I. GEN LAws § 45-42-1 (2002).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Ceraso, 812 A.2d at 832.
25. Id. at 836.
26. 207 A.2d 300 (R.I. 1965).
27. Id. at 301.
28. Id. at 304.
29. 418 A.2d 843 (R.I. 1980).
30. Id. at 848.
31. Id.
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large and the need to obtain an accurate blood alcohol level with-
out undue delay."32 The court distinguished Page v. Staples by not-
ing that the officer in Locke transported the arrestee outside of the
municipality while executing "his official duties," not just for
"mere convenience." 33 Thus, even though no statutory exception
granted the Charlestown police authority to transport the arrestee
into Westerly for the Breathalyzer test, the court created a judicial
exception based on the exigent conditions of the situation.
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Without concluding that the Portsmouth police department
acted under exigent circumstances, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the district court judge's decision to
suppress the Breathalyzer test results. 34
In State v. Locke, the court recognized that the transportation
of a properly detained suspect beyond town boundaries while in
pursuit of official duties was distinct from similar transportation
for mere convenience.35 Thus, the Hagan court moved away from
the rule of law established in Page v. Staples by distinguishing the
arrest of a suspect outside of an officer's jurisdiction and the
transport of an arrestee beyond the town's borders in pursuit of
"legitimate law enforcement duties."36 Here, the court defined the
police department supervisor's decision to send Hagan to Middle-
town for a Breathalyzer test as the pursuit of "gather[ing] and
preserv[ing] evidence for use at trial."37 Furthermore, the court
concluded that this purpose constituted a legitimate law enforce-
ment duty and reversed the district court's decision to suppress
the Breathalyzer test results.38
32. Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1259. In Marran, the Rhode Island Superior
Court interpreted Locke as limiting a police officer's authority to transport an
arrestee outside of the municipality only when these emergent circumstances
are present. No. 94-0525A, 1996 WL 937019, at *8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 6,
1996).
33. Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1259.
34. Id. at 1261.
35. Locke, 418 A.2d at 848.
36. Hagan, 819 A.2d at 1261.
37. Id.
38. Other legitimate law enforcement duties enumerated by the court in-
clude transportation of a suspect to court for a bail hearing or preliminary
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COMMENTARY
While the logic behind Hagan is a reasonable extension of
Rhode Island law, its expansion of the extraterritorial authority of
local police departments does not comport with the conditions in
the neighboring states of Connecticut and Massachusetts. In Mas-
sachusetts, only statutory exceptions provide police officers with
legitimate extraterritorial authority, and only two exceptions
presently exist: fresh pursuit and specially sworn officers. 39 Like
Rhode Island, Connecticut recognizes a judicially created excep-
tion to the statutory limit of extraterritorial police authority, but
requires a finding of emergent circumstances before the exception
applies.40 In State v. Stevens,41 which cited to Locke for persuasive
authority, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the admission
of blood test results in a DUI case where the blood test was taken
at a hospital in Rhode Island rather than Connecticut.42 In its
holding, however, the court explicitly limited the exception to
situations where the police must travel out of the jurisdiction to
"accommodate the medical needs" of the suspect.43
Conversely, Hagan abandoned the requirement for emergent
circumstances from Locke with little explanation. This result
should be remedied by either legislative action or imposed limits
in future cases. Clever municipalities, police officers, and prosecu-
tors might focus on key phrases of the case to greatly expand the
extraterritorial authority granted. The court concluded that the
"duty to gather and preserve evidence for use at trial" constitutes
a "legitimate law enforcement dut[y]" and can serve as foundation
to transport a lawfully detained suspect outside of the municipal-
ity's boundaries. 44 Broad interpretation of this law enforcement
hearing, or to a hospital to provide medical care to the lawfully detained sus-
pect. Id.
39. Commonwealth v. Nicholson, 779 N.E.2d 702, 704 (Mass. App. Ct.
2002).
40. See State v. Stevens, 620 A.2d 789, 796 (Conn. 1993).
41. 620 A.2d 789 (Conn. 1993).
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 796.
44. State v. Hagan, 819 A.2d 1256, 1261 (R.I. 2003).
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duty could include evidence for impeachment and collateral issues,
in addition to non-collateral issues.45
For example, under a strict interpretation of Hagan, police of-
ficers could transport an intoxicated driver to an out-of-town tav-
ern where the driver was imbibing earlier to determine the
veracity of any statement made by the driver. The information ob-
tained during the trip to the tavern could eventually be admitted
in court to impeach the driver on his story about how long he was
at the tavern, how many drinks he drank, and what types of
drinks he drank. If the driver denied any aspects of the evening's
events, this could also be admitted in court. Such abuses of extra-
territorial authority violate the "strong public policy of jurisdic-
tional integrity"46 and can only be curbed by requiring a finding of
exigent circumstances before the exception applies.
CONCLUSION
After Hagan, a police officer can lawfully transport an ar-
restee outside of the officer's municipality when pursuing legiti-
mate law enforcement duties. Unless changed by future case law
or legislation, there is no need to show emergent conditions before
the exception applies. However, the rule of law from Hagan could
be limited by a narrow reading of the holding coupled with the in-
herent urgency of obtaining an accurate blood alcohol concentra-
tion from a suspected drunk driver.
Wayne Helge
45. However, the rule of law established in Hagan is not without its lim-
its. The court did expressly limit its holding to situations where the suspect is
already in lawful custody.
46. Marran, No. 94-0525A, 1996 WL 937019, at *10 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec.
6, 1996).
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Criminal Procedure/Evidence. State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183
(R.I. 2003). The Rhode Island Supreme Court found, inter alia,
that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and the constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial had not been violated; that the police
had probable cause to arrest the defendant based on exigent cir-
cumstances even if constructive entry had been employed; that
nondisclosure of expert testimony was not a discovery violation;
that the defendant's right to cross-examine was not improperly
limited; and that the denial of the defendant's four motions for
mistrial was proper.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A criminal information was filed in the State of Rhode Island
Providence County Superior Court charging the defendant, Keith
Werner, with six felony counts.' On May 24, 1994, a trial on the
first five counts was held in the State of Rhode Island Kent
County Superior Court.2 The jury found the defendant guilty on
Counts 1 and 2 of the lesser charge of assault with a dangerous
weapon and guilty on Counts 3, 4, and 5.3 The defendant filed a
motion for new trial which was denied. 4
On May 15, 1988, Michael McConigle ("McConigle") stopped
at Johnny Ray's Beef & Brew ("the bar") in West Warwick, to
check on his sister who was bartending that night.5 Upon leaving
the bar, McConigle fought with a man driving a vehicle which
looked like a Grenada.6 While the driver was pulling a sawed off
1. State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 187 (R.I. 2003). The defendant was
charged with the following: 1) intent to murder Loran Stoddard; 2) assault
with intent to murder Frank Burton; 3) assault with a dangerous weapon on
Michael McConigle; 4) possession of a loaded weapon in a vehicle; 5) posses-
sion of a sawed-off shotgun; and 6) a felon in possession of a firearm. Id.
2. Id. Count 6 had been severed prior to trial.
3. Id. On August 4, 1994, the defendant was sentenced to 10 years im-
prisonment on the three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon, to be
served concurrently; to 10 years imprisonment on Count 4, possession of a
loaded weapon; and to 5 years imprisonment on Count 5, possession of a
sawed off shotgun. The sentences on Counts 4 and 5 were to be served con-
currently but consecutively to the sentence imposed on Counts 1, 2, and 3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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shotgun from a garbage bag, McConigle ran back into the bar and
told his sister to call the police. 7
Loran Stoddard ("Stoddard"), who lived in the apartment
above the bar, entered the bar at 11:30 p.m.8 After hearing the
commotion, Stoddard attempted to end the argument.9 The driver,
who Stoddard later identified as the defendant, told Stoddard to
mind his own business. 10 When Stoddard failed to do so, the de-
fendant shot Stoddard in both knees."
Frank Burton ("Burton") was inside the bar on the night in
question and heard McConigle shouting about a man outside with
a gun.12 When Burton saw the defendant aiming the shotgun at
Stoddard, he quickly closed the bar door. 13 He then stood at the
door listening. 4 Hearing silence and believing the gunman had
left, Burton open the door.' 5 Burton saw Stoddard lying on the
ground.' 6 The gunman then fired at Burton, and the pellets rico-
cheted off the sidewalk striking Burton's arm and legs.'7
Soon after, a West Warwick policeman arrived and was given
a description of the gunman by McGonigle - a white male ap-
proximately six feet tall with dirty blond hair. 8 The officer was
also given a description of the gunman's vehicle - a 1978 or 1979
gray Ford Grenada or Mercury Monarch with license plates num-
bered IF-536.19 The described vehicle was located on St. John
Street later that night by another officer. 20
Sergeant Appollonio of the West Warwick Police Department
ascertained that the vehicle was empty and unlocked.2' Inside the
car, Sergeant Appollino found a Rhode Island registration listing
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 188.
11. Id. At the hospital on May 15, 1988, Stoddard was shown a photo ar-
ray, and Stoddard identified the defendant as the gunman. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Dennina Prefontaine ("Prefontaine") as the owner of a 1976 blue
Plymouth Fury, a bill of sale from a Diane Levy to Prefontaine,
describing the subject vehicle as a 1979 gray and black Mercury
Monarch, and two magazine subscriptions listing the defendant's
address as 200 Lockwood Street, West Warwick. 22 The police
brought McConigle to the vehicle, and he identified it as the one
used by the gunman.2 3
The police then responded to 200 Lockwood Street and were
greeted by a Cynthia Mackabee ("Mackabee"), who identified her-
self as the defendant's sister.24 Mackabee said she believed her
brother lived with Prefontaine and told them the vicinity of their
apartment.25 After checking with the Traffic Division, the police
discovered that the defendant's listed address was 14B Brookside
Avenue. 26
On May 15, 1988, the police went to the apartment, banged on
the door, and announced their presence.27 Prefontaine exited the
apartment with a Norman Ducharme, whom she said she met at a
bar the night before.28 A detective positioned at the rear of the
house saw the defendant attempting to exit through a window.29
After the detective yelled halt, the defendant ducked back inside,
and shortly thereafter, appeared at the front door. 30 As the defen-
dant emerged, he was handcuffed and taken into custody. 31
After obtaining a warrant, the police conducted a search of
the apartment. 32 From Apartment 14B, the detectives seized pho-
tographs depicting the defendant with a gun; a shotgun shell box
containing one shotgun shell; six more shotgun shells, five live
and one spent; and a shotgun cleaning kit.33 The detectives then
22. Id. at 189.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. It was later discovered that the defendant had moved in with Pre-
fontaine but that the relationship had deteriorated and he was then living in
a different apartment in the same building. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 190.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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went to Apartment 14A, a vacant apartment. 34 Through a par-
tially open door, the detectives saw a plastic bag similar to the one
described by the witnesses at the shooting.3 5 Inside the ceiling, the
detectives found a Mossberg pump-action shotgun.36 Although no
identification could be obtained from the single, partial print on
the gun, McCongile identified the gun as the one pointed at him
outside the bar.37 Kenneth Gammon, another witness, also identi-
fied the gun as the one depicted in the photographs seized from
Apartment 14B.38
At trial, Prefontaine testified that she and the defendant used
a silver and red Mercury Monarch, bearing license plate number
IF-536, although the vehicle was not officially registered. 39 She
also testified that she argued with the defendant on the evening of
May 14, 1988, and the defendant took the keys to the Monarch
and left.40
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Many issues were presented on appeal. This survey, however,
focuses solely on the court's denial of the defendant's motion for a
new trial.
The defendant alleged that on four separate occasions the jury
heard improper evidence regarding the defendant's prior criminal
activity.4 1 First, McConigle testified that when he first encoun-
tered the defendant, the defendant asked him for drugs.42 Defense
counsel objected and moved for a mistrial alleging that the refer-
ence was "highly prejudicial." 43 The trial court found that this was
an "integral part of the testimony" and any prejudice would be
dispelled with a curative instruction.44
In affirming the trial court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated that for bad conduct evidence to qualify as a basis for a
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 206.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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mistrial, the "comment must not only be prejudicial but also ir-
relevant."45 The court agreed with the trial court that the conver-
sation was "an integral part of the witness's testimony."46 The
court held that a defendant does not have to be shielded from
relevant evidence just because it is prejudicial.47 The court be-
lieved the trial justice was able to minimize the prejudice by his
long curative instruction to the jury.48
Second, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a mis-
trial as a result of Stoddard's testimony stating that he identified
the defendant at the hospital from "a bunch of mug shots."49 No
objection was made to this first comment, but Stoddard again
stated he identified the defendant from a mug shot.5 0 Defense
counsel then objected and moved for a mistrial claiming this tes-
timony, combined with the reference to drugs, was highly prejudi-
cial.51 The trial court denied the motion but issued a lengthy
cautionary instruction. 52 With relatively no discussion, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion for new
trial and found that the jury instruction cured any possible preju-
dice from the testimony.53
Third, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a mistrial
when Prefontaine testified she lived with the defendant's sister
when the defendant was in jail.54 The trial court denied the motion
and gave another lengthy cautionary instruction. 55 Again, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion for
mistrial based on this testimony.56 The court, in viewing a totality
of the testimony, reasoned that one reference to jail did not preju-
45. Id. (citing State v. Cline, 405 A.2d 1192, 1210 (R.I. 1979)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The instruction to the jurors stated the court did not know
whether the defendant had been in jail as Ms. Prefontaine testified, and even
if he was, it was of no concern to them. The judge further instructed the ju-
rors to decide the case on its merits, or lack thereof, and to disregard any no-
tion of whether or not the defendant had been in jail.
56. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
dice or inflame the jury to such an extent that it could not be im-
partial.5 7
Fourth, the defendant argued that a mistrial should have
been granted during the testimony of Gammon. 58 Gammon sought
to change his trial testimony from the testimony given at voir dire
examination regarding the shotgun in the photograph seized from
Apartment 14B.59 At trial, Gammon testified the gun introduced
into evidence was not the same gun depicted in the photograph. 6
0
The prosecutor asked Gammon about his prior testimony and
asked whether he received threats regarding his testimony.61
Gammon replied in the negative, and at this point, the defense
counsel again moved for a mistrial based on significant preju-
dice.62 The trial justice, while noting that the prosecutor's question
was "imprudent," denied the motion and gave another cautionary
instruction. 63 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the motion for mistrial because, in accordance
with Brown, a mistrial should be granted for improper prosecuto-
rial questions only if the statement is "inexpiable."64 The court
found the question presented by the prosecutor did not create "in-
curable prejudice", and the curative instruction was effective. 65
Additionally, the court did note that the witness's answer was in
the negative. 66
Lastly, the defendant argued that these four instances de-
scribed above, when viewed in the cumulative, created fundamen-
tal unfairness requiring reversal.67 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court held the trial court's decision to deny a mistrial should be
afforded great weight and should not be disturbed unless the trial
57. Id. at 208 (citing State v. Brown, 522 A.2d 208, 210-11 (R.I. 1987)).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The cautionary instruction stated that no evidence of threats or
coercion had been introduced in his case so the jury was to disregard the
question. The court also pointed out to the jury that the answer to the ques-
tion was "no" anyway.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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judge committed an abuse of discretion. 68 The court concluded the
trial judge did not abuse her discretion on the four motions for
mistrial and, as a result, the cumulative effect of these rulings did
not deprive the defendant of a "fundamentally fair trial."69
COMMENTARY
Why should great deference be given to the trial judge's de-
termination regarding how improper evidence affects the jury?
The answer is the trial judge is in the best position to make such a
decision. As best stated by the court in State v. Temptest, "The
trial justice possesses a 'front-row seat' at the trial and can best
determine the effect of the improvident remarks upon the jury."70
Without allowing the trial justice such great discretionary power,
every case in which an improper question or answer arises would
result in a mistrial. The effectiveness of the judicial system would
seriously be undermined.
While individual errors are often curable by a judicial instruc-
tion, cumulative errors may prejudice the jury to the point where
the defendant should be granted a new trial. As guided by prece-
dent, new trials should be granted when the "cumulative effect of
improper evidence is of such a character that the defendant was
prejudiced thereby to such an extent that only a new trial can cure
it."71 However, the number of errors needed to reach this prejudi-
cial point cannot, and should not, be set at a specific number. As
stated in State v. Yelland, "Determination of whether a challenged
remark is harmful or prejudicial cannot be decided by any fixed
rule of law."72 Rather, the trial justice, who is in the best position
to make such evaluations, must assess the effect of the statement
by placing the remark in its "factual context."73
68. Id. (citing State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 427 (R.I. 2002)).
69. Id.
70. 651 A.2d 1198, 1207 (R.I. 1995).
71. State v. Pepper, 237 A.2d 330, 385 (R.I. 1968) (evidence was admitted
on four separate occasions which was clearly not relevant to the issue at trial
- the defendant's state of mind; therefore, the defendant should have been
granted a new trial).
72. 676 A.2d 1335, 1337 (R.I 1996) (citing State v. DeCiantis, 501 A.2d
365, 367 (R.I. 1985)).
73. State v. Ware, 524 A.2d 1110, 1112 (R.I. 1987).
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CONCLUSION
The above reasoning is well-settled law in Rhode Island.
While, at times, it may appear unfair to a defendant to allow a
jury to deliberate on a case in which they heard evidence which
could prejudice the most reasonable person, we must believe that
jurors will follow the judge's instructions - not only curative in-
structions but the instructions on the law given before delibera-
tion. Without such a belief, the judicial system would be
overburdened with mistrials. Moreover, the trial justice is in the
best position to evaluate whether prejudicial evidence can be
remedied by a curative instruction. The trial justice is the one per-
son in the courtroom who is truly impartial, understands the law,
and is there to guarantee a fair trial to all parties.
Michelle L. Colson
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Corporations. National Hotel Associates v. 0. Ahlborg & Sons,
Inc. 827 A.2d 646 (R.I. 2003). A related entity and president were
found liable for an arbitration verdict rendered against an affili-
ated corporate entity because the totality of the circumstances in-
dicated that the affiliate corporation was not an independent
entity, but rather an instrument of the president and related en-
tity.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Construction Services, Inc (CSI), a non-union construction
company, bid to complete a construction project for the plaintiff,
National Hotel Associates (NHA).' CSI was solely owned by Rich-
ard Ahlborg (Richard) who owned and ran both CSI and a similar
construction entity, 0. Ahlborg & Sons, Inc. (0. Ahlborg).2 NHA
awarded CSI the construction bid based on representations made
by Richard that 0. Ahlborg and Richard, personally, were the
same entities as CSI.3 Renovations on the hotel began in the fall of
1983.4 The project was delayed in December because of problems
with CSI's cash flow. 5 Further delays resulted and eventually
Richard and 0. Ahlborg assumed control of the project. 6 CSI's con-
struction manger was replaced with 0. Ahlborg's construction
manager.7 CSI was able to continue the project only because of
Ahlborg's financial backing, since CSI was otherwise unable to
borrow money itself.8
CSI commenced arbitration proceedings to obtain approxi-
mately $500,000 from NHA for the added expenses of the project. 9
NHA counterclaimed based on CSI's poor performance, which re-
sulted in delay and lost profit for NHA.10 The arbitration resulted
1. Nat'l Hotel Assoc. v. 0. Ahlborg & Sons, Inc., 827 A.2d 646, 648 (R.I.
2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 649.
10. Id.
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in favor of NHA, rendering an award of $230,687.20.11 On July 19,
1986, the Superior Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment
but the execution was returned unsatisfied. 12 The failure to com-
ply with the judgment was apparently due to efforts on behalf of
Richard and 0. Ahlborg, including preferential payments and the
formation of an additional company, Critical Path Construction
Co. (CPC), which was used to funnel remaining assets out of CSI.' 3
In response to CSI's failure to satisfy the arbitration judg-
ment, NHA filed suit against 0. Ahlborg and Richard on four dis-
tinct counts, leading to the case at hand.' 4 Count one alleged that
CSI's corporate entity should be disregarded, allowing NHA to sat-
isfy the judgment against both Richard and 0. Ahlborg because
the companies were mere instrumentalities of Richard.' 5 Count
three alleged that Richard violated his fiduciary duty to CSI's
creditors when he made transfers in a preferential fashion. 16 CSI
subsequently stipulated to summary judgment on count three, but
upon newly discovered evidence, requested the motion be va-
cated.' 7 The trial court judge refused to vacate the motion despite
the new evidence.' 8 Count four' 9 alleged the companies had vio-
lated the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.20 Ultimately, the trial
judge refused to disregard CSI's corporate entity or find that the
defendants should be liable for CSI's judgment on other grounds.2'
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court overturned the lower
court in favor of the plaintiff on both counts three and four.22
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The appellate court declined to address count two, which claimed
that 0. Ahlborg and Richard were liable as guarantors. Id. at 651.
15. Id. at 650.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 650-51. The evidence was that of the post-arbitration behavior,
such as forming a company to channel assets out of CSI and making prefer-
ential payments. Id. at 651.
18. Id.
19. Count four was added by amendment after the defendant released
previously suppressed incriminating evidence regarding CPC, CSI, Richard,
and 0. Ahlborg. Id.
20. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-16-1 (2001).
21. Nat'l Hotel Assoc., 827 A.2d at 651.
22. Id. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island did not address count one,
which argued that the defendants should be directly liable for the corpora-
tion, because the plaintiffs did not raise that issue on appeal.
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BACKGROUND
In evaluating whether the corporate veil should be pierced,
Rhode Island observes separation between two corporations with
common stock "unless the totality of the circumstances surround-
ing their relationship indicates that one of the corporations 'is so
organized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
the other."'23 Further, Rhode Island recognizes that when a corpo-
ration becomes insolvent "directors should be regarded as trustees
of the creditors to whom the property of the corporations must
go." 24 Additionally, Rhode Island has adopted the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which in part deals with preferential
payments and corporate duties. 25
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Piercing the corporate veil
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice
overlooked and misconceived the supporting evidence that CSI
was not a separate entity from 0. Ahlborg.26 The court ruled that
the trial justice's decision was incorrectly based on the time period
of CSI's inception rather than on their actions with respect to this
project and as a corporation as a whole.2 7 Although factors that
the trial court considered were relevant (such as separate annual
reporting, tax returns, financial records, bank accounts, and arti-
cles of incorporation), the factors do not overcome the fact that the
entities were functionally identical. 28 Factors in this case, in the
totality of circumstances, overwhelmingly demonstrated that CSI
was not a separate entity from 0. Ahlborg. 29 Richard dominated
0. Ahlborg and CSI, resulting in no distinction between the com-
23. Vucci v. Meyers Bros. Parking Sys., Inc., 494 A.2d 530, 536 (R.I.
1985) (quoting United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 209 A.2d 215, 219 (R.I. 1965)).
24. Onley v. Conanicut Land Co., 18 A. 181, 181 (R.I. 1889).
25. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-16-1, 4-6 (2001).
26. Nat'l Hotel Assoc., 827 A.2d at 653.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 652.
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panies.30 The two companies had the same employees, officers,
business contacts, and materials. 31 Further, CSI was initially in-
adequately funded and could not borrow money independently of
0. Ahlborg.32 Additionally, Richard held the companies out to be
the same company, making statements such as CSI was the "Sia-
mese twin" of 0. Ahlborg and that he, personally, "was
0. Ahlborg."33 These factors led the Rhode Island Supreme Court
to conclude that the plaintiff may pierce the corporate veil and re-
cover from the parent, related entities, and president of CSI.34
Fiduciary Duty
Richard breached his fiduciary duty to the creditors of CSI.35
The court ruled the actions subsequent to the arbitration ruling
were voluminous and demonstrated the entire scheme to defraud
CSI's creditors, therefore necessitating summary judgment be va-
cated.36 Two weeks after the judgment was entered, Richard
formed CPC, which operated out of the same facility as CSI and
0. Ahlborg, performing CSI's previous duties.3 7 Richard was the
majority stockholder and self-appointed treasurer of CPC.38 All of
CSI's contracts and jobs were transferred to CPC.39 Approximately
$920,573 passed through CSI to CPC.40 Additionally, CSI repaid a
$50,000 loan to the Mayfield Associates for which Richard was
also personally liable. 41 CSI made a $20,000 repayment of a loan
directly to Richard for a loan he had taken from Citizens Bank to
30. Id. at 653-54.
31. Id. at 654.
32. Id. at 648 n.3.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 654-55.
35. Id. at 657. As indicated previously, NHA had stipulated to summary
judgment on this claim because the defendants purposely concealed evidence,
including the formation of CPC, for nine years. Id. at 650. The court held that
due diligence in discovery could not have overcome the trial counsel's inten-
tional misconduct that violated not only discovery rules but also Article V of
the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 657.
36. Id. at 647.
37. Id. at 649.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 649-50.
41. Id. at 650.
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keep CSI afloat.42 These actions were concealed from the plaintiff
when the defendants repeatedly denied discovery requests, includ-
ing deposition notices and a subpoena for documents that would
have revealed the transfers and CPC's very existence. 43
When the evidence finally became available, the trial court al-
lowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint but ultimately denied
and dismissed the claim.44 The trial court justice concluded that
the evidence of CSI's asset transfer, including the creation of CPC,
was not relevant to recovering the arbitration award because the
transfers occurred after the arbitration award.45 Since the direc-
tors of the corporation are the trustees for the stockholders until a
company becomes insolvent, the trial court held that Richard had
an interest in representing stockholders, not a fiduciary duty to
CSI's creditors.46
On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first held that
the evidence was substantial that Richard made payments on
loans and used CPC to the advantage of 0. Ahlborg and himself,
personally. 47 Then the court explained that because the company
was facing a judgment that rendered it insolvent, Richard did owe
a fiduciary duty to the creditors and could not make preferential
treatment for his own interest.48 The court did not choose to adopt
the minority position raised by the defendants, which allows an
insolvent corporation to prefer one creditor over another creditor,
even if he or she is an officer of the corporation, because of the ob-
vious conflict of interest involved in this position.49 Such a position
is unfair to the other creditors because it allows for the director to
foster insolvency and protect their own interest to the detriment of
the remaining creditors.50 Therefore, the court came to the conclu-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 655.
45. Id. at 656.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. ("[I]t is inequitable to allow directors who control the affairs of the
corporation to act in such a way that corporate insolvency is inevitable or to
place themselves in a favorable position by protecting their own interest to
the detriment of the remaining creditors.")
49. Id. at 656-57. Case law in Indiana, Michigan, and Missouri support
this position. 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 753 (2003).
50. Nat'l Hotel Assoc., 827 A.2d at 656.
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sion that Richard had a fiduciary duty to the creditors of CSI
which was breached by the transactions.51
Fraudulent Transfers
The court further held that because Richard engaged in be-
havior that amounted to preferential treatment and insider deal-
ing, he was liable under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(UFTA).52 As discussed above, the evidence that the trial court
failed to properly consider demonstrated preferential treatment
and concealment. 53 The trial court ruled that this claim could not
be allowed because the plaintiffs request for relief was not avail-
able in the UFTA.54 Although the plaintiff did not seek the value
for the transferred contracts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that the arbitration award could be considered relief avail-
able pursuant to Section 6-16-7(a)(3)(iii), which allows for "[any
other relief."55 The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered this
statute broad enough to cover the imposition of personal liability
on Richard.56
COMMENTARY
Upholding the corporate veil of a limited liability company en-
courages economic investment and new ventures by limiting liabil-
ity of the investors.57 Additionally, when a court decides to pierce
the veil, it breaks the legitimate expectations of the investors,
which is contrary to the American system's deference to the ability
to freely contract.58 On the other hand, the corporate form can be
seen as a privilege not to be abused. 59 Most states have, however,
imposed a strong presumption that a parent corporation is not li-
51. Id. at 657.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 656.
54. Id. at 657.
55. Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-16-7 (2001).
56. Nat'l Hotel Assoc., 827 A.2d at 657-58.
57. John P. Glode, General Law Division: Piercing the Corporate Veil in
Wyoming-An Update, 3 WYO. L. REv. 133, 134 (2003).
58. Id. at 135.
59. Id.
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able for the acts of its subsidiaries.60 Rhode Island, like other
states, considers a variety of factors in determining whether the
entities are distinct, including circumstantial evidence. 61 Richard's
exclusive control of both 0. Ahlborg and CSI, as well as the decep-
tion evident in the facts, seems to be what persuaded the court to
pierce the veil of CSI to reach not only Richard but also to reach
0. Ahlborg.
An interesting aspect of this case is the way the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island discusses insolvency and the fiduciary duty
to creditors. CSI was solvent at the time of the arbitration judg-
ment, but when they refused to pay the arbitration judgment, this
action rendered them effectively insolvent, since solvency depends
on one's ability to pay creditors. The trial judge, although recog-
nizing the judgment would render CSI functionally insolvent,
thought the property interest and the contracts, in various stages
of business, were enough to retain the director's status as trustee
for the stockholder as opposed to a fiduciary duty to the creditors.
Originally, the insolvency exception to shareholder interest did
not attach until formal statutory proceedings (e.g. bankruptcy).62
Courts then extended this to situations like the one at hand, mov-
ing further in advance of the actual statutory insolvency of the
company. 63 Rhode Island is in the increasing number of states that
attach the fiduciary duty to creditors upon functional insolvency,
before the formal proceedings have commenced. The overall as-
sessment of the relationship between insolvency and creditor's in-
terest seems to be correct, especially in the case in hand. In
Richard's case, it is clear that he was acting for the benefit of him-
self, not making good business decisions for CSI to remain an ac-
tive entity. Therefore, it is logical to treat the company as
insolvent with a duty to creditors, not to the shareholders (in this
case solely Richard).
What is also interesting is the broad reading of the generic
remedy provision in the UFTA, which allows "[any other relief'
60. Edward F. Novak & Cynthia A. Coates, When will courts hold parent
corporations liable for the criminal acts of their subsidiaries? NAT'L L.J., May
14, 1994, at B5.
61. See generally, Vucci v. Meyers Bros. Parking Sys., Inc. 494 A.2d 530,
536 (R.I. 1985).
62. Christopher L. Barnett, Healthco and the "Insolvency Exception": An
Unnecessary Expansion of the Doctrine? 16 BANKR. DEv. J. 441, 448 (2000).
63. Id.
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rather than the amount of the fraudulent transfers, which is typi-
cally what is sought by plaintiffs relying on the UFTA. Although
the court does not discuss this aspect of the decision, the interpre-
tation of this section potentially creates a broader scope of avail-
able damages.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that when a corpora-
tion is simply an instrumentality of another corporation and its
president, the corporate veil can be broken to pay an arbitration
award rendered against the dependent affiliate entity. Further-
more, when preferential payments amounting to fraudulent con-
veyances breach the fiduciary duty of an insolvent company to its
creditors, relief under the UFTA includes such an arbitration
award.
Alicia J. Byrd
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Evidence. State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096 (R.I. 2003). Testimony
by one witness opining as to the truthfulness or accuracy of an-
other witness's testimony is prohibited as bolstering or vouching.
Furthermore, testimony that addresses credibility or has the same
substantive import is also inadmissible.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On the night of July 18, 1996, David Andrews (Andrews) was
killed when he was shot in the chest while walking in downtown
Providence with his cousin Andre "Bucky" Williams.1 At the scene
of the shooting, Williams told Detective Glen Cassidy that the
gunmen were driving a "maroon-colored" vehicle, but he was un-
able to identify any of its occupants. 2 Two hours later, Williams
gave a formal statement to Detective Stephen Springer, describing
the car as cranberry in color. 3 He further stated that the vehicle
had four occupants but again was unable to identify anyone. 4
Four days later, Williams recanted his inability to identify the
assailants and told Detective Robert Muir that three of the sub-
jects were Troy Lassiter (Lassiter), Derick Hazard (Hazard) and
David Roberts (Roberts).5 Williams further stated that Lassiter
and Hazard fired the guns.6 Subsequently, Williams later con-
firmed the identities of the three men from a photo array provided
by Detective Muir. 7
Lassiter was arrested and tried for murder, conspiracy and
assault.8 Due to his inconsistent statements, Williams's credibility
became the central issue during the trial where Lassiter main-
tained he was mistakenly identified.9 After a jury failed to reach a
verdict in the first trial, Lassiter was retried.'0 The second jury,
however, found Lassiter guilty of murder, conspiracy and assault
with intent to murder and sentenced him to life in prison." Fail-
1. State v. Lassiter, 836 A.2d 1096, 1099 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1099, 1100.
6. Id. at 1100.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1101.
10. Id.
11. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
ing to secure another trial based on newly discovered evidence,
Lassiter appealed. 12
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Lassiter argued that the trial judge erred in ad-
mitting the testimony of Detective Springer. 13 Springer, an experi-
enced detective, testified that he felt Williams was being
untruthful when he claimed he could not identify the occupants of
the vehicle. 14 The trial judge also allowed Detective Springer to
explain the basis of his opinion, stating that Springer was entitled
to convey his state of mind at the time he took Williams's formal
statement. 15
Lassiter argued that Detective Springer's opinion impermissi-
bly bolstered Williams's testimony by implying that Williams in-
deed knew the identity of the assailants but was simply
withholding the information during his initial statements.' 6
Lassiter maintained that this testimony was extremely prejudicial
as it vouched for the credibility of the state's only eyewitness who
made prior inconsistent statements on the dispositive issue of
identification. 7 The court agreed.
Relying on prior decisions, the court stated that it is the jury's
exclusive obligation to determine the credibility or truthfulness of
a witness.' 8 Therefore, any opinion offered to bolster or vouch for
the truthfulness of another witness's testimony is inadmissible.' 9
Even testimony not directly intended to bolster, but having the
same "substantive import," will likewise be deemed inadmissible. 20
The court found that while Detective Springer's opinion did
not literally bolster the truthfulness of Williams's testimony, it did
bolster his initial veracity. Springer's testimony implied to the
12. Id.
13. Lassiter also objected to two portions of Andrews's girlfriend
Wraina's testimony that the trial judge admitted. On one portion, the court
found in Lassiter's favor, and the other portion was a minor issue for which
the trial judge issued a curative instruction.
14. Id. at 1106.
15. Id. at 1107.
16. Id. at 1106-107.
17. Id. at 1106.
18. Id. at 1108.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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jury "that Detective Springer believed that Williams could identify
his assailants and, therefore, that Williams's subsequent state-
ment disclosing their identity was, in fact, worthy of belief."21 The
court also held that Detective Springer's testimony was offered for
the sole purpose of "explain[ing] away" Williams's contradictory
statements and that his testimony was likely given great weight
by the jury.22 As a result, Lassiter's conviction was reversed and
his case remanded for a new trial.
Justice Flanders's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Flanders made five separate arguments in his dissent
from the Court's holding that Detective Springer's testimony con-
stituted impermissible bolstering.
First, Justice Flanders believed that an opinion by a witness
that another is not being honest does not bolster the testimony of
a person who "later testifies at trial to a contrary version of the
same events."23 Second, the dissent found that Detective Springer
never testified as to the truthfulness of Williams's statement iden-
tifying Lassiter. Furthermore, the dissent contended that
Springer's opinion that Williams was not being honest when he
stated he could not identify any of the gunmen does not imply that
Williams was being honest when he later identified Lassiter.24
Third, the dissent found that due to the fact that the police
charged Lassiter despite Williams's inconsistent statements shows
that "the jury would have known that the police chose to believe
Williams's later statement to them, rather than his first one."25
Fourth, the dissent argued that Detective Springer's testimony
was not offered to bolster Williams's testimony but to show that
"he intended to pursue further questioning of Williams . .. to
counter the anticipated defense that the police had coerced [him]
into changing his story." Finally, Justice Flanders believed that if
Detective Springer's testimony had any effect, "it would have un-
derscored the fact that Williams was quite capable of lying to the
police when he wanted to do so."26
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1109.
23. Id. at 1111.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1112.
26. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
In Justice Flanders's view, "the 'bolstering' doctrine has be-
come the "third rail" of Rhode Island criminal law: if a prosecution
witness so much as touches on what he or she thinks about an-
other witness's out-of-court statements or credibility, it becomes a
fatal reversible error, requiring the conviction to be vacated and
warranting a new trial."27
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has made previous findings
of improper bolstering.28 In State v. Miller,29 defendant appealed
his conviction of first-degree sexual assault, claiming the charges
were fabricated. 30 In support of his contention, the defendant of-
fered the testimony of Donna Carroll, a Providence police detec-
tive.3 1 The detective testified that she had spoken to the victim's
mother who never said anything about a rape, even though the
victim made prior statements to the Providence Police and the
grand jury that she had informed her mother she had been
raped.32 On cross-examination, the detective was allowed to testify
that "it was not uncommon for people to neglect fully to elucidate
the details of an incident in a report to a police officer."33 The de-
fendant claimed that the detective's testimony "amounted to
vouching for [the victim's] mother in that it suggested to the jury
that the failure of [the victim's] mother to mention the ... conver-
sation with her daughter to the detective should not be viewed as
adversely affecting her credibility."34 Agreeing with the defendant,
the court held that because "credibility was of paramount impor-
tance, the admission of the detective's testimony on this issue
would be construed by the jury as endorsement of the mother's
credibility."35
27. Id. at 1112-13.
28. See State v. Webber, 716 A.2d 738 (R.I. 1998); State v. Haslam, 663
A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995).
29. 679 A.2d 867.
30. Id. at 872.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 873.
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For similar reasons, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has also
cited approvingly the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v.
Montanino.36 In Montanino, the alleged victim and sole eyewitness
claimed that while a Boy Scout, his scoutmaster twice engaged in
unnatural sexual intercourse with him over a four-month period. 37
However, the alleged victim did not report these incidents until
four years later when he met with a Cambridge police officer.38
At trial, defense counsel elicited from the officer that the boy
made several inconsistent statements regarding the timing and
specific conduct of the first incident during their conversations. 39
The officer also testified, over defense counsel's objection, that
having investigated approximately 300 sexual assault cases, it
was his opinion that "'most' victims eventually provided more de-
tails regarding the assault than they initially revealed."40 On ap-
peal, the defendant claimed that the officer's testimony amounted
to impermissible vouching or bolstering of the alleged victim's tes-
timony and should have been excluded.41
Noting that the boy's credibility was "a crucial issue,"42 the
court held that the officer's testimony constituted impermissible
bolstering. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated, "We think
there is little doubt that [the officer's] comments relating to the
credibility of 'most' sexual assault victims would be taken by the
jury as [the officer's] endorsement of [the victim's] credibility."43
Like the defendants in Miller and Montanino, what separated
Lassiter's freedom from a lifetime of incarceration was arguably
the credibility of the sole eyewitness; credibility that was seriously
damaged by prior inconsistent statements to the police regarding
the identity of the assailants. Given this weakened credibility and
the high standard of proof required in criminal cases, it is very
plausible that the jury would have found, without the testimony of
36. 567 N.E.2d 1212 (Mass. 1991).
37. Id. at 1213.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1214. The defendant claimed that the officer's opinion testi-
mony illustrated "that [the victim] was credible on the theory that the irregu-
larities in [the victim's] statements were consistent with the manner in which
truthful victims of sexual assault relate their experiences." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Detective Springer, that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that it was Lassiter who shot and killed David
Andrews. However, the fact that Lassiter was convicted on all
counts indicates strongly that the jury gave sufficient deference to
Detective Springer's testimony, despite Williams's obvious credi-
bility problems.
The fact is one will never know what weight, if any, the jury
assigned to Detective Springer's testimony. However, that is pre-
cisely the point. Because one cannot know, the admissibility of the
evidence in this case means the difference between freedom and a
life behind bars. Much of Justice Flanders's dissent relies upon his
own interpretation and belief of how the jury would construe De-
tective Springer's testimony, but the ability to easily suggest al-
ternative theories of how the jury may interpret a piece of
evidence does not negate the plausibility of contrary interpreta-
tions. Instead, it is merely illustrative of its debateability.
Given the extraordinary human costs at stake balanced
against the paucity of credible evidence, it appears prudent for the
court to hold that the testimony of Detective Springer was im-
proper bolstering and remand the case for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the testimony by
one witness opining as to the truthfulness or accuracy of another
witness's testimony is prohibited as bolstering or vouching, and
that testimony that addresses credibility or has the same substan-
tive import is also inadmissible.
Joseph J. Ranone
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Family Law. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925 (R.I. 2003). Plaintiff
husband appealed the Family Court's alimony, child support and
visitation decisions pursuant to the final decree of divorce from his
wife, challenging the validity of Family Court discretion in divorce
decisions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Rhode Island Supreme Court heard this appeal from a
family court magistrate judge's divorce judgment., The Supreme
Court in part sustained and in part denied the appeal.2
Michael and Diane Hogan married on August 15, 1987; dur-
ing their marriage, two children were born: Eric (in 1991) and Mi-
kayla (in 1994).3 Also, Diane Hogan ("Diane") was diagnosed with
multiple sclerosis (MS), a degenerative disorder of the central
nervous system.4 The couple sought a divorce decree in the Rhode
Island Family Court.5 In response to the Family Court's decision,
Michael Hogan ("Michael") appealed the alimony and child-
support award, the visitation decision, the court order to repay
Diane a $2,000 credit card charge, and the court's award of
Diane's counsel and deposition fees.6 While Michael is employed,
Diane's ability to work is compromised by her MS. 7 Diane was
awarded full custody of the children and monthly alimony and
child support payments as calculated by the legislatively man-
dated formula plus twenty percent added to the base of the child
support via a wage garnishment.8
THE COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
When deciding the divorce terms, the Family Court found no
compensable fault and determined that Michael and Diane would
each receive fifty percent of the marital estate.9 In his discretion,
the judge awarded the family's new truck to Michael, in turn re-
1. Hogan v. Hogan, 822 A.2d 925, 926 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id. at 931.
3. Id. at 926.
4. Id. at 928.
5. Id. at 926.
6. Id. at 926-27.
7. Id. at 928.
8. Id. at 926-27.
9. Id. at 930.
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quiring him to pay $2,000 in truck-related expenses charged on
Diane's Visa. 10 The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in
the Family Court's apportioning of the marital assets and thus
upheld the assets portion of the Family Court decision.
Additionally, the Magistrate used his discretion to award
Diane counsel and deposition costs." The Court determined that
Rhode Island General Law, section 15-5-16(b)(2)(ii)(G), governed
this discretionary award and that the Family Court evaluated the
parties' respective abilities to pay the costs, a legitimate finding
despite the Magistrate's punitive language towards Michael's atti-
tude and insensitivity throughout the proceedings. 12
Furthermore, the Supreme Court validated the Magistrate's
discretionary considerations of the appropriate factors, such as
Diane's debilitating illness and her compromised ability to work.'
3
The Court upheld the alimony award of one half of all net wages
above $517 per week from the husband's primary employment,
granting Diane the alimony for an indefinite period.14
The Supreme Court disagreed with two portions of the Magis-
trate's decision, however. The Court first disagreed with the Mag-
istrate's discretionary decision to add an additional twenty
percent to the court's child-support guidelines to be garnished
from Michael's wages. The Court reversed and remanded this por-
tion of the divorce decree.
The Magistrate stated it was his uniform practice to add
twenty percent to the proscribed child support guidelines in an at-
tempt to allow a person working a forty-hour week to retain his or
her overtime. 15 Pursuant to Mattera v. Mattera, the Family Court
is permitted to deviate from the statutory support guidelines if
supported by a finding that inequity would otherwise result to the
child or one of the parents.' 6 In Mattera, the Supreme Court de-
cided not to disturb discretionary child-support awards unless
they could ascertain clear abuse of the lower court's discretion.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 929.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 928.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 927.
16. 669 A.2d 538, 542 (R.I. 1996).
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Though the decision was made in the Magistrate's discretion,
the Supreme Court held that he should have made appropriate
findings of fact to support a child-support award exceeding the
Legislature-determined statutory guidelines outlined in Rhode Is-
land General Laws, section 15-5-16.2.17 While a Family Court
Magistrate is permitted to deviate from the recommended amount
if he or she finds that the calculated amount would be inequitable
to the child or to either parent, here the Magistrate did not sup-
port his decision to increase the amount with specific findings or
concerns.' 8 Accordingly, the child-support portion of the award is
remanded for a new hearing, new findings, and a new order as to
the appropriate amount to be paid.19
Second, the Court disagreed with the Magistrate's order that
Michael (the non-custodial parent) pay for a babysitter should he
not be able to accommodate his children's overnight visits. The
Court reversed this decision.
The Family Court noted this element of the divorce judgment
would provide respite for Diane who would otherwise have full
custody of the Hogan children.20 Because Michael lived in one
room of his brother's home and could not accommodate the over-
night visitation request, he argued the Family Court order akin to
indentured servitude. 21
Though the Supreme Court all but ignored the validity of Mi-
chael's indentured servitude claim, they nonetheless acknowl-
edged that the Magistrate had abused his discretion in ordering
the visitation or babysitter compensation scheme. 22 The Court re-
manded the visitation portion of the decree for a new hearing with
instruction to "focus on and advert to the best interests of the
children when establishing the visitation arrangements." 23
COMMENTARY
Whether the Magistrate's visitation-or-pay-a-babysitter
scheme was for the first time ordered or for the first time chal-
17. Hogan, 822 A.2d at 927.
18. Id. (quoting Lembo v. Lembo, 677 A.2d 414, 418 (R.I. 1996)).
19. Id. at 928.
20. Id. at 930.
21. Id. at 929.
22. Id. at 929-930.
23. Id. at 930.
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lenged in the matter of Hogan v. Hogan is unclear. However, de-
ciding the validity of the scheme was one of first impression in
Rhode Island. Rather than establishing a steadfast rule regarding
babysitting orders, the Supreme Court remanded this visitation
issue of the divorce decree for a new hearing and further findings.
While the Rhode Island courts universally accept that in custody
and visitation matters the welfare and needs of the children ex-
pectedly are given paramount consideration, 24 exactly how the use
of the visitation-or-babysitter scheme affects the interest of the
child is a fairly new determination.
With Dana v. Dana,25 the Utah Court of Appeals predated the
Rhode Island Supreme Court's sentiments that a visitation or
babysitter compensation order is not in the child's or the non-
custodial parent's best interest. In Dana, the appellate court over-
turned the Utah Family Court's demand that the father visit his
child or pay extra support. 26The Utah court held that to encour-
age a non-custodial parent to visit by threatening to increase child
support payments was not in the best interest of the child.27 The
court was not persuaded by the custodial mother's argument that
she lacked free time or would incur the additional expense of
babysitting, and overturned the order.28 The Hogan Court did not
follow Dana, but rather remanded for clarification of findings.
A similar ruling in favor of the non-custodial parent was
made in Elkin v. Sabo.29 Here, the New Jersey Superior Court
held the Family Court abused its discretion by increasing a non-
custodial father's child-support obligations for failure to exercise
more visitation.30 In Elkin, the father blamed his inability to ac-
commodate his children's overnight visits on his small apart-
ment.31
While the respective Elkin and Hogan father's housing situa-
tions are similar, the Elkin court's holding was grounded not in
the father's living situation but rather in the original divorce de-
24. See McKim v. McKim, 12 R.I. 462 (1879).
25. 789 P.2d 726, 726 (Utah App. 1990).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 730.
29. 708 A.2d 1225 (N.J. Super. 1998).
30. Id. at 1227.
31. Id.
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cree's lack of a mandated visitation requirement. 32 Therefore, no
direct, Hogan-like scheme was examined in Elkin, but rather the
post-decree addition of terms, and is thus distinguishable from
Hogan .33
While the Hogan scheme of overnight visitation or babysitter
compensation is a rarely seen approach, Family Court alimony
and child-support orders that include babysitting costs are not
novel terms. Indeed, appellate level courts repeatedly uphold
these orders.34 Various approaches are taken to ensure the non-
custodial parent pays for babysitting. Often, babysitting expenses
are added to child-support payments.35 Alternatively, parties de-
cide that in lieu of direct child support payments, the non-
custodial parent will provide babysitters for the children.36
Courts recognize the independent nature of a decree's babysit-
ting terms; accordingly, the payment of babysitting fees when the
non-custodial parent is unable to exercise visitation rights is not a
substitute for support otherwise due.37 Effectually, by introducing
a scheme of overnight visitation or forced payment of a babysitter,
the Hogan court increased the child-support payments above the
already discretionary and unsupported twenty percent addition.
With Hogan, the Rhode Island Supreme Court aligned itself
with the scant case law discussing babysitting and visitation ex-
changes. Perhaps the Court ignored the implicit logic to the Mag-
istrate's order: full-time, single parents need time for themselves,
too.
Magistrate Judge O'Brien heard both parties. At length Mi-
chael and Diane discussed their financial status, the immediate
and lasting effects of Diane's disease on their marriage, and her
ability to work. They discussed their respective living situations.
In addition to the statutory guidelines for calculating support
32. Id. at 1228.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Polizzi v. Polizzi, 270 A.D.2d 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (cost
of babysitter reasonable child care expense); Grant v. Grant, 265 A.D.2d 19
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (non-custodial mother ordered to pay babysitting ex-
penses); Nolan v. Nolan, 215 A.D.2d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
35. Allen v. Bowen, 149 A.D.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (non-custodial
father solely responsible for babysitting expenses).
36. See, e.g., Produit v. Produit, 35 P.3d 1240 (Wyo. 2001); Burleson v.
Burleson, 1996 WL 560262 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
37. Grant, 265 A.D.2d at 22.
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payments, the Magistrate is afforded discretion to determine addi-
tional payments or regulating conditions of the decree.
Much of a child's welfare is determined by the love, support,
and guidance provided by a nurturing parent, parents, or legal
guardian. It is only logical that a degeneratively ill single parent
who is charged with the daily care of two children would benefit
from an evening's reprieve. Fear of over-penalizing a non-custodial
father may be, ironically, punitive to the overworked mother.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court remanded two portions of
the divorce decree and ordered a hearing for further findings.
With this ruling, they displayed skepticism for a Magistrate's dis-
cretionary judgments made without correlating, non-punitive find-
ings of fact. By overturning the award of babysitting costs, Rhode
Island aligned itself with the prevailing, national view in modern
family law.
Amanda B. Mertens
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Health Care Law. Jalowy v. The Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A.2d
698 (R.I. 2003). The Abuse in Health Care Facilities Act protects
an individual from retaliation at the hands of a health care facility
after such individual files a complaint alleging abuse on the part
of the facility. The individual is entitled to sue for relief from re-
taliation with the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the ac-
tion of the facility was in fact retaliatory in response to the
complaint. Residents in assisted-living homes have a conditional
statutory right to receive visitors of their choice so long as those
visitors do not pose health or safety risks to residents, staff, other
visitors, or property.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, John Jalowy, first became familiar with The
Friendly Home in 1992 when his mother, Stacia Jalowy, became a
resident.' Jalowy visited his mother at the home regularly, where
he observed certain members of the nursing staff acting in what
he described as an "unprofessional" manner.2 On May 5, 1992, Ja-
lowy wrote a letter to the management of the nursing facility, al-
leging that two nurses, Joan Thibault and Maureen Stone, were
regularly "smoking and socializing," endangering the elderly resi-
dents.3 Jalowy then met with the administrator of the facility, An-
gelo Rotella, and discussed the concerns that he had voiced in the
letter. That same day, Jalowy claims to have witnessed the same
two nurses ignoring residents who were "begging for help."4 Ja-
lowy then telephoned the State Department of Health and the De-
partment of Elderly Affairs to report the incidents.5 On August 28,
1992, Jalowy sent a letter to the Department of Elderly Affairs de-
tailing the behavior of the two nurses as doing "literally nothing
except socializing and smoking cigarettes... while ... residents
were begging for help and were ignored."6
In December of 1992, Jalowy was leaving the home after a
visit to his mother, and he encountered the two nurses he had
1. Jalowy v. The Friendly Home, Inc., 818 A.2d 698, 702 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 702-03.
4. Id. at 703.
5. Id.
6. Jalowy v. The Friendly Home, Inc., 2001 WL 171918, *3 (R.I. Super.
Ct. 2001).
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complained about.7 Jalowy claimed that these nurses followed him
around the facility taunting him.8 Jalowy then confronted the
nurses, swore at one, and waved his fist in the face of the other.9
The following day, administrator Rotella told Jalowy that he was
no longer welcome at the home, that it was no longer safe to allow
him to visit, that he could arrange outside visits with his mother,
and that he could take the matter to court if he wished. 10
On February 2, 1993, Jalowy filed an action in Superior Court
seeking injunctive relief and damages.1' He alleged that Rotella
and the home violated section 23-17.8-5 of the Rhode Island
Abuse in Health Care Facilities Act by banishing him from the
home in retaliation for filing complaints with the home, the De-
partment of Health, and the Department of Elderly Affairs. 12 He
also alleged a constitutional violation of his freedom of associa-
tion.13 The Superior Court issued an order temporarily enjoining
defendants from preventing Jalowy from visiting his mother at the
home, and constructed a visitation schedule allowing Jalowy to
meet with his mother in the lobby of the home for one hour, three
days per week. 14
In 1995, the superior court entered summary judgment in fa-
vor of the defendant nursing home on the constitutional claim,
and in 1999, Jalowy amended his complaint to include claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 15 At the
conclusion of trial, the jury found for the defendants on the re-
taliation charge, but decided in favor of Jalowy on the emotional
distress claims, awarding Jalowy no compensatory damages, but
granting punitive damages in the amount of $50,001 against
Rotella and the home.' 6 Jalowy moved for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict or for a new trial on the retaliation claim, and for
7. Jalowy, 818 A.2d at 703.
8. Id. The matter of whether the nurses had followed or antagonized Ja-
lowy was disputed at trial. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Jalowy continued to abide by these visitation guidelines until the
death of his mother in 1997. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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an additur and a new trial on the emotional distress claims. 17 The
defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
intentional infliction claim.18 The trial justice granted the defen-
dants' motion entering a judgment "that plaintiff take nothing,
[and] that the action be dismissed on the merits," and Jalowy ap-
pealed. 19
BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Abuse in Health Care Facilities Act 20 (the
Act) imposes a duty upon health care workers, emergency person-
nel, other professionals, or any person to report witnessed acts of
elder abuse, neglect, or mistreatment, 21 under penalty of fine and
possible imprisonment.22 Falling under the category of "any per-
son," Jalowy was protected from retaliation by the facility for re-
porting such acts, with a right to file a civil action seeking
injunctive relief and damages. 23
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Abuse in Health Care Facilities Act
The trial justice denied Jalowy's motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict of the retaliation claim because: 1) the
report of complaint that Jalowy filed was insufficient according to
statutory guidelines; and 2) a reasonable jury could have con-
cluded that the home had imposed the banishment on Jalowy for
reasons other than retaliation.24 Jalowy contended that he was not
required to file a report under the provisions of the Act to warrant
protection, and further, that he was entitled to a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the actions of the defendant home were indeed re-
taliatory. 25 The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed that Jalowy
was entitled to protection from retaliation under the Act regard-
17. Id.
18. Id. at 703-04.
19. Id. at 704.
20. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17.8-1 (1992).
21. Id. § 23-17.8-2.
22. Id. § 23-17.8-3.
23. Id.
24. Jalowy, 818 A.2d at 704.
25. Id.
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less of the form of his complaint, inferring that the wording of the
statute, in which "a person who is about to make a complaint" is
used to describe those protected from retaliation, includes those
who had not met all of the formalities of an official report of
abuse. 26 The court reasoned that the letters to Rotello and to state
regulatory agencies were sufficient to constitute a "report" under
the Act.27 Further, the court also agreed that Jalowy was entitled
to the "rebuttable presumption" of retaliation, having shown evi-
dence of his complaints and subsequent treatment.28 However, Ja-
lowy's attorney failed to request a jury instruction regarding the
presumption, and the court determined that this failure to request
or object amounted to a waiver of the presumption, thus leaving
the burden to prove retaliatory motive of the defendants on Ja-
lowy. 29 The court held that the home's interest in the health and
safety of its residents and staff was sufficient to show a legitimate,
non-retaliatory motive, and the claim of retaliation ultimately
failed.30
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In analyzing the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the trial court held that Jalowy did not present evidence
that the acts of the defendants were so "extreme and outrageous"
as to warrant a finding for Jalowy.31 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court agreed that the actions and demeanor of administrator
Rotella, and the resulting six weeks Jalowy endured without visit-
ing his mother, were not actions of the kind that would be "utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."32 Specifically, with regard to
the missed visitation, the court recognized that visitors to nursing
homes do not have an absolute right to visit relatives, but rather
those rights are conditioned upon considerations of the health and
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 705. The court stated that even if the proper jury instruction
had been requested and given, the defendants presented sufficient evidence
to show that their motives were borne of safety concerns, and Jalowy's claim
would nevertheless have failed. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 706.
32. Id. at 707-08 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
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safety of residents, staff, and other visitors, and the welfare of the
facility itself.33 Thus, the court denied Jalowy relief for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.3 4
Finally, and briefly, the court denied Jalowy's motion for ad-
ditur or new trial on the claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. 35 The court held that Jalowy did not fall into the two
classes of individuals who are eligible to recover for negligent in-
fliction: 1) those within the zone of danger, who are physically en-
dangered by the actions of the defendant; or 2) bystanders who
witness the defendant injuring a family member.36 Because the
behavior complained of by Jalowy effected himself, and not a rela-
tive, and also because the behavior was not physically dangerous,
Jalowy did not satisfy either eligible category. 37 The court denied
all of Jalowy's claims, and the defendant nursing home left victo-
rious.38
COMMENTARY
Although not expressly mentioned in the opinion, Jalowy was
a case of first impression with regard to the enforcement of the
Abuse in Health Care Facility Act (the Act).39 With cases of elder
abuse, nursing home neglect, and violence against seniors being
publicized in the media on an increasingly regular basis, the im-
portance of the Jalowy decision is clear: the welfare of Rhode Is-
land's elderly population is a growing concern. In Jalowy, the
court sets a precedent for utilizing the Act, reinforcing the "duty"
of professionals and private citizens to report witnessed cases of
abuse and neglect, and providing a remedy for those who are re-
taliated against for reporting an offending facility. The Act itself
provides this remedy, however, Jalowy establishes an important
procedural element to the remedy. Through the rule of Jalowy, the
33. Id. at 709 (referring to R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17.4-16(a)(2)(viii)(1992)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 710.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 710-11.
39. See State v. Scott, 617 A.2d 1362 (1992) (featuring the only other case
discussing the Act). It was deliberated during the time period in which
amendments to the legislation were being made, and holds that certain
amendments were contradictory to the initial statutory language. Thus, there
was no real adjudication involving violations of the Act. Id.
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Supreme Court of Rhode Island has provided an incentive for citi-
zens to fulfill their "duty" in the form of a "rebuttable presump-
tion," giving the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, and placing the
burden to prove a legitimate, non-retaliatory motive upon the de-
fendant.40 Even though the court found that the home had over-
come this presumption in Jalowy, the court established a
precedent indicating the importance of reporting abusive incidents
for the sake of Rhode Island's senior citizens.
Interestingly, while the court denied Jalowy's claim of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress in his treatment at the hands
of the facility of the staff, the court left open an avenue to a possi-
bly successful negligent infliction claim with regard to nursing
home abuse. Although not explicitly stated, it is possible that the
negligent infliction claim could be brought in cases where the rela-
tive had witnessed such abuse being acted upon his or her relative,
thus fulfilling the second category of persons eligible to bring the
negligent infliction claim. Jalowy was denied his claim because he
argued that the facility had acted against him when causing dis-
tress. Had Jalowy argued that the staff had abused or neglected
his mother in his presence, he may have had a viable claim.
Whatever the circumstances, the court has established a prece-
dent that will likely be revisited in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an individual who
reports an abusive incident is protected from retaliation at the
hands of the offending health care facility via a statutory remedy
and a "rebuttable presumption," placing the burden of persuasion
on the defendant facility to prove a non-retaliatory motive for its
actions against the complainant. In order to bring a claim that
such retaliatory actions amounted to negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, the plaintiff must fall within two categories: 1) one
at risk in the "zone of danger;" or 2) a relative who witnesses the
injury of a family member. Plaintiff John Jalowy was denied his
claim of retaliation due to failure to request appropriate jury in-
struction and evidence of legitimate health and safety concerns of
the defendant facility. Additionally, claims of infliction of emo-
40. Jalowy, 818 A.2d at 704.
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tional distress were denied (both intentional and negligent) as not
alleging sufficiently outrageous behavior, and not falling into the
categories of those eligible to bring a claim of negligent infliction.
Mary H. Hayes
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Labor. DiGuilio v. R.I. Board of Corrections Officers, 819 A.2d
1271 (R.I. 2003). An employee must demonstrate that a union's
failure to arbitrate a grievance amounted to unfair representation
before the employee can sue an employer in court. An employee
does not have standing to contest the merits of a contract claim in
court, unless the employee demonstrates that the union breached
its duty of fair representation.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Rosemary DiGuilio (DiGuilio) worked for the Department of
Corrections (DOC) as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and was a
member of the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers
union.' In January 2001, DiGuilio obtained a provisional regis-
tered nurse (RN) license and, as a result, received a promotion
from the DOC.2 In her new capacity at the DOC, DiGuilio was as-
signed to work a different shift from what she had previously
worked in her position as an LPN.3 In March 2001, DiGuilio ob-
tained her professional RN license.4 Subsequently, she bid on a
RN position on the shift that she had formerly worked when she
was a LPN. 5 DiGuilio lost her attempt for this bid to another un-
ion member whom the DOC determined to have more contractual
seniority than DiGuilio. 6 DiGuilio objected to the DOC's interpre-
tation of "seniority" and filed a grievance with the union.7 The un-
ion responded that it would not take DiGuilio's case to
arbitration.8 The DOC and union's collective bargaining agree-
ment stated that only the union, not individual employees, had
the ability to take a grievance to arbitration.9
Subsequently, DiGuilio brought an action in superior court.10
The union and the DOC responded by filing a motion to dismiss."
1. DiGuilio v. R.I. Bd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1271, 1272 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
20041
824 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:771
Their motion was based on the argument that the union had valid
reasons not to get involved, such as internal discipline and morale
and the potential conflict that could arise with two union members
pitted against one another. 12 However, the superior court justice
held that DiGuilio had standing to sue if she could demonstrate
that the contract was not administered according to its terms. 13
The justice denied the union and the DOC's motion to dismiss and
granted DiGuilio declaratory relief under the collective bargaining
agreement. 14 The justice then left it to the parties to work out a
suitable agreement to the dispute. 15 The justice later found that
the parties were unable to reach a mutually acceptable remedy to
the situation. 16 Thereafter, he placed DiGuilio in her desired posi-
tion, appointing her to the RN shift for which she had unsuccess-
fully bid. 17
BACKGROUND
There is a considerable amount of federal law in this area.'8
The key federal case that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would
rely upon was Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. 19 In that case,
truck drivers who had been fired for alleged dishonest conduct
filed a claim of wrongful discharge against their employer and
their labor union claiming that the falsity of the charges against
them could have been established through minimal investigation
and that the union breached its duty of fair representation. 20 The
United States Supreme Court held that a union's breach of its
duty of fair representation relieves an employee from adhering to
the procedures dictated by a collective bargaining agreement. 21
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
20. Id. at 556.
21. Id. at 570-71.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The issue of "whether an employee, who has unsuccessfully
petitioned her union to arbitrate her grievance, has the right to
seek a judicial remedy under a collective bargaining agreement in
the absence of a claim that the union's actions amounted to unfair
representation" is a question of first impression in Rhode Island. 22
The court relied heavily on federal labor law to reach its holding
that for an employee to succeed with a breach of contract claim
against his employer when his union refuses to arbitrate his
grievance, the employee must show: (1) that the employer
breached the contract and (2) that the union breached its duty of
fair representation to the employee. 23 In citing Hines in support of
its position, the court stated that the U.S. Supreme Court explic-
itly rejected the argument that "where the union refused to proc-
ess a grievance, the employee should be allowed his suit in court
without proof of the union's breach of duty."24 Instead, an em-
ployee must prove that the union breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation for the employee to have standing in court to bring a
claim against the employer. 25 Using this well-accepted principle of
federal labor law, the court applied the rule to the facts of
DiGuilio's case. In her case, DiGuilio failed to allege, much less
prove, that the union breached its duty of fair representation
when it refused to pursue arbitration of her grievance. 26 There-
fore, DiGuilio could not succeed with her contract claim because
she did not have standing under the collective bargaining agree-
ment to seek a remedy in court.27
The court discussed its reasoning behind the holding, stating
that a union has no duty to arbitrate a meritless grievance and
"must balance and consider the legitimate interests of all its
members."28 When one member of a union challenges a decision of
22. DiGuilio, 819 A.2d at 1273.
23. Id. (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71
(1976); Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901, 74 F.3d 344,
346 (1st Cir. 1996)).
24. DiGuilio, 819 A.2d at 1273 (quoting Hines, 424 U.S. at 570 n.10).
25. DiGuilio, 819 A.2d at 1273.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1274.
28. Id. at 1273 (citing Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Lo-
cal 901, 913 F.Supp. 74, 79 (D.P.R. 1995).
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the union, it has the potential to affect other members of the union
whose situation may be altered by such a decision.29 Thus, if the
court adopted DiGuilio's argument that she be permitted to pur-
sue her claim in court, the court would take decisions affecting the
rights and status of other union employees out of the hands of un-
ions and arbitrators and into the court system.30 Therefore, the
court reasoned that it was better to embrace the federal rule that,
before an employee can sue his or her employer in court, the em-
ployee must demonstrate that the union's failure to arbitrate his
or her grievance amounted to unfair representation.31
COMMENTARY
The question presented to the court in this case was one of
first impression in Rhode Island. The holding in the case repre-
sents a triumph for unionized employers whose collective bargain-
ing agreements provide that the union may bring a grievance to
arbitration but do not furnish an individual employee with a simi-
lar right.32 However, employees who are not satisfied with a un-
ion's action, or inaction, have no recourse under such collective
bargaining agreements unless the employee can show that the un-
ion breached its duty.33 The court deals with this by holding that
unions have a duty to fairly represent their members. This ruling
allows unions to determine what is best for their membership as a
whole, while permitting individual union members to bring a
claim in court only if the employee has been inadequately repre-
sented by his or her union.
CONCLUSION
The ruling in this case dictates that to sue an employer in
court despite the contrary language of a collective bargaining
agreement, an employee must first prove that a union's failure to
arbitrate a grievance amounted to unfair representation. If the
employee does not show that the union breached its duty of fair
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1274.
31. Id.
32. Effective Collective Bargaining Does Matter, RHODE ISLAND EMP. L.
LETTER (Powers, Kinder, Keeney) May 2003 at 1.
33. Id.
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representation, the employee does not have standing to contest
the merits of a claim in court.
Timothy G. Healy
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Mental Health Law/Constitutional Law. In re Stephanie B.,
826 A.2d 985 (R.I. 2003). The Rhode Island Family Court lacks the
statutory authority to enjoin a private, non-party mental health
care facility from refusing to treat a mentally-ill juvenile. Fur-
thermore, all orders issued by the family court must comply with
the minimum requirements of due process.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case is the consolidation of three separate cases arising
from the hospitalization of three mentally ill juveniles, Stephanie
B., Amanda A., and Thomas J. (hereinafter Stephanie, Amanda,
and Thomas), all of whom were under the temporary custody of
the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF).' The
facts underlying all three cases occurred during a two week span
in the summer of 2002.2 Prior to the litigation in question, DCYF
had Amanda and Thomas hospitalized for inpatient psychiatric
treatment at Butler Hospital (Butler), a private mental health
care facility.3 During an off-the-record status conference meeting
involving DCYF and Thomas' representatives, a meeting to which
Butler was not a party, the family court issued an order enjoining
Butler from discharging Thomas.4 Moreover, the family court is-
sued its order against Butler in the absence of any expert medical
testimony indicating that Thomas was still in need of hospitaliza-
tion.5
In response, Butler filed an emergency motion to vacate the
non-discharge order, along with two medical affidavits attesting
1. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d 985, 987 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 988.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 992. In response to the family court's actions, Butler produced
several doctors who were willing to testify that continued hospitalization was
no longer medically appropriate. After waiting outside the courtroom, the
doctors were informed that the order had simply been continued after a
bench conference, and that the court had no time to conduct a formal hearing
or to hear any testimony. Alarmed by the lack of formality in the family
court's procedures, the Rhode Island Supreme Court criticized the family
court as follows: "This procedure, including allowing busy professionals to
languish in the corridor only to be informed that the court had no time to
hear from them, in no way furthers the goal of increasing public confidence in
our courts." Id.
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that hospitalization was no longer medically appropriate. 6 Al-
though the family court was initially persuaded to allow Butler to
discharge Thomas, Butler agreed to continue hospitalization when
Thomas' condition deteriorated as he discovered that he would be
released to a homeless shelter due to the unavailability of an al-
ternative residential placement. 7 However, once Thomas had
again become ready for discharge, the family court again enjoined
Butler from discharging him because DCYF could not provide him
with an alternative residential placement.8 Similarly, the family
court enjoined Butler from discharging Amanda during the course
of a separate proceeding to which Butler was not a party.9 Al-
though that non-discharge order was "lacking in formality," Butler
complied with the order without further contest. 10
Unlike Thomas and Amanda, Stephanie was hospitalized
pursuant to a civil commitment order at Bradley Hospital (Brad-
ley), a private facility specializing in the psychiatric treatment of
juveniles.1 ' When Stephanie attained the age of eighteen, how-
ever, Bradley sought to have her transferred to Butler.12 Conse-
quently, while reviewing Stephanie's treatment plan, the family
court ordered Bradley to notify Butler concerning its desire to
transfer Stephanie. 13 The family court's order further stipulated
that if Butler refused to agree to Bradley's request, "Butler Hospi-
tal and/or its agents will be subpoenaed.. .and Butler Hospital
will be expected to show cause why they are unable to assist Brad-
ley Hospital with its plan."14
Here again, Butler was not a party to the proceeding from
which the order was issued, nor was Butler notified of the family
court's order until after it had been issued.15 In response, Butler
sought to vacate the show cause order on the following grounds: 1)
6. Id. at 988-89.
7. Id. at 989.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 987-88.
10. Id. at 988. The Court noted that the order enjoining Butler from dis-
charging Amanda had been "merely handwritten on the back of a way-
ward/delinquent event hearing sheet." Id.
11. Id. at 987-88.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 988.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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the order was issued without service of process; 2) Butler was de-
nied the opportunity to be heard; and 3) the order exceeded the
family court's jurisdictional authority. 16 In light of testimony given
by Stephanie's attending psychiatrist that transfer to Butler
would be inappropriate, the family court excused Butler from any
further participation in Stephanie's treatment plan.17 Despite be-
coming moot, however, the show cause order against Butler was
never vacated.' 8 On May 7, 2003, Butler filed three petitions for
certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme Court alleging that the
family court had not only exceeded the scope of its statutory au-
thority, but had also violated Butler's due process rights.19 The
court agreed to decide the issues raised by Butler despite the fact
that all three juveniles had since been released from Butler.20 In
recognizing that the issues raised on appeal were "capable of repe-
tition while evading review," the court granted Butler's request for
a hearing under the exception to the mootness doctrine. 21
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ultimately held that the
family court exceeded both its statutory and constitutional author-
ity when it issued a series of ex parte orders compelling Butler to
provide inpatient psychiatric care to Amanda, Thomas, and
Stephanie.22 The Court noted that the family court has the ple-
nary authority "to hear and determine cases pertaining to way-
ward or dependant children who need custodial care or
treatment."23 Moreover, the family court has the sole authority to
review all civil commitment petitions concerning minors under the
age of eighteen.24 However, because the family court "has no gen-
eral equitable power,"25 its powers are limited to those expressly
granted by the legislature. 26 Therefore, the family court derives its
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 987.
20. Id. at 988-89.
21. Id. at 989.
22. Id. at 995.
23. Id. at 992 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3 (1997)).
24. Id. at 992 (citing R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-8 (1997)).
25. Id. at 993 (citing Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I. 1985)).
26. Id. at 992 (citing Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 963 (R.I. 2000)).
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authority to order inpatient psychiatric treatment exclusively
from the Mental Health Law. 27
Hence, the family court may exercise its authority under the
Mental Health Law to impose inpatient psychiatric treatment
upon a juvenile under a civil commitment order if all of the statu-
torily mandated procedural requirements have been met.28 There-
fore, since neither Thomas nor Amanda had been admitted to
Butler under a civil commitment order, the court concluded that
there was no statutory authority under which the family court
could order further inpatient treatment.29 Moreover, although
Stephanie had been admitted to Bradley under a civil commitment
order, the family court's show cause order against Butler did not
comport with the procedural requirements for transferring a civ-
illy committed patient from one facility to another.30 In each case,
therefore, the court concluded that the family court failed to com-
ply with the procedural dictates of the Mental Health Law.31
In addition to exceeding its statutory authority, the family
court failed to comply with the minimum constitutional require-
ments of due process. Under both the United States and Rhode Is-
land Constitutions, a court order is invalid unless the issuing
court has obtained personal jurisdiction over the party against
whom the order has been issued.32 A court obtains personal juris-
diction only if the party has been served with process, and has
been given an opportunity to make an appearance in court either
27. See generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-1 (1997).
28. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 993. Under the procedural require-
ments of the Mental Health Law, the civil commitment process must begin
with the filing of a petition attesting that the individual in question "is in
need of care and treatment and that a likelihood of serious harm by reason of
mental disability exists." R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-8(b). After a preliminary
hearing, the individual in question is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing,
whereby the court must determine "by clear and convincing evidence"
whether the individual "is in need of care and treatment in a facility,
and... whose continued unsupervised presence in the community would, by
reason of mental disability, create a likelihood of serious harm." § 40.1-5(i)-
(j).
29. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 993.
30. A patient who has been certified for treatment in one facility may be
transferred to another facility only "when deemed in the interest of the pa-
tient and approved by the transferring and receiving facilities." R.I. GEN:
LAws § 40.1-5-32 (1997).
31. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 993.
32. Id.
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to contest the merits of the claim or to contest jurisdiction. 33 Al-
though a court may issue a temporary restraining order without
notice to the adverse party under certain exigent circumstances, 34
such an order is merely "a temporary stopgap measure" that must
"expire by its terms."35 In sum, a court violates due process when
it indefinitely enjoins a party in the absence of prior notice and
the opportunity to be heard.
The family court properly exercised jurisdiction over Amanda,
Thomas, and Stephanie, thereby having the authority to review
the progress of their respective treatment plans.36 However, be-
cause Butler was not a party to any of the treatment hearings, 37
the family court could not exercise jurisdiction over Butler without
service of process and an opportunity to be heard. Since Butler
was not properly served with process, 38 the family court violated
Butler's due process rights by indefinitely enjoining Butler from
refusing to treat Amanda, Thomas, and Stephanie. Moreover, the
court questioned whether a private inpatient facility could ever be
compelled to treat a patient, even if all the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. 39
COMMENTARY
In sum, the Court declared all the orders issued against But-
ler to be null and void because they were procedurally deficient on
due process grounds, and they exceeded the scope of the family
court's limited statutory authority. In prior case law, the court has
limited the scope of the family court's jurisdictional powers "over
matters that the Legislature has expressly designated." 40 Al-
33. Id.
34. A temporary restraining order may be issued in order "to prevent
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage," but must expire by its
terms. Id. at 994.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 992.
37. Id. at 994.
38. Id.
39. "In the context of outpatient treatment, we have opined that a private
facility ought not be ordered to accept a patient unless willing to do so. By
implication, a private inpatient facility should be afforded the same protec-
tion." Id. at 995.
40. Hovarth v. Craddock, 828 A.2d 1212, 1214-15 (R.I. 2003); see gener-
ally Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000); Rhode Island Central
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though the family court is not a court of "general equitable
power,"4' it may exercise its equitable authority within matters
"arising out of the family relationship."42 Of particular significance
is the court's insistence that the family court's equitable jurisdic-
tion is procedurally restricted to matters arising from "a petition
for divorce, bed and board, or separate maintenance." 43 The issu-
ance of an ex parte injunction against a non-party is "equitable in
nature."44 Therefore, the family court may issue an ex parte order
against a non-party only in matters arising from, or relating to, a
divorce proceeding. 45 Despite the fact that the legislature has de-
clared that the statute from which the family court was created
should be "liberally construed,"46 the Court has chosen to restrict,
rather than to expand, the scope of the family court's equitable au-
thority under its organic statute in matters not arising from a di-
vorce proceeding.47
The repeated act of issuing ex parte injunctions against But-
ler in mattersrelating not to divorce, but rather to the mental
health of three juveniles, indicates a failure on the part of the fam-
ily court to comprehend the limits placed upon its equitable pow-
ers by the Rhode Island Supreme Court's prior case law.
Moreover, the family court failed to comprehend the limits of its
authority to act under the Mental Health law, especially pertain-
ing to the conditions of Stephanie's civil commitment. A patient
who has been certified to receive treatment at one facility may be
transferred to another facility only with the approval of the receiv-
Credit Union v. Pazienza, 572 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1990); Waldeck v. Piner, 488
A.2d 1218 (R.I. 1985).
41. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 993.
42. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-10-3(a).
43. Rubano, 759 A.2d at 965 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-10-3(a)).
44. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 994.
45. See Rhode Island Central Credit Union v. Pazienza, 572 A.2d 296,
297 (R.I.1990) (holding that the family court properly exercised its equitable
jurisdiction in issuing an ex parte order temporarily enjoining a non-party
mortgagee from foreclosing on a home to which full title was awarded to the
wife pursuant to a valid divorce decree).
46. R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-10-2. The legislature has declared in full that the
statute "shall be liberally construed to the end that families whose unity or
well-being is threatened shall be assisted and protected, and restored, if pos-
sible, as secure units of law-abiding members." Id.
47. See Hovarth v. Craddock, 828 A.2d 1212, 1215 (R.I. 2003); Rubano,
759 A.2d at 964-65; Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I. 1985).
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ing facility. 48 Hence, the family court clearly violated the Mental
Health Law by issuing an order compelling Butler to show cause
as to why it refused to accept Stephanie's transfer from Bradley
because the Mental Health Law confers no authority under which
a court could compel a mental health facility to accept a patient.49
Furthermore, the court was justified in reaching the merits of
Butler's appeal despite the fact that Thomas, Stephanie, and
Amanda had since been discharged from Butler. The foundational
premise underlying the Mental Health Law is that the state's in-
patient psychiatric facilities should be reserved for those patients
who are in need of inpatient treatment.50 However, the family
court issued the non-discharge injunctions against Butler in re-
sponse to the failure of DCYF to provide three mentally-ill juve-
niles under its custody with an adequate residential facility, while
giving no consideration to whether the juveniles were in need of
continued inpatient care.51 As such, the essence of Butler's com-
plaint was that DCYF had conspired with the family court to
transform Butler's psychiatric facilities into a warehouse for men-
tally-ill juveniles, while affording Butler with no opportunity to
preserve its interest in reserving its limited resources for patients
who were in actual need of inpatient treatment. In recognizing
that the inability of DCYF to provide these mentally-ill juveniles
with adequate residential placements involved issues "of extreme
public importance, which are capable of repetition but which
evade review,"52 the court wisely concluded that the mootness doc-
trine should not pose a barrier to the court's responsibility in pre-
48. R.I. GEN. LAws § 40.1-5-32(b) (1997).
49. See R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hosps. v. R.B., 549
A.2d 1028, 1032 (R.I. 1988) ("No community mental health center should be
ordered to accept a patient suffering from [a] mental disability unless its offi-
cials are willing to do so.").
50. See R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, 549 A.2d at 1030-31 (holding that a
district court judge presiding over a civil commitment hearing may impose
out-patient treatment at one of the state's community mental health centers
in lieu of confinement to an in-patient facility whenever out-patient treat-
ment is found to be the least restrictive alternative in accordance with "the
care and treatment necessary and appropriate to [the patient's] condition"
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(10))).
51. In re Stephanie B., 826 A.2d at 989.
52. Id. (quoting Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I. 1980)).
SURVEY SECTION
venting the family court from continuing to exceed the limited
scope of its judicial authority.53
CONCLUSION
This case essentially reaffirms the court's prior holdings that
the family court's equitable powers are strictly limited to matters
arising out of petitions for divorce and other similar proceedings.
The family court, therefore, may not extend its equitable authority
into matters relating to the psychiatric treatment of juveniles, but
must instead act in strict accordance with the procedural dictates
of the Mental Health Law. Moreover, in matters relating to the
inpatient care of mentally-ill juveniles, the family court must ad-
here to the basic requirements of due process by affording all af-
fected parties with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Hence, the family court may not compel a private, non-party men-
tal health facility to treat a mentally-ill juvenile.
Cameron J. Jones
53. See id. at 995 ("Finally, it has not escaped our attention that the need
for appropriate residential placements for children in DCYF custody who no
longer require acute mental health treatment should. be addressed; however,
the ultimate solution lies not with the judiciary, but with the other two
branches of state government.").
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Municipal Law. Champlin's Realty Associates, L.P. v. Tillson,
823 A.2d 1162 (R.I. 2003). The Coastal Resources Management
Council shall have exclusive jurisdiction over commercial ferry op-
erations in the absence of an express legislative grant of regula-
tory authority to the municipalities.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Payne's New Harbor Dock (Payne's) and Champlin's Marina
(Champlin's) own and operate docking facilities in the New Har-
bor section of the Great Salt Pond.' The Pond is a tidal water body
on Block Island that is connected to the Atlantic Ocean by way of
a man-made breachway.2 Both docks were scheduled to be the
primary loading and unloading points for ferry service to the is-
land as provided by the Hi-Speed ferry (Hi-Speed) and Viking
Quest's ferry, the Montauk (Montauk).3
After the Montauk began ferrying visitors into Champlin's
Marina, the Block Island building official, Marc Tillson, notified
Champlin's that the commercially zoned district encompassing its
wharf did not permit such ferry terminals. 4 On October 18, 2000,
the Town of New Shoreham (Block Island) issued a cease and de-
sist order prohibiting the Montauk from docking at Champlin's. 5
Soon thereafter, on February 26, 2001, the town presented
Payne's with a similar cease and desist order prohibiting Hi-
Speed's ferry from docking at their facility. 6
Champlin's, Hi-Speed, and Viking Quest sought declaratory
and injunctive relief in superior court to block the town's enforce-
ment of the orders. 7 The superior court concluded, by virtue of the
docks' location below the mean high-water mark, that the Coastal
Resources Management Council (CRMC) retained exclusive juris-
diction over the matter, not the Town of New Shoreham.8
1. Champlin's Realty Associates, L.P. v. Tillson, 823 A.2d 1162, 1164
(R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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The town asserted that it had regulatory authority over the
docking activities taking place in the Great Salt Pond pursuant to
an 1887 legislative grant of ownership from the state to the Town
of New Shoreham.9 The town asserted that by transferring owner-
ship of the pond to the town, the state relinquished all rights to
regulate within the pond in favor of the town's exclusive jurisdic-
tion.'0 Alternatively, the town asserted that it had concurrent ju-
risdiction to prohibit the docking activities by virtue of its zoning
authority over the land appurtenant to the docks."
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The sole issue on appeal was whether the Town of New
Shoreham possessed jurisdiction over commercial ferry operations
occurring in the Great Salt Pond.' 2 After concluding that the town
possessed neither exclusive nor concurrent jurisdiction, the court
indicated that any regulatory authority the town may have pos-
sessed over ferry operations had since been revoked and pre-
empted by clear delegations to the CRMC.' 3 The town presented
alternate arguments based on exclusive jurisdiction and concur-
rent jurisdiction.
First, the town contended that it possessed exclusive author-
ity to regulate ferry operations within the Great Salt Pond by vir-
tue of the 1887 legislative act which granted and ceded all the
"right, title and interest of the state" in the pond to Block Island.' 4
Because this interpretation purports to grant rights in tidal lands
to the town, the court considered the grant's legal effect in light of
the public trust doctrine.' 5 The public trust doctrine dictates that
the state holds title to all land below the high-water mark in a
proprietary capacity for the public benefit.1 6 The court traced the
development of the doctrine from its foundation in Greek philoso-
phy, to its application in British common law, and its eventual
codification in the Rhode Island colonial charter and subsequent
9. Id. at 1164-65.
10. Id. at 1165.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1169-70.
14. Id. at 1165.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Rhode Island Constitution. 17 As applied in the context of a land
grant encompassing tidal lands, the court opined that state trans-
fer of ownership in land to a municipality, is merely a transfer of
title to the land, the jus privatum.18 Moreover, the state cannot di-
vest itself of its obligation to preserve the public right to access
and enjoy tidal lands, the jus publicum, without an explicit dele-
gation of such regulatory authority. 19 Because the 1887 legislative
grant did not explicitly confer such authority upon the Town of
New Shoreham, the state only transferred the jus privatum in the
instant case. 20 Therefore, the court concluded that the state did
not confer exclusive regulatory authority to the town through the
1887 grant.21
Second, the town alternatively claimed concurrent jurisdiction
over the pond.22 The town's rationale was premised on the belief
that, as an indirect consequence of its power to regulate the dry
land appurtenant to the dock through its zoning ordinances, it had
the power to enjoin the use of the dock itself.23 The court dis-
agreed, noting that while the town may regulate the activities of
the upland area around a wharf, that power falls well short of the
power to veto a commercial ferry operation.24 The court stressed
that the CRMC is the exclusive regulatory body for commercial
ferry operations.25 In light of the court's earlier finding that the
jus publicum remained with the state and that the authority to
regulate upland does not translate into the authority to regulate
the use of appurtenant tidal lands, the court determined that the
Town of New Shoreham lacked any regulatory power to disallow
commercial ferry operations. 26
17. Id. at 1166.
18. Id. at 1166-67.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1167.
22. Id. at 1165.
23. Id. at 1167-68.
24. Id. at 1168.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1168-69.
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COMMENTARY
In Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 7 a case decided by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court four years earlier, the court held
that the CRMC has "exclusive jurisdiction over residential, non-
commercial boat wharves that are constructed on tidal land."
28
The Thornton-Whitehouse decision was narrow in scope, and did
not hold that the CRMC has exclusive jurisdiction over all recrea-
tional boating facilities, irrespective of where they are constructed
or the nature of their use. 29 In Champlin's, however, the court was
forced to evaluate how this convergence of municipal zoning power
and the CRMC's regulatory authority would operate in the context
of commercial docking activities.
Contrary to the court's holding in Thornton-Whitehouse, the
Champlin's decision stands for a broad reading of the CRMC's
regulatory authority. In extending the Thorton-Whitehouse deci-
sion, the Champlin's court holds that, in addition to regulating
residential, noncommercial boat wharves, the CRMC is the only
regulatory body with jurisdiction over commercial docking activi-
ties as well. If the Thorton-Whitehouse decision presented only a
minor setback to municipal zoning authority over tidal lands, the
Champlin's decision represents the proverbial knockout punch.
Both cases strongly indicate that the CRMC possesses jurisdiction
over all docking activities in tidal lands generally, barring an ex-
plicit delegation state delegation of authority to the municipality.
The public trust doctrine holds that the state retains title to
all land below the high-water mark in a proprietary capacity for
the benefit of the public. In other words, the state is entrusted
with the duty of preserving the public's right to enjoy the tidal
lands. While the Champlin's holding relies upon the public trust
doctrine to justify why a state regulatory agency, the CRMC, and
not the Town of New Shoreham, has jurisdiction over commercial
docking activities in the Great Salt Pond, it unknowingly employs
the doctrine to preserve a private commercial enterprise against
the will of the people. As utilized here, the doctrine is not preserv-
ing the general public's ability to access or use tidal lands, rather,
27. Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255 (R.I. 1999).
28. Id. at 1262.
29. Id.
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it is justifying the maintenance of a private commercial enterprise
unwanted by local residents.
At the very least, the town should be granted concurrent ju-
risdiction over the tidal lands appurtenant to the upland region
they control. Any other regulatory scheme hampers a municipal-
ity's ability to properly regulate their sovereign coastal domain be-
cause the town is functionally unable to respond to most
situations arising out of the tidal lands. While the state, in the
form of the CRMC, is empowered to allow a commercial ferry ser-
vice to dock in the Great Salt Pond, the town is powerless to de-
fend itself against such a decision and potential upland
repercussions. True tests to the court's holding in Champlin's may
come when more repugnant activities such as gas pumping or
dock expansion are proposed on tidal lands. These questions will
undoubtedly be presented in the near and future, and the munici-
palities will certainly not accede jurisdiction without a fight.
CONCLUSION
The CRMC enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over commercial ferry
operations. The extent of a municipality's power over commercial
ferry operations is limited to regulating construction of buildings,
landscaping, lighting, and any other use of the upland.
Allen G. Bowman
SURVEY SECTION
Municipal Law/Constitutional Law. Gardner v. Cumberland
Town Council, 826 A.2d 972 (R.I. 2003). This case involved the
constitutionality of a city council's decision to abandon a street.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that it did not have ju-
risdiction to review the merits of the city council's decision and
that the plaintiffs' procedural rights, the opportunity to be heard
and notice, afforded in the enabling statute, had not been violated.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The Millers, who owned property on both sides of an unnamed
street, petitioned the Cumberland Town Council to abandon the
street.' The Gardners, who owned a flower and gardening center
that abutted the unnamed street, objected. 2 After the town council
continued the petition several times, it finally notified the Gard-
ners and other abutting property owners that it would hold a
hearing on the petition.3 In two town meetings, the town council
heard evidence to determine whether or not the street had ceased
to be useful to the public. 4
The council met to vote on the Millers' petition with the Mill-
ers, the Gardners, and their respective lawyers present.5 At the
meeting, both lawyers voiced their concern that the newly elected
town council members would be voting on the petition without
hearing the evidence. 6 The town solicitor and the Gardners' attor-
ney asked the new council members if they felt comfortable voting
on the matter and they all responded in the affirmative.7 The town
council then voted unanimously to abandon the street.8 Although
section 24-6-1(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws provides that
personal notice shall be served upon every owner of land abutting
a street which has been abandoned, the plaintiffs never received
such notice. 9 The town council also failed to assess whether aban-
1. Gardner v. Cumberland Town Council, 826 A.2d 972, 974 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 974-75.
8. Id. at 975.
9. Id. at 980. R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-6-1(a) provides "personal notice shall
be served upon every owner of land abutting upon that part of the highway or
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donment of the street caused any damages to the abutting land-
owners. 10
The Gardners appealed the council's decision to the superior
court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction." The
superior court found that section 24-6-1 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, which addresses the abandonment of highways or
driftways by towns, did not provide a right of appeal. 12 The Gard-
ners appealed the superior court's decision to dismiss and also pe-
titioned for a writ of certiorari to review the council's order.13 The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island issued the writ and granted the
appeal. 14 The court then granted a joint motion to dismiss the
Gardners' appeal. 15 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled only
on the writ. 16
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The first issue addressed by the court was whether the court
could review the council's abandonment order. 17 The Court ruled
that the town council was acting prospectively and thus "whether
it is expedient to discontinue a highway is a question for legisla-
tive decision." 8 As a result, the Court did not have the jurisdiction
to review the merits of the town council's decision. 19 Justice Gold-
berg, who dissented, concluded that although the ultimate deci-
sion was legislative, the procedure that surrounded the decision
was part judicial and part legislative.20
The majority then ruled on whether the plaintiffs were given
an opportunity to be heard. The enabling statute that allows a
town council to declare a street abandoned includes several proce-
driveway which has been abandoned who is known to reside within this
state...."
10. Id. at 977.
11. Id. at 975.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 976 (quoting 2 ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS § 1182 (4th ed.
1926) as in Godena v. Gobeille, 143 A.2d 290, 293 (R.I. 1958)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 984.
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dural protections such as the requirement of actual notice to an
abutter, and an opportunity to appear and be heard for or against
the abandonment. 21 In addition, the town council must, at the
same time, appraise and award damages.22 The plaintiffs argued
that they were denied an opportunity to be heard because at the
time of the vote the city council did not have a quorum since only
three of the city council members attended the prior hearings in
which evidence on this matter was heard. 23 Section 408 of the
Code of Ordinances of Cumberland, Rhode Island, indicates that
"four members of the Town Council shall constitute a quorum for
the transaction of business, but a smaller number may adjourn
from time to time."24 The majority ruled that it is enough if those
who decide on a matter have "considered and appraised the evi-
dence."25 The court held that the council's decision was valid be-
cause all seven council members voted after "educating
themselves" about the evidence. 26 The Court relied on the fact that
written minutes and videotapes of the previous hearings were
available for review by the council members.27
The dissent disagreed with the majority and argued that the
plaintiffs were denied an opportunity to be heard.28 The dissent
relied on the Court's previous decision in D'Agostino v. Doorley
which held that the statutory processes surrounding abandonment
"must be scrupulously followed." 29 Justice Goldberg concluded that
the process was not scrupulously followed because no meaningful
opportunity to be heard occurred since the majority of the council
had not been present at the prior hearing.30 The dissent found the
21. Id. at 977.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 978.
24. Id. at 978-979 (quoting CUMBERLAND CODE § 408).
25. Id. at 979 (quoting Younkin v. Boltz, 216 A.2d 714, 715 (Md. 1966)).
26. Id. The Court relied on the presumption that "regularity supports the
official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the con-
trary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official du-
ties." Id. (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-
15 (1926)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 983.
29. Id. at 982 (quoting D'Agostino v. Doorley, 375 A.2d 948, 950-51 (R.I.
1977)).
30. Id.
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council members' comfort level concerning the decision was irrele-
vant.31
Finally, the majority found that although section 24-6-1(a) of
the Rhode Island General Laws provides for personal notice when
a street is abandoned the fact that the plaintiffs were not given
notice was of no legal consequence since both were present at the
town council meeting.3 2 The court ruled that attendance at the
process was considered a waiver of the right to object to a defect
concerning notice of any proceedings that occurred at the meeting
unless "the person who raises the issue of the defect in notices be
in some way disadvantaged or aggrieved by such defect."33 The
Court found that no such disadvantage had taken place in this
case.
The dissent stated that the town council's failure to comply
with the enabling statute also invalidated the council's decision. 34
Justice Goldberg concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to
know whether or not they would be compensated. 35 Since the town
council failed to address the issue of damages at the December
meeting, Justice Goldberg argued that the lack of notice should
render the council's decision invalid. 36 Justice Goldberg also ex-
pressed concern that under section 24-6-4 of the Rhode Island
General Laws a property owner may, within one year after the
making of the award, petition the superior court for a jury deter-
mination of damages against the town.37 Since the plaintiffs were
never given notice of the council's decision to award damages (or
in this case the lack thereof) the one year limitations period began
to run even before the plaintiffs knew of the council's determina-
tion.38
31. Id. at 984.
32. Id. at 980.
33. Id. at 980-81 (quoting Graziano v. Rhode Island State Lottery
Comm'n, 810 A.2d 215, 222 (R.I. 2002)).
34. Id. at 985.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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COMMENTARY
Curiously, the court found the council's duty to assess dam-
ages to abutting land owners quasi-judicial, but allowed the coun-
cil members to determine the damages without ever hearing the
evidence. In judicial proceedings, judges hear evidence, make cer-
tain determinations about the credibility of witnesses, and ulti-
mately render decisions. Applying the majority's ruling to this
scenario, the court would allow a judge to be absent from a trial
but still render a decision about damages after reading the trial
transcript. Of course such a situation offends our basic under-
standing of fairness. It does not seem to make sense to excuse the
actions of a city council because the damages assessment occurred
in a quasi-judicial setting. Rather, the court should be more will-
ing to safeguard the rights of those being affected in order to pro-
mote legislative accountability, fairness and effectiveness.
The dissent concluded that the plaintiffs were not given an ef-
fective opportunity to be heard because three of the city council
members were not present during the previous hearing.39 Al-
though the dissent admonished the council's conduct, Justice
Goldberg never explained why such an absence would constitute a
lack of an opportunity to be heard.40 Such a determination was a
perfect opportunity to discuss the policy issues that the majority
neglected to consider. In congressional as well as presidential de-
bates the issue of attendance is considered important. Absence
from the House or Senate during voting implies an unwillingness
to be an active member of that particular legislative body. At the
local level, promoting effective and active council members is
equally important. By ruling that a city council member may not
vote if he or she is not present at the prior fact finding hearing en-
sures that such members will actively participate in the legislative
process from the fact finding phase to the decision. Moreover, re-
quiring attendance at the fact finding phase increases accountabil-
ity. Instead of relying on second hand information that has been
filtered, the elected member must use his or her experiences and
observations from previous hearings.
39. Id. at 983.
40. Justice Goldberg stated that "at best, this case represents sloppy and
uninformed practices by a newly elected town council." Id. at 985.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that it could not re-
view a city council's decision to abandon a street because such a
determination is legislative. In addition, the court found that the
Gardners' rights had not been violated even though the enabling
statute was not "scrupulously followed." 41 The court ruled that the
town council did give the Gardners a meaningful opportunity to be
heard despite the fact that three of the council members had not
been present at the previous hearing and the council failed to pro-
vide the Gardners with actual notice of the abandonment. This
case is an important contribution to the now existing law in that it
emphasizes that attending a hearing generally constitutes a
waiver of any defect in notice and that legislative discretion may
overcome some procedural deficiencies.
Dena Rinetti
41. Id. at 982.
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Property Law/Constitutional Law. Sells!Greene Building Co.
v. Rossi, PB 02-1019; Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, PB
02-2778, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66 (Apr. 23, 2003). The
Mechanics' Lien Law of the General Laws of Rhode Island, which
provides that a mechanics' lien can attach to property prior to any
hearing, is unconstitutional as a violation of the due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island
Constitution.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case involved two separate mechanics' liens that
Petitioners placed on the property of the Respondents, Robert and
Lisa Rossi; by agreement the two cases were consolidated into this
one action.1 Respondents owned property in Smithfield, Rhode
Island and entered into a contract with Petitioner Sells/Greene
Building Company for construction of an office building and other
improvements to the property.2 Petitioner Gem Plumbing and
Heating Company also entered into a contract with the Rossis to
provide and install water and sewer lines on the property. 3 Both
Petitioners properly recorded their notices of intention to claim a
mechanics' lien in accordance with sections 34-28-4 and -5 of the
Rhode Island General Laws.4 Consistent with section 34-28-10,
within 120 days of filing its notice of intent, Sells filed both a
petition to enforce the mechanics' lien and a notice of lis pendens
in the amount of $129, 807.78, for unpaid labor and materials. 5
Similarly, 120 days after filing its notice of intent, Petitioner Gem
1. Sells/Greene Bldg. Co. v. Rossi, PB 02-1019, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS
66, at *5-6 (Apr. 23, 2003). The court has already granted Respondents'
motions to dissolve the mechanics' liens and notices of lis pendens because
the amount paid by Respondents into the court registry was substituted to
secure any valid mechanics' lien claim of the Petitioners. This case here is the
Respondents' challenge to the constitutionality of Rhode Island's Mechanics'
Lien Law. Id. at *4-5.
2. Id. at *2.3. Id. at *3.
4. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-28-4 (1995) provides both the substantive
requirements for notices of intention as well as the time periods and locations
in which they must be filed. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-28-5 (1995) instructs the
town clerk to maintain a record of the notices of intention to claim a lien.
5. 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *2-4.
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also filed a notice of lis pendens and a petition to enforce the
mechanics' lien for unpaid labor and materials in the amount of
$35,500.00.6
Prior to any form of hearing, the Respondents paid into the
court registry $166,264.66 in order to dissolve the liens.7 Along
with the payment, Respondents filed a motion to dissolve, release,
and discharge the mechanics' liens in accordance with section 34-
28-17 of the statute.8 The court granted the motion, noting that
the deposited funds in the registry were sufficient to secure the
Petitioners' mechanics' lien claims. 9 Thereafter, Respondents
challenged the constitutionality of the Mechanics' Lien Law and
sought a release of funds from the court registry.'0 At oral
argument, Respondents argued this statute resulted in an
unconstitutional taking of property without due process," because
the only way a property owner could remove the lien before a
hearing was either to file a bond or provide the court registry with
sufficient cash to cover the amount claimed in the lien. 12 The court
did not decide that issue at that time; rather, it invited the
Attorney General and various construction and trade associations
to file amicus curiae briefs. 13 The Attorney General thereafter filed
a brief, arguing that the statute did not violate due process. 14 On
February 6, 2003, the Superior Court of Rhode Island heard full
arguments from both sides on the issue regarding the
constitutionality of the Mechanics' Lien Law. 15 The court
6. Id. at *3-4.
7. Id. at *4. $130,404.66 was paid for the Sells/Greene claim (including
filing costs, etc.) and $35,860.00 was paid toward the Gem claim. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at *5.
11. Id. at *7.
12. Id. at *5-6.13. Id. at *5.
14. Id. at *7-8. Court rules require that when the constitutionality of a
state statute is challenged, notification of such a challenge must be given to
the state's Attorney General. R.I. R. APP. P., art. 1, Rule 32(b).
15. Sells, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *6. This action took place in front
of Judge Silverstein on the business calendar. This court was designed to be
more flexible than the Bankruptcy Court and is intended to expedite
resolutions of business disputes. See Judith Kelliher, He's All Business, R.I.
LAW TRIB., Jan. 30-Feb. 5, 2002, at 9.
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subsequently held that the statute in its current form was indeed
unconstitutional.16
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
When the law authorizes the "taking of a significant property
interest [that is] protected by the Fifth Amendment,"17 an
individual is entitled to the rights of due process. Petitioners here
claimed that a mechanics' lien does not constitute a significant
taking of property18 and even if it does, then the law provides
adequate due process protections. 19 In rejecting both these
assertions, the court relied on Connecticut v. Doehr,20 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that an attachment was the
taking of a significant property interest because it "clouds title;
impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate property; taints
any credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity
loan ... ; and can even place an existing mortgage in technical
default. . ."21 The court reasoned the mechanics' lien in question
here likewise forces the property owner to either lose his ability to
transfer the property, or in the alternative, lose access to the cash
that is required to release the lien. 22 Additionally, the lien clouds
the property owner's title and also creates the possibility of
default on mortgage provisions. 23 Therefore, the mechanics' lien
constitutes a taking of a significant property interest requiring
due process protections. 24
The court next held that, contrary to Petitioners' assertions,
the Rhode Island Mechanics' Lien Law does not provide adequate
safeguards to guarantee sufficient due process protections. 25 A
16. Id. at *47.
17. Id. at *32 (citing Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1517 (1st
Cir. 1991)).
18. Id. at *34.
19. Id. at *7-8.
20. 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
21. Sells, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *28 (citing Doehr, 501 U.S. at
11). Unlike this case, Doehr dealt with prejudgment attachment of real
estate. However, the court here concluded that such attachment has the same
effects as a mechanics' lien.
22. Sells, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *40.
23. Id. at *39-40.
24. Id. at *37.
25. Id. at *45.
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lack of due process exists because the property owner is deprived
of a significant property interest before he or she has the
opportunity for a hearing. 26 Secondly, the lien is unconstitutional
because it becomes enforceable over the property without the
claimant having to demonstrate that it is valid, or if the
underlying debt even exists. 27 While it is true that Petitioners may
be subject to perjury for lying on the claim petition, this was held
to be an insufficient protection for what might be an erroneous
deprivation of property.28 Further due process protections are
required because serious "repercussions flow before the property
owner has any opportunity to challenge the truth, accuracy, or
validity of the amounts claimed under the lien."29 The court found
that requiring a hearing before the issuance of the lien would not
unduly burden the courts of the State and would satisfy the
requirements of procedural due process. 30
COMMENTARY
This decision constitutes an arguably long-overdue
interpretation of the Mechanics' Lien Law in Rhode Island.
Interestingly, this case does not represent the first time a court
has stricken down a Rhode Island lien or attachment law on due
process grounds. 31 For instance, in response to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shelvin,32 the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island held that
Rhode Island's procedure for prejudgment attachments was
unconstitutional 33 because the attachment allowed property to be
taken without judicial notice or a hearing.34 In deciding that case,
the court specially noted that to be effective, section10-5-2, only
required the writ of attachment to be stamped by the clerk and
26. Id. at *43.
27. Id. at *42-43.
28. Id. at *44-45.
29. Id. at *43.
30. Id. at *47.
31. See, e.g., infra notes 32, 33 and 40.
32. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
33. See McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F.Supp. 1013 (D.R.I.
1972).
34. In that case, a woman who failed to make payments on her furniture
had her car repossessed before any complaint or writ of attachment was
served on her. Id. at 1014.
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delivered to the sheriff with a summons and a complaint. 35 Like
the Mechanics' Lien Law, property was taken without any due
process protections whatsoever.
McClellan sparked numerous changes in Rhode Island laws
on the procedures for liens and attachments. For example, the
Rhode Island Superior Court amended Rule 4(j) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure to require a hearing before
attachment to property, at which the claimant has the burden of
establishing his claim will be successful. 36 To further satisfy the
requirements of McClellan, the Rhode Island General Assembly
amended section 10-5-2 to require notice and a hearing before
attachment to property can occur.3 7 As Justice Silverstein opined
in Sells, "These responses recognized that constitutional due
process requires an opportunity to be heard before property
interests can be interfered with by the mechanism of a writ of
attachment."38
In 1994, the Rhode Island government continued to amend its
laws to provide the appropriate level of due process required for
attachments.3 9 In Shawmut Bank of Rhode Island v. Costello,40 the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held unconstitutional section 10-
5-5 of the Rhode Island General Laws, which had allowed judges
to grant writs of attachment after a party filed a complaint, even
though it provided for a post deprivation hearing after the
attachment was granted.41 Despite the post-attachment hearing,
the statute violated due process because "the right to be notified
and the opportunity to be heard must be granted 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."'42 Similarly here, the court
correctly overruled the Mechanics' Lien Law because while the
property owner is given his day in court, such a day comes only
after the property interest is lost, which is too late to satisfy due
process.
35. Id.
36. Sells/Greene Bldg. Co. v. Rossi, No. 02-1019, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS
66, at *21-22 (Apr. 23, 2003).
37. R.I. GEN. LAWS §10-5-2 (1997). See 1973 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 109, § 1.
38. Sells, 2003 R.I. Super. LEXIS 66, at *24.
39. Id. at *31.
40. 643 A.2d 194 (1994).
41. Id. at 202.
42. Id. at 198 (quoting Fuentes v. Shelvin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1992)).
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There is relatively little discrepancy between the property
interests affected by an attachment or through a mechanics' lien.
Both deny the property owner the full use and benefits of his or
her property by virtue of clouding the title, or in the case of the
mechanics' lien, through the loss of the availability of the cash for
the bond that is required to release the lien. Therefore, in light of
these similarities, Rhode Island law must require the same
guarantees of due process for both attachment and mechanics'
liens proceedings. The Sells decision simply represents another
step in Rhode Island's evolution to bring its laws in line with the
guarantees of due process its citizens are entitled to enjoy.
CONCLUSION
Rhode Island's Mechanics' Lien Law is unconstitutional
because it denies the property owner his guaranteed right to
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island
Constitution. When the lien becomes effective, a significant
property interest is lost, for which the mechanics' lien law
provides no protection. Because the lien can become effective prior
to any hearing or determination on the validity of the claim on
which the lien is based, it fails to provide adequate due process.
Therefore, the procedures in the General Laws of Rhode Island,
Title 34, Chapter 28 are unconstitutional.
Jesse Nason
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Property Law/Zoning Law. Coventry Zoning Board of Review v.
Omni Development Corp., 814 A.2d 889 (R.I. 2003). Only individu-
als whose land use is affected, or a city or town solicitor acting on
the public's behalf, are aggrieved parties who may appeal a local
municipal zoning board decision that approves a special exception
for low and moderate income housing. The Rhode Island Low and
Moderate Income Housing Act applies to residential subdivision
applications and is not limited to proposals for development of
multifamily housing. A State Housing Appeals Board decision will
be reversed unless it is supported by specific findings, takes into
account existing regulations, and uses the correct standard of re-
view as unambiguously provided for in the Act itself.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On February 22, 2001, Omni Development Corporation
(Omni) submitted an application to the Town of Coventry Zoning
Board of Review (zoning board) for special exceptions to certain
provisions of the Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing
Act (Act).1 The Act was designed to promote the development of
low and moderate income housing in the state.2 Although the Act
is silent with respect to residential subdivision proposals, and is
most frequently applied to proposals for adapting or developing
multifamily housing,3 Omni sought approval under the Act to con-
struct a forty-three-lot residential subdivision for an undeveloped
parcel of land.4 This project involved the construction of twenty
single-family homes for families with low and moderate income, as
well as twenty-three market-rate dwellings priced in accordance
with Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation
guidelines.5
Omni requested relief from several provisions of Coventry's
subdivision and zoning ordinances. 6 As part of its application,
Omni argued that the proposed project would not be economically
1. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review v. Omni Dev. Corp., 814 A.2d 889,
893; see R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 45-53-1 to -7 (1991).
2. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 893.
3. R.I. GEN LAws § 45-53-2 (1997).
4. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 893.
5. Id. at 894.
6. Id. at 893-94.
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viable unless the exemptions were granted. 7 In particular, Omni
wanted exemption from five construction regulations and the fair-
share development fee ordinance requiring payment of impact fees
upon each new dwelling unit constructed in the town.8 After hear-
ings, the zoning board approved the application, but only granted
some of the special exemptions requested by Omni.9 The zoning
board denied relief from subdivision regulations for vertical face
curbing and a secondary access road into the development, requir-
ing Omni to expand the width of an existing bridge to provide for
secondary access. 10 In addition, the zoning board relieved Omni of
the development impact fees on each low and moderate-income
unit, but refused to exempt Omni from paying fees for the market-
rate dwellings."
Omni appealed the zoning board's decision to the State Hous-
ing Appeals Board (SHAB), arguing that the conditions imposed
rendered the project economically infeasible and that the decision
was inconsistent with local needs. 12 SHAB reviewed the decision
and granted relief from the conditions, deciding that they were not
necessary for the protection of the environment, were inconsistent
with local needs, and that the costs created an "unnecessary re-
striction on affordability."13 The zoning board appealed to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court.14
BACKGROUND
Section 45-53-5 of Rhode Island General Laws indicates that
SHAB's decisions "may be appealed in the [S]upreme Court," but
sets forth no standing requirement. 15 However, section 45-53-4
states that an appeal to the Supreme Court of a zoning board deci-
sion granting special exception for low and moderate income hous-
ing may be undertaken by "[a]ny person aggrieved by the issuance
of an approval ... "16
7. Id. at 895.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 894.
10. Id. at 895.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 895-96.
14. Id.
15. R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53-5 (1991).
16. Id. § 45-53-4.
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As a standard of review, the Act provides that in hearing an
appeal of a local zoning board, SHAB must determine whether the
decision was "reasonable and consistent with local needs." 17 If
conditions are imposed, it must also consider "whether these con-
ditions and requirements make the construction or operation of
the housing infeasible."18 SHAB must examine the regulation or
ordinance in light of these criteria and set forth the evidence it re-
lied upon to reach its conclusion, resolving any disputed issues of
fact. 19 In towns like Coventry that do not have the minimum
number of low and moderate income housing units established by
the Act,
[a] zoning or land use requirement or regulation may be
found to be consistent with local needs if it is reasonable
in light of the state's need for low and moderate income
housing and of the number of low income persons in the
community, and if it relates to the health and safety, bet-
ter building design, or preservation of open space.20
A project is "infeasible" when the conditions attached by the zon-
ing board render it "impossible ... to proceed in building or oper-
ating the low or moderate income housing without financial
loss."21
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
This was a case of first impression. 22 Although the issue of
standing was not raised by Omni, the court raised the issue sua
sponte, holding that the zoning board lacked standing to appeal
SHAB's decision. 23 Noting that appeals can only be undertaken by
aggrieved persons who have an actual stake in the outcome of the
controversy, the court held that "challenges ... must be made by
those whose land use will be affected by the decision or by a city or
17. Id. § 45-53-6(a).
18. Id.
19. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 899.
20. Id. at 899-900; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(2) (1998).
21. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(3) (1998).
22. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 894.
23. Id. at 896.
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town solicitor acting on the city's behalf."24 Regardless, the court
proceeded to decide the important issues of the case, remanding
the case to SHAB for further findings only upon the condition that
the town solicitor intervene as a party before the court within
thirty days of the date of the decision to avoid dismissal of the ap-
peal. 25
Contrary to the zoning board's argument, the court held that
the Act applied to residential subdivision applications and is not
limited to proposals for development of multifamily housing.26 Al-
though the Act and SHAB's own regulations were drafted so as to
apply most clearly to multifamily housing, nothing in the statute
or regulations precludes their applicability to residential subdivi-
sions as affordable housing.27 The Legislature contemplated expe-
dited review and approval of multifamily housing when enacting
the Act.2S
The court also held that SHAB could not modify, vacate, or
reverse the zoning board's decision or remove the conditions at-
tached to the approval so long as the zoning board's decision was
consistent with local needs.29 SHAB also failed to make specific
findings, failed to take into account existing subdivision regula-
tions, and failed to use the correct standard of review as explicitly
laid out in the Act.30 SHAB declared each of the conditions im-
posed by Coventry to be "an unnecessary restriction on afforda-
bility."31 However, the appropriate standard of review under the
Act is whether the conditions make it "impossible" to carry out the
proposal without suffering financial loss. 32 Thus, the court re-
manded the decision to SHAB for further fact-finding.33 Regarding
the impact fees, the court noted that SHAB retained the authority
to decide whether placing such fees on low and moderate income
initiatives will have a harmful effect on the development of afford-
24. Id. at 897 (quoting Kirby v. Planning Bd. of Review, 634 A.2d 285,
288 n.3 (R.I. 1993)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 902-03.
27. Id. at 902.
28. Id. at 901-02.
29. Id. at 906.
30. Id. at 904-06; see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-6(c) (1991).
31. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 895-96.
32. Id. at 904; see R.I. GEN. LAwS § 45-53-3(3) (1998).
33. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 905.
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able housing. Accordingly, that issue was also remanded to fur-
ther examination by SHAB in accordance with the Act.
34
COMMENTARY
This case adds to Rhode Island's understanding of the Low
and Moderate Income Housing Act in three distinct ways. First,
the court declares a clear rule on who will have standing to appeal
SHAB decisions. The Act is somewhat ambiguous on the standing
issue. 35 However, this decision to allow standing only for those
whose land use will ultimately be affected by the proposed con-
struction (or those acting in their behalf) is in accordance with
general standing doctrine requiring there to be an injury before
asserting a claim. Rhode Island law has complied with this stan-
dard for quite some time. 36
Second, the court clarified another ambiguity of the Act. The
court decided that the Act is applicable to residential subdivision
applications and is not limited to proposals for development of
multifamily housing.37 This holding is supported by the plain lan-
guage of the Act, which neither precludes nor specifically rejects
its applicability to residential subdivision proposals. The language
of the Act also contemplates such applicability by giving "equal
consideration [to] ... retrofitting existing dwellings and assimilat-
ing" new low and moderate income housing into existing
neighborhoods. 38 This language implies that there is no real limit
on what type of housing may be facilitated under the Act, so long
as the construction or rehabilitation furthers and promotes the ob-
jective of the Act to provide affordable housing to low and moder-
ate income citizens in the state.
The one problem with the Act's applicability to subdivision
proposals is their complicated process of review as compared with
other proposals. As the court noted, however, a recent amendment
to the Act specifically addresses this problem with subdivision
proposals and clearly delineates a strict process of review to be
34. Id.
35. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 45-53-4 (2002).
36. See, e.g., City of E. Providence v. Shell Oil Co., 290 A.2d 915 (R.I.
1972); DiIorio v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 252 A.2d 350 (R.I. 1969); D'Almeida v.
Sheldon Realty Co., 252 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1969).
37. Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 901.
38. R.I. GEN LAws § 45-53-2 (1997).
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conducted in accordance with regulations promulgated by SHAB.39
This amendment declaring SHAB's jurisdiction over such reviews
also indicates a legislative intent to include residential subdivi-
sions within the purview of the Act. Moreover, including residen-
tial subdivisions within the Act's purview is logically related to
furthering the purpose of the Act, because it encourages construc-
tion of a wider range of low and moderate income housing units
than would be facilitated if residential subdivisions were excepted
from the statute.
Finally, the court declares that SHAB's failure to state find-
ings of fact to support its decision, along with its application of an
incorrect standard of review, presented a reason for remand. This
holding may reflect a general disdain on the part of the court re-
garding the amount of power that SHAB has had in Rhode Island
in the past, and may serve as a future check on that power. In ad-
dition, a failure to clearly support findings is a widely accepted
reason to reverse a board of review's decision in this context. 40
Moreover, the court's statement of the correct standard of review
with respect to whether conditions attached to a zoning board ap-
proval make that project infeasible is a clear and unequivocal re-
statement of the unambiguous language of the Act itself.41 There
can be no clearer statement of statutory law than when a legisla-
tive enactment provides the standard of review in the statute it-
self.42
CONCLUSION
With this decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
made clear who will be considered aggrieved parties with standing
to appeal SHAB decisions, that the Rhode Island Low and Moder-
ate Income Housing Act applies to residential subdivision applica-
tions, and that a SHAB decision will be reversed unless it is
39. Id. § 45-53-4 (1998), amended by P.L. 2002, ch. 416, § 1; see Coventry
Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 902 n.6.
40. See, e.g., Bellevue Shopping Ctr. v. Chase, 556 A.2d 45 (R.I. 1989).
41. See Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review, 814 A.2d at 900.
42. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(3) (1998).
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supported by specific findings, takes into account existing regula-
tions, and uses the correct standard of review as unambiguously
provided for in the Act itself.
Nicole M. Labonte
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Real Property. Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346 (R.I. 2003). A
claim of right to own or use real property through adverse posses-
sion arises from the petitioner's objective acts to so own or use the
property in a manner hostile to the record owner. Petitioner's mis-
taken belief, or lack thereof, concerning the true record owner of
the property does not affect this claim of right.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Lawrence Tavares (purchaser) brought this suit against the
record owner to quiet title to three parcels of land.' Tavares
bought two parcels of land from James Amarantes (predecessor) in
1991 and two years later he purchased a third parcel positioned
between the first two. 2 The predecessor acquired his title in 1977
from the Almys.3 Upon obtaining his title, seller mistakenly be-
lieved the three parcels in question were part of his property.4
However, between 1978 and 1979, he surveyed his property and
learned he was not the true owner of the three parcels.5 Notwith-
standing this clarification, he continued to use and possess the
parcels as if he had true title.6 Subsequently, predecessor may
have even subdivided the three parcels from his original purchase
and deeded the subdivision to himself and his wife.7 Additionally,
predecessor posted no-trespassing signs, dug drainage ditches,
and built a stone wall around the property in question.8
Purchaser asserted he is the rightful owner of the property as
he and his predecessors "had been in 'open, adverse, exclusive and
uninterrupted possession and enjoyment' of the property for more
than seventy years."9 The trial court determined that purchaser
could not establish ownership by adverse possession. 10 The court
reasoned that purchaser had not possessed the property for the
statutory ten-year period and that purchaser could not tack on
predecessor's use and possession, as it was neither under a claim
1. Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 348 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 349.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 348.
10. Id. at 349.
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of right or adverse to the true owner's interest." The court deter-
mined predecessor's activities were not open or notorious because
they were not visible from the street or the property line.' 2 Fur-
ther, the court opined that the predecessor in interest could not
assert a claim of right to the property for he was on notice as to
the true owner.' 3 Purchaser appealed to the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court arguing that the trial court wrongly found that
predecessor's use was not under a claim of right, hostile, and open
and notorious. 14
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Pursuant to Sherman v. Goloskie, in order to successfully es-
tablish adverse possession, possession must be "actual, open, noto-
rious, hostile, under a claim of right, continuous, and exclusive"
for a requisite ten-year period.15 The issue presented to the Court
was whether purchaser proved that his predecessor satisfied these
elements. If so, purchaser could tack on predecessor's use and pos-
session to his own, thus satisfying the requisite ten-year period.' 6
The Court determined that the trial justice erred in consider-
ing the record owner's absentee ownership of the property as a
factor.' 7 This, the Court declared, should not influence predeces-
sor's claim of right in regards to open and notorious use.'8 The re-
cord owner's failure to visit the property from his Vermont
residence will have no bearing on the claimant's open, notorious,
and hostile use.19Moreover, the Court found that predecessor's
want of colorable legal title also should have no bearing on a claim
of right.20 The Court held that it is not a mistaken belief concern-
ing rightful ownership that gives rise to a claim of right rather,
such a claim is established through objective acts manifesting in-
tent to use the property in a method hostile to the record owner.2'
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Sherman v. Goloskie, 188 A.2d 79, 83 (1963)).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 351.
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A claimant can seek to quiet title even when claimant knows he is
not the record owner so long as he engages in acts openly, notori-
ously, and hostile to the true owner's rights. 22 Here, predecessor
posted no-trespass signs, erected stone walls, dug drainage
ditches, and cut wood on the property. These objective acts, not his
subjective knowledge of ownership, should have been evaluated to
determine if the acts sufficiently satisfied the requisite elements
to establish a claim of right.23
In addition to objective acts, the Court deemed it necessary to
evaluate the nature of the property. In evaluating whether prede-
cessor's objective acts were sufficiently open and notorious, it is
crucial to consider the location and type of the property.24 The
Court confirmed that, when land is rural and unimproved, use
and possession need not be complex in order to establish adverse
possession. 25 Rather, the Court ascertained, use and possession
need only be consistent with similarly situated property.26 Such
use and possession is adequate to put the record owner on notice.27
In this case, predecessor testified at trial concerning the ex-
tent of his open and hostile use.28 Predecessor described the stone
wall he had erected on the property as well as the no-trespassing
signs.29 Both, predecessor claimed, were visible from the road.30
Predecessor was not cross-examined, his testimony was not im-
peached, nor did the record owner present conflicting testimony.31
However, the trial court failed to consider this uncontested testi-
mony in determining whether the use of the land was sufficiently
open.32 Notwithstanding this testimony, a claimant need not show
that use was visible from the nearest road.33 As previously dis-
cussed, the suitable question is whether the claimant used the
land similar to owners of corresponding property.34 The Court
22. Id. at 352.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 353-54.
33. Id. at 354.
34. Id. at 352.
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noted that constructing and maintaining a physical structure for
the requisite ten-year period may be sufficient to demonstrate ad-
verse possession.35 The trial court, therefore, should have ruled
whether predecessor's stone wall had been constantly maintained
for ten years. 36
Finally, the Court held that predecessor's subjective intent to
adversely possess the land in question does not preclude a claim of
right.37 Conversely, intentional actions undertaken to acquire such
property are the crux of adverse possession.38 Predecessor had al-
ready engaged in activity hostile to the true owner for a statutory
period before deeding the property to himself.39 If predecessor had
met the elements necessary for a claim of right, purchaser may
tack on predecessor's use of the property when seeking to quiet ti-
tle.40 Considering the aforementioned factors, the Court vacated
the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court.41 On remand, the trial court must consider the elements of
adverse possession without regard to record owner's absenteeism
or predecessor's subjective knowledge of ownership.42
COMMENTARY
As the court indicates, the components of adverse possession
have remained constant in Rhode Island case law. Possession
must be "actual, open, notorious, hostile, under a claim of right,
continuous, and exclusive" for a ten-year period. 43 The claimant
may tack on predecessor's possession provided the predecessor
satisfied the requisite elements." If open acts occur on the land,
the true owner is charged with knowledge of such acts.45 Further,
the Court noted, the hostile component does not refer to an emo-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 355.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Sherman v. Goloskie, 188 A.2d 79, 83 (R.I. 1963).
44. Taffinder v. Tiffany, 381 A.2d 519, 521 (R.I. 1977).
45. Id. at 523.
2004] 863
864 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:771
tional state but rather acts inconsistent with the true owner's
rights.46
Recently, the Court distinguished a "claim of right" from
"color of title."47 The latter requires either a written instrument
conveying title or at a minimum a subjective belief that the claim-
ant holds title to land.48 This, the Court declares, is not necessary
for establishing a claim under adverse possession. 49 Thus, Tavares
is consistent with the unequivocal elements of adverse possession
established through precedent. The decision summarizes two
common issues arising in adverse possession claims, notice and
colorable legal title. The Court holds fast to the stable doctrine de-
termining that adverse possession is obtained through objective
acts, not subjective beliefs. Moreover, the true owner is charged
with notice once objective acts take place on the property. This de-
cision, as well as prior decisions, will encourage landowners to use
and enjoy their land rather than let it remain fruitless and unpro-
ductive.
The Court's decision is also consistent with the laws of
neighboring states. Massachusetts' high court held that the claim-
ant's subjective knowledge of ownership has no bearing on the
claim and pronounced, "the inner workings of his mind are irrele-
vant."50 The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that color of ti-
tle is not an element of adverse possession.51 Both states, like
Rhode Island, have determined that open use yields constructive
notice to true owner.52 Therefore, once a claimant commences open
use of another's land, true owner beware, for continuous use may
result in an involuntary title shift.
Speculation and absenteeism cannot be tolerated in the land-
scarce enclaves of southern New England. If one fails to notice
open, notorious, and hostile use of one's land for a ten-year period,
the land may be put to better use in the hands of another. Argua-
bly, one has the right to dispose of his land as he so pleases. How-
ever, perhaps this practice is better suited for a less populated
46. Id.
47. Carnevale v. Dupee, 783 A.2d 404, 412 (R.I. 2001).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Lawrence v. Town of Concord, 788 N.E.2d 546, 552 (Mass. 2003).
51. Ruick v. Twarkins, 367 A.2d 1380, 1384 (Conn. 1976).
52. See generally supra notes 50 and 51.
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location. New England, in all of its social, political and economic
glory, would cease to thrive if its land were permitted to rest idly
in the hands of a few.
CONCLUSION
A claimant need not hold a subjective belief that he holds true
title to land in order to establish a claim under adverse posses-
sion. Rather, such a claim is fulfilled through the objective acts
conducted upon the property demonstrating open use inconsistent
with the true owner's rights. In Rhode Island, one can enter an-
other's land with intent to establish ownership through adverse
possession.
Matthew R. Plain
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Taxation. White v. Clark, 823 A.2d 1125 (R.I. 2003). A taxpayer
who appealed a decision of the tax administrator was exempt from
the prepayment requirement under section 8-8-26 of the General
Laws of Rhode Island because he proved a reasonable probability
of success by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, peti-
tioner was entitled to de novo review of the tax administrator's fi-
nal order with a full evidentiary hearing.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Petitioner White owned and operated a business that offered
videotaping services of depositions for use in litigation.' The Divi-
sion of Taxation conducted an audit of petitioner's business and
concluded that White owed sales and use tax on the sale of the
videotaped depositions, assessing a deficiency of $31,787.97 in-
cluding penalties and interest.2 The auditor based his determina-
tion upon the finding that the sale of videotaped depositions
constituted a sale of tangible personal property; thus, the sales
were subject to the Rhode Island Sales and Use Tax.3
Upon appeal at an administrative hearing, the hearing officer
affirmed the deficiency assessment against the petitioner.4 The
tax administrator's final decision and order reduced the deficiency
assessment to $30,910.08. 5
White appealed the tax administrator's final order to the Dis-
trict Court seeking de novo review and filed a motion for exemp-
tion from the prepayment requirement under section 8-8-26 of
the General Laws of Rhode Island.6 Section 8-8-26 provides that
a petitioner's appeal of the tax administrator's final order "shall be
conditional upon prepayment of all taxes, interest, and penalties
set forth in the assessment, deficiency, or otherwise." 7 An appel-
lant can avoid the prepayment requirement only upon a showing
"(1) that the taxpayer has a reasonable probability of success on
the merits; and (2) that the taxpayer is unable to prepay all taxes,
interest, and penalties set forth in the assessment, deficiency, or
1. White v. Clark, 823 A.2d 1125, 1126 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id. at 1126-27.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1127.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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otherwise."8 Both parties stipulated that White was unable to pre-
pay the tax administrator's assessment, thus the only issue before
the District Court was whether petitioner "had a reasonable prob-
ability of success on the merits."9 Applying the "real object test,"10
the District Court found that petitioner's sale of videotapes was
the real object of his business and that the service he provided was
incidental to those sales." Thus, the transactions were taxable
and White's motion for exemption from the prepayment require-
ment was denied. 12 White petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. 13
THE COURT'S HOLDING AND ANALYSIS
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a party appealing
a final order of the tax administrator must prove a "reasonable
probability of success" by a preponderance of the evidence.' 4 Not-
ing that the burden of proof for this prong of the prepayment
exemption under section 8-8-26 is less than that required to
reach a determination on the merits, the court concluded that the
issue on appeal to the District Court is whether the petitioner has
"shown at least a reasonable probability, rather than a certainty,
of ultimate success on a final hearing." 5
White raised two allegations of error in his petition for a writ
of certiorari. First, that the District Court erred in summarily de-
ciding that he did not have a reasonable probability of success in-
stead of affording him de novo review with a full evidentiary
hearing. 6 Second, that the District Court erred in concluding that,
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the "'real object test' for
ascertaining the tax consequences of sales that involve a mixture of tangible
products and services" in Statewide Multiple Listing Service, Inc. v. Norberg,
392 A.2d 371 (R.I. 1978). White, 823 A.2d at 1127. The Norberg court summa-
rized the test as follows: "Where the real object of the transaction is the ser-
vice rendered and the transfer of personal property is merely incident to the
service the transaction is not taxable." Id. (quoting Norberg, 392 A.2d at 374).
11. White, 823 A.2d at 1128.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1126.
14. Id. at 1127.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1128.
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under the "real object test," the videotapes were tangible personal
property subject to Rhode Island Sales and Use Tax.17
The court held that the District Court was wrong to deny
White's motion for prepayment exemption and to summarily de-
cide his claim that his videotaped depositions were not taxable.'8
The court began by noting that whether videotaped depositions
were subject to sales tax was an issue of first impression in Rhode
Island. 19 The supreme court concluded that White had proved a
reasonable probability of success by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and thus should have been exempt from prepayment as a
condition precedent to de novo review of the tax administrator's
final order.20 In addition, because the issue raised was novel and
"fair ground for litigation," combined with the great potential for
injury due to petitioner's inability to prepay, the District Court
erred by failing to afford White de novo review by summarily de-
ciding the reasonable probability of success issue.2' The court held
that, under the circumstances, petitioner should have had an op-
portunity to develop a record for appeal through a full evidentiary
hearing.22 Because the District Court summarily decided the is-
sue, the supreme court did not directly address petitioner's claim
that the videotaped depositions were merely incidental to the ser-
vice he was providing.23
COMMENTARY
The court's decision to require proof of a "reasonable probabil-
ity of success" by a preponderance of the evidence is commendable
in this instance, but perpetuating this as the default burden of
proof for every challenge to a tax administrator's final order may
frustrate the purpose of prepayment under section 8-8-26. Cer-
tainly the primary goal of the prepayment requirement is to estab-
lish a rebuttable presumption in favor of the tax administrator -
that an appellant is unable to prove a "reasonable probability of
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (quoting Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776, 787 (D.R.I.
1970)).
22. Id.
23. See id.
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success" - thereby deterring challenges and, consequently, de novo
appeals and docket congestion. With this in mind, the court did
well to disguise a general statement of policy within the specific
holding of this case. At first blush, this decision seems to fix the
burden of proving a "reasonable probability of success" at a pre-
ponderance of the evidence under section 8-8-26; however, a
closer reading suggests that the court actually limited its holding
to requiring application of the preponderance burden only when a
novel underlying substantive claim is presented.24 Since whether
the sale of videotaped depositions is subject to sales tax was an is-
sue of first impression, a lower burden of proof was appropriate to
ensure de novo review and thus an evidentiary record for subse-
quent appeal of the novel issue. However, had the underlying sub-
stantive issue already been decided (i.e., that the sale of
videotaped depositions were subject to sales tax), the court hints
that a summary decision may have been appropriate. 25
The court's distinction between novel and settled substantive
claims as a basis for varying the burden of proving a "reasonable
probability of success" is appropriate. Application of a more strin-
gent burden of proof under section 8-8-26 upon presentation of a
settled substantive claim is in accord with the apparent purpose of
the prepayment condition precedent - to deter challenges to defi-
ciency assessments. Relaxing a challenger's burden of proving a
"reasonable probability of success" in the absence of a novel sub-
stantive issue would frustrate this purpose by permitting more
appeals and subsequently encouraging dispute with a tax admin-
istrator's final order. This could have the further effect of under-
mining the tax administrator's role as a final arbiter in deficiency
and assessment proceedings, as well as making de novo appeal
commonplace as opposed to the rare privilege it was intended to
be.
CONCLUSION
In Rhode Island, the burden of proving a "reasonable prob-
ability of success" in a motion for exemption from prepayment un-
der section 8-8-26 of the General Laws of Rhode Island is by a
24. See id. at 1127-28.
25. See id. at 1128.
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preponderance of the evidence, at least where the underlying sub-
stantive claim on appeal is novel. If an appellant meets the bur-
den of proof she may appeal the final order of the tax
administrator de novo, and be afforded a full evidentiary hearing.
Todd Barton
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Tort Law. Bourque v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 814 A.2d 320 (R.I.
2003). Merchant/Shopkeeper may request a person detained for
shoplifting to sign a statement waiving his or her right to bring a
civil action against the merchant based upon the detention in re-
turn for the merchant agreeing not to bring criminal action
against the customer. The waiver, however, may not contain an
admission of guilt nor may the customer's release from detention
be conditioned upon signing the waiver. A licensed social worker is
qualified to testify about a psychological diagnosis if he or she has
"present sufficient qualifications," such as working along with a
psychologist or being licensed to diagnose mental health matters.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Defendant supermarket's store security detained plaintiff Lois
Bourque, accusing her of shoplifting.' After a store detective had
gone through her purse and Bourque was preparing to leave the
interrogation room, a security guard stopped her and allegedly
told her that she could not leave until she had signed a waiver
form.2 The waiver contained an acknowledgement of taking mer-
chandise from the store without paying and without intending to
pay.3 Bourque signed the statement because she reasonably be-
lieved that she could not leave until she did.4
Thereafter, Bourque brought a civil action against Stop &
Shop Companies, Inc. (Stop & Shop) for false imprisonment, false
arrest and extortion with a demand for punitive damages.5 After a
Superior Court jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff finding the de-
fendant liable for damages, Stop & Shop filed motions for judg-
ment as a matter of law and for a new trial.6 The trial justice
denied these motions, and the defendant filed a timely appeal.7
1. Bourque v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 814 A.2d 320, 322 (R.I. 2003) (per
curiam).
2. Id. at 324.
3. Id. at 322. The statement read "I have acknowledged appropriating
certain merchandise for my own use without paying for it or intending to pay
for the merchandise." Id. at 323.
4. Id. at 324.
5. Id. at 322.
6. Id. at 322, 324.
7. Id.
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BACKGROUND
Section 11-41-21(b) of the Rhode Island General Laws re-
quires that any person stopped by a merchant promptly identify
herself or himself by name and address.8 A merchant may not
elicit any other information from the suspected shoplifter except
for requesting a waiver statement until the police have placed the
person into custody.9 The detention must be reasonable and not
accomplished by unreasonable restraint or excessive force.' 0 The
detention period must not exceed one hour."
Furthermore, section 11-41-21(c)(1) provides in part: "A mer-
chant may request a person detained for shoplifting to sign a
statement waiving his or her right to bring a civil action arising
from the detention in return for a signed statement from the mer-
chant waiving the right to bring criminal charges based upon the
alleged shoplifting....
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Stop & Shop presented numerous issues for the
court's review. First, Stop & Shop argued that the trial justice
erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law be-
cause the plaintiff signed the statement waiving her right to bring
civil charges against Stop & Shop based on the detention.13 Next,
Stop & Shop argued that the trial justice should have granted its
motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial
because there was no evidence of extortion or coercion on its
part.14 Third, Stop & Shop maintained that the trial judge incor-
rectly instructed the jury on the shopkeeper's privilege.15 Stop &
Shop also argued that the trial justice erred in deciding that a li-
censed social worker was qualified to diagnose post traumatic dis-
8. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-41-21(b) (2002).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.12. Id. (c)(1).
13. Bourque, 814 A.2d at 322.
14. Id. at 324.
15. Id. at 325.
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tress disorder. 16 Finally, Stop & Shop questioned the appropriate-
ness of punitive damages in this case. 17
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court decision in
all respects as discussed below.
First, Stop & Shop argued that its motion for judgment as a
matter of law should have been granted because the plaintiff
signed the waiver form preventing her from bringing the suit.18 In
reviewing "the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party,"19 the court held that the trial justice was correct in his
assessment that Stop & Shop's waiver form exceeded the bounds
of section 11-41-21(c)(1).20 Stop & Shop's waiver included an ac-
knowledgement of guilt, which was not allowed by the statute.
21
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the plain language of sec-
tion 11-41-21(b) prohibited the merchant from eliciting anything
but the name and address of the detainee until the police placed
the person into custody; the acknowledgement of guilt included in
the waiver was clearly an elicitation of something other than the
person's name and address. 22 The court also agreed with the trial
justice that a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiffs signa-
ture was coerced and, therefore, invalid.23 The court that the de-
fendant's security personnel pressured the plaintiff into signing
the document because the plaintiff reasonably believed she could
not leave the interrogation room until she had signed the waiver.24
Stop & Shop argued next that because there was no evidence
of coercion or extortion on its part, the trial justice erred in deny-
ing its motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a
new trial. 25 In denying Stop & Shop's motion, the trial justice con-
sidered the credibility of the witnesses and found that while the
plaintiff was a credible witness, the two security guards were
not.26 The trial justice also explained that Bourque was a victim of
16. Id.
17. Id. at 326.
18. Id. at 322.
19. Id. at 323.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 324.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 324-25.
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extortion because "Stop & Shop... applied improper force or used
improper threats to get her to do something she didn't want to
do ... "27 The court held that the trial justice did not overlook or
misconceive any material evidence and correctly denied the mo-
tion for a new trial.28
Stop & Shop's third challenge was to the trial justice's jury in-
structions on the shopkeeper's privilege. 29 Stop & Shop argued
that the trial judge did not properly state the law, but the court
held that the jury instructions did not draw any conclusions for
the jury and properly defined what the law would allow or not al-
low. 30 Even if the charge was erroneous, the court explained that
it would not reverse because Stop & Shop did not make an objec-
tion to the jury instructions specific enough to alert the trial jus-
tice of any error as required by Rule 51(b) of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. 31
The defendant's next issue on appeal concerned the trial jus-
tice's decision that a social worker was qualified to diagnose Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and to allow that social worker
27. Id. at 324.
28. Id. at 325.
29. Id. The jury instructions were as follows:
So, the so-called deal or trade-off and the only one that is permitted
of a merchant is to say, "Look, you can sign this paper and you won't
sue us and we'll sign it, also, and we won't prosecute you as being a
shoplifter." The law does not permit or authorize a merchant to say,
'You must sign this paper and then we'll let you leave the room.' So,
that is not authorized by our Legislature. It is unlawful to continue
to detain a person even if the initial stop was all right and even if
the initial detention was done lawfully. The merchant may not con-
tinue to detain a person unless and until they sign a paper admitting
shoplifting or saying that, "You can only leave the room if you sign
this document." That is not a fair trade-off or not a question of fair-
ness. It's not the law. The law does not permit that kind of a trade-
off, so to speak.
Id. at 324.
30. Id. at 325.
31. Id. Rule 51(b) of Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Proce-
dure states in part:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an in-
struction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which the party
objects and the grounds of the party's objection. Opportunity shall be
given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury.
R.I. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 51(b).
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to give her professional opinion about the diagnosis. 32 Stop & Shop
argued that the court in Vallinoto v. DiSandro held that "absent a
close working relationship between the social worker ... and the
physician[,] ... the social worker could not have been able to tes-
tify concerning the psychotherapy sessions ... . '33 While this was
the holding in Vallinoto, the court also looked at its instructions
for remand in that same case which stated "if the social worker
had 'present sufficient qualifications' she would be able to tes-
tify."34 In the present case, the court found that the social worker
was a licensed social worker who provided mental health diagno-
sis to her patients; she worked along with a psychologist; and in-
surance did not require diagnosis from someone with a higher
medical degree that what she had; therefore, she was qualified to
testify about her diagnosis of PTSD.35 The court also noted that
the social worker's testimony was cumulative because of collabo-
rating medical evidence, so even if the social worker was not quali-
fied to testify on this matter, there would be no reversible error.
3 6
Finally, Stop & Shop argued that punitive damages were not
appropriate in this case.37 In Rhode Island, the standard for im-
posing punitive damages is "a rigorous one."38 The plaintiff seek-
ing punitive damages must produce evidence "of such willfulness,
recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as
amount[s] to criminality."39 The court held that in this case the
demand for damages was properly pled, and because the defense
failed to object to the trial justice's instructions on punitive dam-
ages, the award would stand.40
COMMENTARY
The court in Bourque based most of its opinion on the plain
meaning of Rhode Island General Laws section 11-41-21. The
32. Id. at 325.
33. Bourque, 814 A.2d at 325 (quoting Vallinato v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d
830, 840 (R.I. 1997)).
34. Id. (quoting Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 840).
35. Id. at 325-26.
36. Id. at 326.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Mark v. Congregation Mishkon Tefiloh, 745 A.2d 777, 779
(R.I. 2000)).
39. Id. (quoting Mark, 745 A.2d at 779).
40. Id.
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statute clearly states the requirements for detaining a suspected
shoplifter and obtaining a waiver. The waiver is narrowly limited
but equally protects both the suspected individual and the mer-
chant. False imprisonment can only be charged if the merchant
exceeds the limits set by the statute. Most jurisdictions have
"shopkeeper privilege" statutes that allow a merchant to detain a
suspected shoplifter for a short period of time.41 Rhode Island ap-
pears to be the only state that also includes the option of obtaining
a statement of waiver of future rights to bring civil or criminal ac-
tion.42
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-10-14 (1975); IND. CODE § 35-33-6-2
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402.1 (1943); S.C. CODE ANN. 16-13-140 (1976);
see also 17 AM. JUR. 2D False Imprisonment § 76 (noting that many state leg-
islatures have enacted statutes that allow merchants to detain shoplifters if
detention is for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, and if there is
probable cause).
42. The author has been able to find no other state statute that provides
for a disclaimer similar to that of Rhode Island's statute. Some states do have
statutes that provide for a civil agreement between the merchant and the
shoplifter for the recovery of damages to the merchant. For example, New
Hampshire's statute provides in part:
IV. A merchant and a person accused of shoplifting by such mer-
chant may agree to execute a civil settlement agreement for $200 in
civil damages, plus the return of the merchandise or the replacement
value of the merchandise within 60 days of the date the agreement is
signed. The form of the settlement agreement shall be as follows:
Settlement of Claim for Taking Merchandise Without Payment
The undersigned, , having failed to pay for certain mer-
chandise, more specifically described as follows , hereby
agrees to pay, within 60 days of the date this agreement is signed,
civil damages in the amount of $200, plus the merchandise or the re-
placement value of the merchandise. The parties agree that this
payment shall constitute full and complete payment of damages to
the following establishment . The following establishment
agrees to waive any and all claims it may have for civil
damages.
Nothing in this agreement shall constitute an admission of guilt for
purposes of criminal law. If this agreement is signed and payment is
made in full within 60 days, no police report or criminal complaint
will be filed by the merchant relative to this incident. However, noth-
ing in this agreement can or will bar the state of New Hampshire
from instituting such criminal prosecutions as it deems necessary.
N.H. REV. STAT. § 544-C: 1 (1992). This type of disclaimer differs from the dis-
claimer provided in Rhode Island General Laws section 11-41-21 because
Rhode Island allows a merchant and suspected shoplifter to waive future
rights to bring both civil and criminal actions against the other.
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The court's decision that the social worker was qualified to
testify about her diagnosis of PTSD seems to be the first applica-
tion of the "present sufficient qualifications" test adopted by the
court in Vallinoto u. DiSandro. In 2001, the court decided that a
trial justice properly excluded a registered nurse from testifying
as an expert citing the holding in Vallinoto.43 The court in that
case, Torrado v. Santilli, noted that the nurse was neither a social
worker nor a psychologist even though she worked full time as a
psychotherapist.44 Another factor that distinguishes that case
from Bourque is that the nurse in Torrado did not work along with
a medical doctor or psychiatrist in diagnosing patients.45 Accord-
ing to the decision in Bourque, some factors for the courts to con-
sider in determining whether a social worker can be an expert
witness qualified in mental health diagnosis are: 1) whether or not
the social worker worked along with a psychologist; 2) whether the
social worker is licensed to provide mental health diagnosis; and
3) whether insurance required a diagnosis and treatment services
to be rendered from someone with a higher medical degree that
the social worker. 46
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plain lan-
guage of section 11-41-21(c)(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws
does not allow a merchant to include an acknowledgment of guilt
in the waiver provided to an individual suspected of shoplifting,
nor may release from detention be conditioned upon signing the
waiver. The court also held that a licensed social worker was
qualified to testify about a psychological diagnosis if the social
worker had present sufficient qualifications, such as working
along with a psychologist and being licensed to diagnose mental
health matters.
Kathryn Surline Windsor
43. Torrado v. Santilli, 776 A.2d 1059 (R.I. 2001).
44. Id. at 1060.
45. Id.
46. Bourque v. Stop & Shop Co., Inc., 814 A.2d 320, 326 (R.I. 2003).
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Tort Law. Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819
A.2d 666 (R.I. 2003). A landowner has the duty to provide ade-
quate illumination in common areas; however, the plaintiff in a
negligence suit has the burden of proving that the defendant had
or should have had notice of the dangerous condition, that the
condition existed for a long enough time so that the owner should
have taken corrective steps, and that the dangerous condition was
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. The act of turning
off adequately working lights is not necessarily presumed to cre-
ate a dangerous condition.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Terry Lieberman, the plaintiff, was an independent contractor
employed part-time for Roberta Segal and Associates on the fourth
floor of the Doris Building., On February 11, 1997, plaintiff
worked late and began to leave the building at approximately 6:45
p.m. 2 As the plaintiff left, she noticed that the hall lights were off
which she then turned on herself.3 When the plaintiff entered the
stairwell, which she routinely used to access the parking lot, the
plaintiff noticed that the lights on the fourth-floor landing were
off.4 However, the stairwell was lit by the lights at a lower-floor
landing.5 Plaintiff did not turn the lights at the fourth-floor land-
ing on and began walking down the stairs.6 Midway between the
floors, the lights went off without warning.7 The plaintiff did not
call out because she thought the lights were mechanically con-
trolled.8 The plaintiff paused attempting to adjust her eyes to the
light and continued down the stairs in the complete darkness. 9
Unfortunately, the plaintiff lost her footing and fell down the re-
maining stairs to the third-floor landing.'0 At that time, the plain-
tiff cried out and an unidentified man appeared in the stairwell to
1. Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Assocs., L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 668 (R.I.
2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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assist her down the remaining stairs.1 The plaintiff drove herself
home that evening and returned to work the next day.12
The following day, the plaintiff reported the incident to both
her boss and the defendant, Bliss-Doris Reality Associates.' 3 She
explained that someone had turned the lights out on her.14 One
month later, the defendant installed motion sensors in the stair-
well and other common areas. 15 Furthermore, the defendants were
aware that the cleaning crew typically turned the lights off at ap-
proximately 7 p.m. each night even though the lease agreement
with Roberta Segal and Associates required the defendant to pro-
vide lighting until 10 p.m. each night.16 Additionally, the parking
lot lights remained lit until 10 p.m. and according to the defen-
dant's agent, the parking lot lights were visible through the win-
dows in the stairwell where plaintiff had fallen. 17
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against the commercial
landlords of the building. At trial, the jury returned a verdict for
the defendants. 8 The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial claim-
ing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and
that the judge erred in his instruction to the jury.19 Plaintiffs mo-
tion for a new trial was granted. 20 The trial judge determined that
the evidence did not support the jury's verdict that the defendants
were not negligent and that the court had committed an error by
charging the jury on notice separately from its other negligence
instructions. 2' The defendants appealed the granting of a new
trial.22
11. Id.
12. Id. at 669.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible in Rhode
Island to show liability while not admissible in a federal court. Compare R.I.
R. EVID. 407, with FED. R. EVID. 407.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In reversing the trial court's grant of a new trial, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court determined that reasonable minds could
differ as to whether the defendant was negligent; therefore, the
jury verdict should have been undisturbed. 23 In reviewing a grant
for a new trial, the trial court decision "will not be disturbed
unless he has overlooked or misconceived material and relevant
evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong."24 The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court determined that the jury could have found that the
defendant was providing adequate light because there was a light
switch available to the plaintiff on the fourth floor landing.25 Fur-
thermore, the court acknowledged that the act of turning out a
light is not per se a dangerous condition on the property.26 Addi-
tionally, the Court weighed the fact that the plaintiff chose to con-
tinue down the unlit stairwell without calling for help.27
Therefore, the evidence could have supported a verdict for either
the plaintiff or the defendant. 28 Thus, the court held that the new
trial should not have been granted. 29
In addition, the court rejected the trial court finding that it
had erred in the jury instructions. 30 The court reviewed the jury
instructions as a whole instead of simply looking at the challenged
portion.31 The court found no evidence that the jury had placed
any undue emphasis on the instruction concerning notice even
though it was given separately from the other instructions.32
Justice Flanders dissented, reasoning that the trial court
could have easily concluded that the fair preponderance of the
evidence supported a verdict for the plaintiff because the plaintiff
was injured due to the defendant's breach in a duty to safeguard
the lighting.33 Furthermore, Justice Flanders criticized the court
23. Id. at 671.
24. Id. at 670 (quoting Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n, Inc., 713
A.2d 766, 770 (R.I. 1998)).
25. Id. at 672.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 673.
33. Id.
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for applying a type of de novo review to the trial court's findings as
opposed to the usual deferential standard. 34
COMMENTARY
As Justice Flanders pointed out, the court did not appear to
follow the established standard of review when reviewing a trial
judge's ruling on a motion for a new trial. When ruling on a mo-
tion for a new trial, the trial judge sits as a "superjuror" substitut-
ing his or her own findings despite the jury's verdict.35 The trial
judge must "reviewf the evidence, comment[] on the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and exercise[] his in-
dependent judgment[.]" 36 If the trial judge completes that process,
then the ruling on the motion will not be disturbed unless evi-
dence has been overlooked or misconstrued or the ruling was just
clearly wrong.37 Therefore, the reviewing court generally should
give deference to the trial court ruling so long as the ruling is sup-
ported by the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and findings
of fact.38
The court in Lieberman clearly stated the appropriate review-
ing standard, yet went on to examine the evidence independently
of the trial court's conclusions.3 9 Although the trial judge deter-
mined that the defendants created a dangerous condition by leav-
ing the light switch unprotected, the court did not accept that
finding and weighed the plaintiffs own actions heavily against
her.40 As Justice Flanders pointed out, the jury in the case never
considered the plaintiffs own contributing negligence because af-
ter answering the interrogatory concerning the defendants' negli-
gence in the negative, the jury was instructed not to decide the
remaining questions of proximate cause and comparative negli-
gence.41 The trial judge was considering the motion for a new trial
34. Id. at 674.
35. English v. Green, 787 A.2d 1146, 1149 (R.I. 2001).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally, Barbato v. Epstein, 196 A.2d 836 (R.I. 1964); Lamont v.
Central Real Estate Co., Inc., 294 A.2d 195 (R.I. 1972); Kurczy v. St. Joseph
Veterans Ass'n., Inc., 713 A.2d 766 (R.I. 1998); English v. Green, 787 A.2d
1146 (R.I. 2001).
39. Lieberman, 819 A.2d at 670.
40. Id. at 672.
41. Id. at 675.
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in light of the one issue the jury ruled on - the defendants' own
negligence. 42 Therefore, the trial judge correctly viewed the evi-
dence of defendants' negligence as opposed to examining the ac-
tions of the plaintiff and whether those actions amounted to
comparative negligence. Yet, the court reversed the grant for a
new trial. The court made no findings concerning what evidence
the trial judge misconceived or overlooked. In contrast, the court,
upon review, closely evaluated all the evidence presented at trial
and based on its own findings held that reasonable minds could
differ on the issue of the defendants' negligence. The court en-
gaged in a type of review that more closely resembles de novo re-
view than the deferential review the court is supposed to use.
CONCLUSION
A landowner does have a duty to provide adequate lighting of
common areas, yet the act of turning off adequate lighting does
not in and of itself create a dangerous condition. The plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the defendant had notice of the condi-
tion and that the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injuries.
Sarah A. Potter
42. Id.
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Tort Law. Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699 (R.I. 2003). Property
owners have a legal duty to exercise reasonable care to control the
conduct of licensees to prevent intentional harm to others or to
prevent licensees from conducting themselves in a manner that
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. This duty arises
only if two conditions are met: (1) the property owner must know,
or have reason to know, that he or she has the ability to control
the licensee, and (2) the property owner must know, or should
have known, of the necessity and opportunity to exercise such con-
trol.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1994, James Gallagher was thirty-four years old and had
lived all of his life in a North Providence home owned and occu-
pied by his mother, defendant Sara Gallagher.' James Gallagher
had a history of mental illness, suffering hallucinations and delu-
sions. 2 On July 3, 1994, James Gallagher left the defendant's
home with a loaded shotgun and walked to the hedge between the
home and that of his neighbor, Ronald Volpe. 3 As Volpe trimmed
the hedge, James Gallagher shot him three times, killing him.4
Plaintiffs, the decedent's family, brought a wrongful death ac-
tion against Sara Gallagher. 5 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
was negligent in allowing her mentally ill son to keep and store
guns and ammunition on her property.6 The trial jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs.7 Defendant filed a motion for a new
trial.8 The trial justice granted the motion, overturning the jury
verdict. 9 The trial justice believed she had made an error of law by
allowing the case to go to the jury because it was not foreseeable
1. Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 702 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id. at 702. Gallagher's sister, a psychologist, believed he was a para-
noid schizophrenic. Id. at 703.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to sue James Gallagher (in prison for
second-degree murder), but he did not participate in the civil trial. Plaintiffs
settled claims against defendant's adult daughters prior to the civil trial. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 704.
8. Id.
9. Id. The trial justice did so even though she had denied the defen-
dant's motions for judgment as a matter of law on three occasions. Id.
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that James Gallagher would use the guns and ammunition main-
tained on defendant's property in a violent and deadly manner. 10
Plaintiffs appealed."
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the order for a new
trial, concluding that the trial justice had not erred in instructing
the jury as to property owner liability under section 318 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, which the supreme court adopted. 12
The court first established that the defendant was "present"
according to section 318 because she lived in the house where her
son stored guns and ammunition.13 Defendant's son was a licensee
under the Restatement because she consented to him living on her
land.' 4 Consequently, the defendant had the requisite control over
her son's use of the property because he lived there only with her
permission.'5 Defendant also testified that if she knew he had
guns she would have taken them away,16 "virtually conced[ing]"
knowledge that she could control her son, according to the court.'
7
Defendant's ability to control her licensee-son and her knowl-
edge that her mentally ill son possessed and stored guns and am-
munition on her property established a legal duty to exercise
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 704-05. "Duty of Possessor of Land or Chattels to Control Con-
duct of Licensee":
If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his pos-
session otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to
exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person
as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so con-
ducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
them, if the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control the third person, and (b) knows or should know of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 (1964).
13. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 706-07.
14. Id. at 707.
15. Id.
16. The jury concluded, and the court agreed, that defendant knew her
son kept guns on the property. Id.
17. Id. If the evidence suggested that defendant's son dominated her by
physically or psychologically abusing or threatening her then the jury rea-
sonably could conclude that the defendant did not know, or have reason to
know, that she could control her son's conduct. Id. at 707-08.
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reasonable care in controlling her son's conduct in order to prevent
him from intentionally harming others or from creating an unrea-
sonable risk of harm to others. 18 By allowing such a condition to
exist on her property the defendant "created an unreasonable risk
of bodily harm to the victim and to others on and outside her
property who foreseeably might have come within the zone of dan-
ger that her son's deadly arsenal posed for all those in the vicin-
ity[.]"19
The court further held that the absence of evidence indicating
that defendant's son had exhibited violent behavior in the past did
not render the shooting an unforeseeable incident. 20 Defendant
knew her son suffered from mental illness and allowed him to
maintain dangerous weapons on her property; this was enough to
establish that the "property owner is taking a foreseeable risk that
a third party in close proximity of that dangerous activity will be
hurt or killed as a result of allowing such an unstable individual
to use her property in this careless manner."21 As a result, the ab-
sence of similar violent incidents in the past by defendant's son
does not negate her negligence. 22
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for assuming
that the defendant was liable for her adult son because she al-
lowed him to stay on her property-that this automatically
granted her the ability to control his conduct. 23 The dissent argued
"the majority effectively has created a new cause of action allow-
ing tort liability for parents who fail to control the conduct of their
adult offspring." 24 Additionally, the dissent expressed concern
about the societal consequences of holding parents liable for men-
tally ill children-fearing that such a holding would dissuade par-
18. Id. at 709.
19. Id. at 709-10.
20. Id. at 710.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 716. "When negligence occurs, we are simply unwilling to sacri-
fice the first victims' rights to life and liberty upon the altar of an inflexible
prior-similar-incidents rule." Id.
23. Id. at 718 (Shea, J. (ret.), dissenting).
24. Id. at 720. The dissent established that only the Legislature can cre-
ate new causes of action. Id. (citing Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I.
1995)).
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ents from helping or housing these troubled children who have few
options in life.25
COMMENTARY
The majority opinion perpetuates a rule of personal responsi-
bility beyond simple responsibility for one's own actions and re-
quires responsibility for conduct of others known to be dangerous.
The court specifically restricts the holding to the particular facts
presented in the case, 26 understanding that such a holding could
have extensive implications. 27 Consequently, the case turns on the
mental illness of the licensee-murderer and the court's finding
that the jury could conclude that the defendant both knew she
had, and actually had, control over licensee's conduct. By limiting
the holding to a relationship of property owner and licensee, the
court avoids possible extension to find general liability of parents
for their children, whether minors or adults.
The most important aspect of Volpe v. Gallagher is the su-
preme court's adoption of section 318 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, holding a landowner civilly liable for negligence regard-
ing the criminal conduct of a licensee. As the dissenting opinion
indicates, holding a property owner liable for the conduct of a
third party under a theory of general landowner liability or a duty
to control a third party's conduct is inconsistent with the history of
the common law in the United States. 28 However, courts in the re-
gion have relied upon section 318 to find landowners liable for the
conduct of others. In Irons v. Cole,29 a Connecticut court held par-
ents liable in a wrongful death action for a murder committed by
their adult son, a licensee upon their property, based in part on
section 318.30 The court found that the parents were negligent in
failing to remove or request the removal of guns that their son
25. Id. at 723.
26. Id. at 718.
27. Especially in modern times where school-shootings are persistent
problems, liability based on parent-child relationship would be a dangerous
conclusion from this case.
28. Id. at 718.
29. 734 A.2d 1052 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998).
30. Id. at 1055.
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possessed on their property, in light of their knowledge that he
abused alcohol and was violent.31
Although the dissent relies on inconsistencies between cases
in two neighboring jurisdictions and this case, there are signifi-
cant factual differences that account for these disparities.32 In ad-
dition, both the majority and the dissent discuss the
Massachusetts case of Andrade v. Baptiste, in which the court de-
clined to find a wife liable for her husband's shooting of a store
clerk.33 The Volpe dissent relies upon Andrade to establish that
section 318 presupposes a landowner's liability to control the con-
duct of a third person. 34 The dissent further argues that there was
no liability because there was no legal ability or duty to control
the husband's misuse of his own personal property.35 However, the
court in Andrade determined section 318 to be inapplicable to the
facts because there was no misuse of the wife's real property.36
Therefore, the majority in Volpe correctly distinguishes Andrade37
because Volpe did involve misuse of the defendant's property-she
allowed a mentally ill individual to maintain guns and ammuni-
tion on her property.
James Gallagher was known to be mentally ill, but was al-
lowed to maintain dangerous weapons on the property where he
was permitted to live. According to the findings of the jury and the
supreme court, the defendant knew her son kept guns on the
property, knew that he was mentally ill, and knew she could con-
trol him-holding her liable fosters personal responsibility in
31. Id. at 1056.
32. See McDonald v. Lavery, 534 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (de-
fendants not liable for son's violence during intoxication because it was not
foreseeable); Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990) (de-
fendants not liable for adult son's assault with an axe on a police officer
escorting a crisis team to their home to evaluate the son, the court relied on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 319 (1965)). The dissent also looked at four
other jurisdictions establishing a trend of finding that parents have no duty
to control their mentally ill adult children. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 719 (citing
Wise v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Barmore v.
Elmore, 403 N.E.2d 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Whitesides v. Wheeler, 164
S.W. 335 (Ky. 1914); Youngblood v. Schireman, 765 P.2d 1312 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1988)).
33. 583 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Mass. 1992).
34. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 719.
35. Id. at 719.
36. Andrade, 583 N.E.2d at 839.
37. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 713.
20041
888 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:771
landowners necessary to avoid violent results. The dissent's
strongest argument rests on the impact such a holding has on
parents with mentally ill children. 38 The impact of this decision on
such parents may be that fewer parents will allow mentally ill
adult children to live with them.3 9 However, the lesson from this
case is not that parents should not allow their children to live on
their property, but that they have a duty to prevent the children
from conducting themselves in a manner that could hurt others.
The court did not propose a strict liability standard, but limited
liability to situations where control of licensees can be exercised.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted section 318 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts holding a property owner civilly li-
able for the conduct of her mentally ill adult son (a licensee on the
property) who maintained guns and ammunition on her property.
The court declared that such conduct was an unreasonably risky
activity that the property owner could have controlled and knew
could be controlled, which ultimately resulted in violence.
Bethany M. Whitmarsh
38. Id. at 723.
39. See Advocates Decry State Court Decision Holding Parent Liable,
MENTAL HEALTH WKLY., June 2, 2003, at 1 (reporting that mental health ad-
vocates believe Volpe perpetuates a stigma against mentally ill and discour-
ages family members from allowing mentally ill relatives to live in their
homes, negatively affecting the housing shortage for mentally ill people).
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Trial Practice. Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Ass'n., Inc., 820
A.2d 929 (R.I. 2003). The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied a
defendant property owner's petition to reverse a decision of the
superior court finding liability for injuries suffered due to an unlit
stairwell. Kurczy addressed several areas of Rhode Island trial
practice law, but it most notably expanded the permissible scope
of a supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
A child was injured when he fell down a stairwell at a wed-
ding reception in 1990.1 His mother sued the owner of the prem-
ises, alleging negligent maintenance of property.2 Plaintiffs theory
of liability was simply that the defendant failed to properly light a
dangerous stairwell, which in turn caused the injury to her child.3
A jury trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant property owner,
and the plaintiff appealed. 4 On remand, a second jury trial re-
sulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.5 The defendant property owner
appealed, raising seventeen separate reasons why the court
should vacate the judgment returned in the plaintiff's favor.6
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court rejected each of the defendant property owner's ar-
guments, and affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
These arguments included an improper denial of a Judgment as a
Matter of Law, an improper denial of a Rule 59 motion, an im-
proper exclusion of opinion testimony proffered by an expert wit-
ness, an improper admission of opinion testimony proffered by an
expert witness, an improper admission of opinion testimony by a
teacher, an improper jury instruction regarding a duty of care, an
improper jury instruction regarding spoilation, and an improper
1. Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Assoc., Inc., 820 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I.
2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ("[D]efendant apparently decided to throw up against our appel-
late wall as many possible arguments as it could squeeze into the fifty pages
of briefing allowed by this Court, hoping that one or more of them might
stick").
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Allen type jury instruction. 7 An Allen charge, named for the Su-
preme Court case Allen v. United States8. is an instruction given
to a deadlocked jury that urges the jurors to reach a verdict.9
Regarding the Allen charge, the judge asked the jurors to re-
turn to the courtroom with a fresh approach, to respect each oth-
ers opinions, and not to abandon any firmly held convictions. 10
When the jurors did return, the following Monday, the trial judge
gave a second Allen charge which was the subject of defendant's
appeal. " This second charge urged jurors in the minority to reex-
amine their position in light of the majority view, to resolve per-
sonality differences, and reflected on the rarity of hung juries.12
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that this charge was proper
under the circumstances, and because the trial judge told jurors
that they were not to change their vote at the expense of a firmly
held conviction the Allen charge was not coercive. 13 The Court re-
iterated that the propriety of an Allen charge "should be decided
upon the particular facts and circumstances of the individual
situation." 4 The charge should be examined using the ordinary
meaning of the language in light of the surrounding circumstances
and the subject matter being discussed.15 The court addressed the
concerns of those who feel that instructing the minority jurors to
reexamine their beliefs about the case, but not instructing the ma-
jority jurors to do the same, is unduly coercive. The court pointed
out that Rhode Island has long recommended "the use of a modi-
fied Allen charge that refrains from singling out the minority ju-
rors."16 However, the United States Supreme Court upheld the
validity of addressing minority jurors,1 7 and the court in this case
7. Id. at 938-48.
8. 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
9. The charge is controversial because the option of a hung jury is a long
standing tradition in American civil and criminal trials. The fear of the Allen
charge is that when a judge expresses disappointment (or worse), the jury is
unfairly coerced into reaching a verdict that is not representative of their
logical decision-making skills.
10. Kurczy, 820 A.2d at 948.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 949 (quoting State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1981)).
15. Id. (derived from Smith v. Campbell, 107 A.2d 338 (R.I. 1954)).
16. Id. at 950.
17. See Lowenfield v.Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988).
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points out that "the mere direction of a supplemental charge at
minority jurors is not, in itself coercion- provided that jurors are
still instructed to retain any firmly held convictions they may
have about the evidence." 8
COMMENTARY
Once deemed the high water mark,19 asking the minority ju-
rors to reexamine their views is now an appropriate element of the
Allen charge. In State v. Patriarca,20 the Court upheld an Allen
charge because the trial judge "made no reference whatever to the
minority but simply encouraged all jurors to make an effort to
reach unanimity."21 The Court determined that because the trial
judge did not single out the minority, he "exercised an abundance
of caution in advising the jurors not to abandon conscientiously
held views simply to accommodate others."22 In State v. Souza 23,
the Court upheld an Allen charge by finding that "it was not coer-
cive and that it did not contain any admonition to minority jurors
to give up their convictions in deference to the majority."24 In
Bookbinder v. Rotondo,25 the Court upheld an Allen charge that
addressed the minority jurors, but that charge merely asked that
"the minority, if there is a minority... listen to others, and to ex-
change views and arguments in an honest effort to come to a deci-
sion in this case."26 According to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,
that Allen charge did not urge the minority jurors to reexamine
their views.
Asking the minority jurors to reexamine their views is a con-
troversial element of the already controversial Allen charge if not
addressed to the majority jurors as well. The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court cites to an article in the Virginia Law Review, but
that article clearly states that "it seems clear that when the ma-
18. Kurczy, 820 A.2d at 951. See also Note, The Allen Charge: Recurring
Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1972).
19. See State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 322 (R.I. 1973); State v. Souza,
425 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1981).
20. State v. Patriarca, 308 A. 2d 300 (R.I. 1973).
21. Patriarca, 308 A.2d at 322.
22. Id.
23. 425 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1981).
24. Souza, 425 A.2d at 900.
25. 285 A.2d 387 (R.I. 1972).
26. Id. at 391.
2004]
892 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:771
jestic weight of the court is thrown behind an argument directed
primarily at minority jurors... there is created a situation
frought with potential coercion and prejudice."27 The controversy
lay in the "clear implication of the charge- that minority jurors
are responsible for the jury's inability to reach a unanimous ver-
dict."28 The Allen charge at issue in Kurczy exacerbated this coer-
cive effect by giving reference to the rarity of hung juries, when in
fact a jury is "at perfect liberty to hang."29 This appeal to the jury's
pride, however, has long been deemed proper in Rhode Island. The
question then, is what new potency do these "proper" Allen charge
phrases have now that they may be directed to the minority ju-
rors?
References to the costs and time of litigation, while proper,
are now falling on the shoulders of the minority jurors. This added
pressure adds to the coercion, but it may also seem suggestive of
the opinion of the judge. For example, by instructing the jury that
the costs of litigation mandate a verdict now, it is the logical con-
clusion of the jury members that the cost will fall on the shoulders
of the plaintiff. It could seem, then, that the judge is asking the
jury to find for the plaintiff now or force the plaintiff to re-try a
possibly valid claim. The same results from instructing the jury
that another jury will not be better suited to decide this case.
Referring to the issue as being "very simple," while proper,
now sends a message that the judge expected a decision quickly,
and clearly the minority has failed to see the simplicity of the is-
sue. If the majority of the jurors agree, then surely that is the
simple, "correct" answer that the judge expected.
In State v. Rodriguez, decided just one month after Kurczy,
the Court made reference to the fact that they had long criticized
"an Allen charge that simply urged the minority to consider the
opinion of the majority."30 However, in Rodriguez, the Court up-
held an Allen charge directed to one dissenting juror.31 This swift
27. Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexami-
nation of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REV. 123 (1967).
28. Note, The Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Develop-
ments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1972).
29. Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100, 133-34
(1968).
30. State v. Rodriguez, 822 A.2d 894, 900 (R.I. 2003).
31. Id. at 904.
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departure from a longstanding criticism has been given no expla-
nation.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has expanded its scope of
permissible Allen charges. They have done so consistent with the
United States Supreme Court, but inconsistent with several prior
Rhode Island decisions. The United States Supreme Court has set
the ceiling for permissible Allen charges, but Rhode Island has
long resisted against pushing the Allen charge to this extent. With
the decision in Kurczy, the Court has abruptly shifted the trial
practice in Rhode Island.
Kara M. Hoopis
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Trusts and Estates. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608 (R.I. 2003).
An internal partnership property transfer is subject to the statute
of frauds and must be committed to writing to be enforceable. Evi-
dence to support the substitution of the will of the dominant party
for the free will of the subservient party is necessary to show un-
due influence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Before divorcing in 1968, Paul and Elizabeth Filippi had three
children, Peter, Carolyn and Paula.' In 1973, Paul married
Marion and they also had three children. During his marriage to
Elizabeth, Paul wholly acquired Shoreham, Inc., a corporation
that owned all of the physical assets of Ballards Inn and Restau-
rant (Ballards) on Block Island.2 During the last twelve years of
his life, Paul executed fifteen documents relating to his estate. 3
Peter, Carolyn, and Paula formed a limited partnership and
bought a property known as Ocean View, upon which Ballards
partially encroached. 4 Peter, Carolyn and Paula allege that they
discussed the fate of Ocean View with their father, and he orally
agreed to accept the conveyance of Ocean View to his real estate
corporation, Block Island Realty, pay the outstanding mortgage on
the property, and retain the portion of land upon which Ballards
encroached. Peter, Carolyn and Paula agreed to reimburse their
father for expenses associated with the sale or development of
Ocean View and would equally divide the net proceeds of the sale
of Ocean View between them.5
In 1986, Ballards was destroyed by fire.6 Paul, Marion, Peter,
Carolyn, Paula and other family members decided to sell Ocean
View to rebuild Ballards, as the restaurant was uninsured.7 In
September of that year, Paul sold two small parcels of Ocean
View, receiving cash and promissory notes.8 In December, Paul
sold the remaining Ocean View property to developers for cash
1. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 612 (R.I. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 613.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 614.
8. Id.
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and a promissory note.9 After the Ocean View sales, Paul liqui-
dated Block Island Realty and personally became the holder of the
notes. 10 To obtain cash to rebuild Ballards, Paul agreed to subor-
dinate his priority position on the Ocean View mortgage so that
the developers to whom he sold Ocean View could sell the property
to a third party, and in return he received a portion of the mort-
gage in cash, along with other payoffs, and an easement on the
property on which Ballards encroaches."
In April of 1993, Peter, Carolyn and Paula (plaintiffs) brought
an action against Marion (defendant) as executrix of the estate for
breach of contract with Paula when Paul failed to leave Ballards
Inn and Restaurant on Block Island to her upon his death, and
against Citizen's Trust Company (defendant), the institutional
trustee, alleging that a trust amendment, substantially decreasing
the amount to the plaintiffs, was a product of undue influence ex-
erted by Marion shortly before Paul's death. 12 In 1999, on plain-
tiffs motion, the actions were consolidated. 13
The trial justice denied Marion's motions in limine to exclude
evidence of the oral agreement relating to Ocean View 14 and the
alleged agreement between Paul and Paula to leave Ballards to
her upon his death if she worked for him. 15 The jury trial began in
June 2000.16
At the close of plaintiffs case, at the close of all the evidence,
and after the verdict, the defendants moved for judgment as a
matter of law. 17 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs.
However, the trial justice then determined that the undue influ-
ence claim was equitable in nature and the jury verdict was
merely advisory.' 8
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 615.
13. Id.
14. The evidence of the Ocean View transaction included only a Purchase
and Sale Agreement between the partnership and Block Island Realty and
the resulting deed, naming Block Island Realty as the sole owner of Ocean
View; neither document referenced the alleged oral agreement between the
four. Id. at 616.
15. Id. at 615.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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In December, defendants renewed their motion for judgment
as a matter of law and filed a motion for a new trial concerning li-
ability.19 Both were denied, but a new trial was granted on the is-
sue of damages unless the plaintiffs accepted a remittitur
reducing the jury's award.20 Plaintiffs accepted the remittitur and
judgments in December, and in January, 2001, plaintiffs and de-
fendant both appealed. 21
The trial justice issued his written decision on the undue in-
fluence claim in February, finding, contrary to the jury verdict, in
favor of the defendants. 22 He determined plaintiffs to be biased,
noted their failure to present any unbiased, corroborating wit-
nesses and their lack of any evidence that Marion was able to
override Paul's wishes unless Paul wanted to let her.23 The trial
justice did not lightly disregard the jury verdict, but found it did
not deserve deference because it probably resulted from the jury's
frustration with Paul's near constant amendments to the agree-
ments and Marion's impeachment at trial.24 The trial justice de-
termined that the verdict would not stand a motion for new trial,
and concluded that the jury disregarded his instruction that "[i]t
is not undue influence if Paul was influenced only by his affection
and love for Marion and his three younger children."25 The cases
were consolidated on appeal. 26
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Because Marion acknowledged the existence of the oral
agreement, the only outstanding issues were the trial justice's de-
termination of whether the Ocean View agreement between plain-
tiffs and Paul was a partnership or joint venture agreement and
his ruling that the agreement was not subject to the parol evi-
dence rule.27 Since the Ocean View agreement between Paul and
the plaintiffs was for two or more persons to carry on a business
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 616.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 612.
27. Id. at 617.
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for profit, it was a partnership. 28 The transaction in question in-
volved a transfer of land between the plaintiffs partnership and
Paul or Block Island Realty, and was a transfer of land between
partners. 29 Under the Moran30 rule, the statute of frauds applies
to this partnership agreement.
The oral agreement between Paul and plaintiffs described a
term that was within the statute of frauds: the Ocean View trans-
fer. As such, under Kinden, the remaining terms of the agreement
become subject to the statute of frauds and must be in writing to
be enforceable. 31 The trial justice incorrectly applied Moran, ignor-
ing the "internal partnership property transfer" exception and
finding that the agreement was not subject to the statute of
frauds. 32 Under Kinden, all terms of the agreement would be sub-
ject to the statute of frauds when at least one term is within the
statute of frauds. 33 The Ocean View purchase and sale agreement,
signed by Peter and Paul, contained no reference to the previous
oral agreement and explicitly stated that it was an integrated
agreement subject to no other understandings, conditions or rep-
resentations.3 4 Likewise, the deed indicated Block Island Realty as
the only owner.35 No agreement subsequent to the purchase and
sales agreement provided the terms of a contract indicating that
Paul agreed to share the proceeds with the plaintiffs as part of a
business venture.36 "The power of the written word must remain
28. Id. at 618.
29. Id.
30. Moran v. McDevitt, 83 A. 1013, 1013, 1015 (R.I. 1912) (finding that a
transfer of property between partners must be committed to writing to be en-
forceable, but that agreements of co-partnership can be proven by parol evi-
dence and are not in violation of the statute of frauds if the agreement does
not contemplate a transfer of land between the parties or create any interest
or estate therein or affect the title of the land between the parties in any way,
but is concerned rather with the profits and losses to be derived from the sale
of the land).
31. Kinden v. Foster, 197 A. 100, 102 (R.I. 1938) (concluding that when a
promise is entire and indivisible even terms that may not in themselves be
within the statute of frauds are subject to the statute of frauds and must be
in writing to be enforceable).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
2004]
898 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:771
paramount."37 The trial justice erred by not excluding evidence of
the oral agreement under the parol evidence rule.38
Determining whether undue influence has been exerted is a
fact-intensive inquiry.3 9 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has
previously defined undue influence as "the substitution of the will
of the dominant party for the free will and choice of the subservi-
ent party."40 The trial justice examined the totality of circum-
stances: the relationship between the parties, Paul's physical and
mental condition, the opportunity and disposition of Marion to ex-
ert her influence, and Paul's acts and declarations. 41 The court de-
termined that Marion did not exert undue influence over Paul,
finding no evidence that Marion substituted her will for Paul's
free will. 42
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in Filippi v. Filippi, reaf-
firmed its earlier holdings of Moran and Kinden. Moran estab-
lished an explicit exception to the rule that otherwise permits an
agreement between co-partners that does not contemplate a trans-
fer of land between the parties, or create any interest or estate
therein, or affect the title of land between the parties in any way,
but is rather concerned with the division of profits and losses that
may be derived from the sale of land purchased for partnership
purposes, to be established and enforceable by oral testimony
alone.43 Under Moran, an agreement to transfer property between
partners must be in writing to be enforceable." The Kinden rule -
that an agreement that is entire and indivisible is within the stat-
ute of frauds and must be in writing to be enforceable as long as
one of the promises made in the agreement is within the terms of
the statute - survives and is inapplicable in Filippi since the part-
nership agreement involved an "internal partnership property
transfer".45
37. Id. at 622.
38. Id. at 621.
39. Id. at 630 (relying on Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 438 (R.I.
2001)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Moran, 83 A. at 1015-16.
44. Id.
45. Kinden, 197 A. at 102.
SURVEY SECTION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court also reaffirmed its position
that it will not adopt a per se rule to establish what is or is not
undue influence, and will continue to use a totality of the circum-
stances approach. 46 A preponderance of the evidence must show
that the will of the dominant party has been substituted for the
free will of the testator for undue influence to be established.47
"Mere suspicion, surmise or conjecture" that undue influence has
been exercised is not sufficient to support a claim or defense of
undue influence. 48 The effect of undue influence is upon the mind
of the testator: undue influence "overcomes the free and unre-
strained will of the testator," so that the testator is not acting as a
"free agent" but rather is under the control of another.49 Absent a
showing that the testator's desires have been supplanted by the
desires of the dominant party, a claim or defense of undue influ-
ence is unsupportable.
CONCLUSION
A transfer of property from one partner to another, i.e., an
"internal partnership property transfer", is subject to the statute
of frauds, and an agreement to share in the profits and losses de-
rived from the sale of land between partners must be committed to
writing to be enforceable. Parol or extrinsic evidence is not admis-
sible to vary, alter or contradict a complete written agreement.
A wife does not exert undue influence on her husband merely
because he amends testamentary documents to provide for her
and their children. Proof of the mere exercise of familial influence
does not alone make a claim of undue influence supportable. Evi-
dence to support the substitution of the will of the dominant party
46. See id. To determine what constitutes undue influence, the totality of
circumstances must be examined. Id; see also Tinney, 770 A.2d at 438. The
trial justice must weigh many factors to assess a claim or defense of undue
influence. Id; see also Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321 (R.I. 1998). The to-
tality of the circumstances approach produces a "better reasoned analysis."
Id. at 1326.
47. Id. at 1324 (citing Murphy v. O'Neill, 454 A.2d 248, 250 (R.I. 1983)).
48. Popko v. Janik, 167 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Mass. 1960).
49. Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Solicitation Of Testator To Make A Will
Or Specified Bequest As Undue Influence, 48 A.L.R. 3d 961 § 2 (1973).
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for the free will of the subservient party is necessary to show un-
due influence.
Christine M. O'Reilly-Stewart
SURVEY SECTION
2003 PUBLIC LAWS OF NOTE
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 83. An Act Relating to Health and
Safety-Birth Defects Surveillance System. Establishes a birth de-
fects surveillance system intended to improve early recognition
and response to birth defects while maintaining confidentiality of
the affected child's individually identifiable information at the re-
quest of the parent/guardian. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-13.3-1.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 83. An Act Relating to Education-
Certification of Athletic Coaches. Requires all coaches in athletic
programs in any school supported by public money to provide an-
nual proof of approved first aid training successfully completed
within three years from the date of application for certification.
Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-11.1-1.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 88. An Act Relating to Motor Vehicle Of-
fenses. Strengthens the penalties for first time offenders driving
under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances by increas-
ing the maximum allowable fine, license suspension period and
public community restitution hours, and by providing for impris-
onment. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 98. An Act Relating to Businesses and
Professions-Telephone Sales. Includes text messaging to cellular
telephones or pagers in the prohibition against initiating tele-
phonic communication by a salesperson or telephonic seller unless
procedures have been instituted for maintaining a do-not-call list.
Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-61-3.5.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 107. An Act Relating to Health and
Safety-Fire Safety Code. Amends Title 23 of the General Laws
(Health and Safety) to include The Comprehensive Fire Safety Act
of 2003 intended to improve fire safety throughout the state.
Amends R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 23-28.1 to -28.3, 23-28.6, 23-28.11
and 23-28.25.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 129. An Act Relating to Privileges and
Immunities of Militiamen. Amends the State Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act by including national guard members serving in
active duty, entitling them to the same rights and privileges as
other members of the military. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 30-7-10.
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2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 147. An Act Relating to Health Care-
Home and Community Care Services to the Elderly. Updates the
current laws surrounding care services for the elderly by adding
such definitions as "Adult day services programs," "Long-term
care ombudsperson," "Respite care services," and "Assisted living
residences." It also changes the makeup of the home and commu-
nity care advisory committee. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-66.3-
1, 42-66.3-4, 44-66.3-5, and 44-66.3-8.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 153. An Act Relating to Industrial Leg-
islation. Repeals the Industrial Registration program, which
sought to remove all unsafe and unhealthy conditions from the
workplace. Repeals R.I. Gen. Laws ch. 28-19.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 162. An Act Relating to Criminal Of
fense-Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification.
Amends the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notifi-
cation Act concerning board review and community notification
procedures, increases the review board panel by one and changes
the role of the court in registering an offender. Amends R.I. Gen.
Laws §§ 11-37.1-2, 11-37.1-4 to -6, 11-37.1-8 to -10, 11-37.1-
12, 11-37.1-13, 11-37.1-15, 11-37.1-16.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 204. An Act Relating to Education-
Health and Safety of Pupils. Establishes a requirement that all
school districts adopt a policy prohibiting harassment, intimida-
tion or bullying at school. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-21-26.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 322. An Act Relating to Domestic Rela-
tions-Child Custody. Repeals the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act and in its place enacts the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Repeals R.I. Gen Laws §§ 15-
14-1 to -26 and codifies the new act as R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-
14.1-1 to -42.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 328. An Act Relating to Health and
Safety-Mercury Reduction and Education Act. Amends the Act to
delay implementation of controls on the sale, disposal and collec-
tion of mercury-filled products from January 1, 2004 until July 1,
2005, and creates a fourteen member commission to oversee and
plan for mercury hazard reduction and elimination. Amends R.I.
Gen. Laws §§ 23-24.9-6 to -11, 23-24.9-16 and 23-24.9-19; cre-
ates § 23-24.9-2.1.
SURVEY SECTION
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 348. An Act Relating to Divorce and
Separation-Child Support. Strengthens the role of the guardian
ad litem in a divorce proceeding. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-5-
16.2.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 369. An Act Relating to Criminals-
Correctional Institutions-Parole. Establishes procedures for a
preliminary parole hearing violation to ensure due process for the
alleged parole violator and stipulates these procedures are to be
used in the event of a revocation of parole and the return of a pa-
rolee to a correctional institution. Amends R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 13-
8-18 and 13-8-19; creates § 13-8-18.1.
2003 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 378. An Act Relating to Child Protec-
tion-Amber Alert. Implements the "Amber Alert" abducted child
emergency public alert program in Rhode Island, assigning re-
sponsibility to the state police. Creates R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-28-
3.1 and 42-28-3.2.
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